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RÉSUMÉ 
En s'inspirant de la littérature récente qui a dépeint l'ambivalence comme étant adaptative et 
en lien avec des comportements stratégiques, cette thèse examine le versant utile des attitudes 
ambivalentes. Elle met tout d'abord en évidence que son expression peut-être sciemment 
contrôlée et mise en avant pour des raisons d'auto-présentation. De plus, elle démontre que les 
individus peuvent présenter une attitude ambivalente afin de gagner l'approbation sociale sur 
un objet d'attitude controversé alors que l'inverse a été observé sur des objets consensuels 
(Première ligne de recherche). Cette thèse a également révélé que l’expression d’attitudes 
ambivalentes pouvait amener à être valorisé socialement. En effet, contrairement à des 
attitudes plus tranchées (pro-normatives ou contre-normatives), les attitudes ambivalentes ont 
été évaluées de façon plus importante sur la dimension de l'utilité sociale (une dimension qui 
indique la compétence d'autrui ou encore la propension à évoluer dans la hiérarchie sociale). 
La valorisation de l'ambivalence n'est apparue que sur la dimension de l'utilité sociale et non 
sur la dimension de la désirabilité sociale (une dimension qui indique la sympathie d'autrui 
ainsi que la propension à être apprécié socialement). De plus, ce résultat a été observé sur des 
thèmes controversés et non sur des thèmes consensuels (Seconde ligne de recherche). Dans 
l'ensemble cette thèse soutient une approche de l'ambivalence comme donnant lieu à des 
bénéfices. Elle peut également ouvrir la voie à l'étude de l'ambivalence en lien avec la pensée 
critique. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing on the recent literature that portrayed ambivalence as being adaptive and linked with 
strategic behaviors, this thesis examines the useful side of ambivalent attitudes. It first 
revealed that the expression of ambivalent attitudes could be controlled and purposely 
displayed for self-presentational concerns. Furthermore, it demonstrated that people could put 
ambivalence forward to gain social approval when expressing it on controversial social issues, 
whereas the opposite was true on consensual social issues (First line of research). The thesis 
also revealed that the expression of ambivalent attitudes could lead to be socially valued. 
Indeed, contrary to clear-cut attitudes (either pro-normative or counter-normative attitudes), 
ambivalent attitudes have been evaluated the highest on the social utility dimension (a 
dimension indicating people's competence as well as the extent to which they are likely to 
climb in social hierarchy). The valorization of ambivalent attitudes only appeared on social 
utility and not on social desirability (a dimension indicating people's niceness as well as the 
extent to which they are likely to be socially appreciated). This effect was true on 
controversial social issues but not on consensual ones (Second line of research). Overall, this 
thesis provides support for an approach that conceives attitudinal ambivalence as leading to 
benefits. It also may open avenues for the study of ambivalence in relation with critical 
thinking. 
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1. OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1- Overview 
   2
"The presence in moral codes, proverb sets, and motivational systems of opposing values is often interpreted as 
discrediting the value system by showing its logical inconsistency. This is a misapplication of logic, and in 
multiple-contingency environments, the joint presence of opposing tendencies has a functional survival value. 
Where each of two opposing tendencies has survival relevance, the biological solution seems to be an 
ambivalent alternation of expressions of each rather than the consistent expression of an intermediate 
motivational state. Ambivalence, rather than averaging, seems the optimal compromise".  
 
      Campbell, 1965 (cited in Weick, 2004, p.661) 
 
Attitudes were conceived of as bipolar constructs from the inception of their 
systematic investigation in Social Psychology (see Thurstone, 1928; Likert, 1932, Osgood, 
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957 for example). The concept of attitude refers to an evaluation of a 
stimulus (an object, or a person for instance) with some degree of positivity or negativity 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Olson & Fazio, 2009); in this respect, an attitude can only be 
considered as indicating if an individual tends to like or dislike an attitude object. However, it 
appears that, depending on the attitude object, our evaluations can sometimes be not so clear-
cut. It seems quite easy to imagine that people can have troubles to make up their mind when 
being asked to state if death penalty is a good or a bad thing for instance. In this dissertation, 
we will focus on such type of attitudes, namely on attitudinal ambivalence. Ambivalence is 
characterized by holding simultaneously both a positive and a negative attitude toward an 
attitude object (Scott, 1968; Kaplan, 1972; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). As we will 
see in the theoretical part, because of its duality, ambivalence has mostly been considered as 
either being linked with indecision (if people cannot pick a side, then they should most likely 
not know enough about the issue), or with discomfort (if people hold both a positive and a 
negative attitude, then they must feel conflicted). Consequently, this type of attitude has 
mainly been discussed in negative terms in the literature in Social Psychology. However, 
ambivalence has been differently portrayed in other domains (such as Management or in 
Psychology of Organizations for instance). In such domains, ambivalence has been conceived 
of as a compromise between knowledge and doubts (Weick, 1998) that can allow adaptation 
in a fast environment (Weick; 2002, 2004). Ambivalence has also been discussed as 
enhancing mindfulness and thus potentially leading to wiser decisions (Piderit, 2000; Fiol & 
O’Connor, 2003; Plambeck & Weber, 2010). In this dissertation, we propose an approach in 
which ambivalence has been considered as having some value, and as being potentially 
useful.  
 The basis of the reasoning has been rooted on the fact that several studies in the field 
of social influence and attitude strength considered ambivalence as a weak form of attitude 
(Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Conner & Sparks, 2002). Its weakness has been questioned through 
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several factors: its link with behavior, its stability across time and its resistance toward 
influence. For instance, ambivalence was repeatedly found to be a poor predictor of intentions 
or further behaviors (see Armitage & Conner, 2004 for a review). Ambivalent individuals 
appeared to be less confident in their attitude or political judgments (Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 
1995; Jonas, Diehl, & Bröemer, 1997; Meffert, Guge, & Lodge, 2004). They also were 
reported as suffering more in decision-making situations. For instance, they tended to 
fluctuate more importantly in their evaluations (Lavine, 2001), to take more time to choose 
their political candidate (Mutz, 2002) whereas this was less the case for univalent individuals. 
Ambivalence has also been described as leading to less stable attitudes over time (Bargh, 
Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Jonas, Brömer, & Diehl, 2000a; but see Jonas, Brömer & 
Diehl, 2000b). Furthermore, ambivalent individuals appeared to be easily influenced by others 
(Zemborain & Johar, 2007) or even by internal factors (their mood for instance; see Bell & 
Esses, 1997). Being submitted to univalent attitude expressions, ambivalent individuals sided 
with univalent individuals and endorsed their point of view as a result (Armitage & Conner, 
2000; Hodson, Maio & Esses, 2001).  
However, the pliability of ambivalent attitudes has been questioned and nuanced by 
Cavazza & Butera (2008). These researchers reported in line with previous studies that 
ambivalent individuals changed their attitude when they were in a situation of influence but, 
of importance, such fluctuation appeared only when ambivalent individuals were directly 
confronted with the source of influence. In other terms, they mirrored the attitudes of the 
source of influence but, unlike univalent individuals, this was only done at a direct level 
(where the source of influence was more salient). They indeed maintained their attitude at the 
indirect level (where the source of influence was less salient). Ambivalent individuals were 
thus no longer considered as undecided individuals waiting for someone to help them picking 
a side (see Hodson et al., 2001 for this kind of reasoning), but rather as individuals who could 
adapt to a source of influence, as their shift was only superficial.  
Our first set of studies focused especially on this aspect. We investigated if individuals 
could indeed adapt their level of ambivalence to normative pressures and hypothesized that 
such adaptation would be done strategically. More precisely, we predicted that ambivalence 
could be used for self-presentational purposes and expected individuals to display more or 
less ambivalence as a function of the normative pressures of the environment. We also aimed 
at highlighting one of the mechanisms possibly responsible for this effect. We proposed to 
view ambivalence as indicating that one is pondering the pros and the cons of an issue when 
expressing this form of attitude. Consequently, we hypothesized that people should decide to 
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display ambivalence in order to gain social approval when they are expressing their position 
on a controversial attitude object. We expected to observe the reverse on more consensual 
attitude objects. Indeed, on such attitude objects, there is a strong consensus on what the 
expressed response should be (Pérez & Mugny, 1996) and thus, ambivalent attitudes could no 
longer be put forward to appear positively in the eyes of others.  
 The second set of studies questioned the perception of ambivalent individuals. Indeed, 
hypothesizing that attitudinal ambivalence could be strategically displayed and used on 
controversial issues in order to form a positive image of oneself implies that ambivalent 
attitudes could indeed be valued by an observer. Thus, we decided to investigate if the 
strategy of displaying attitudinal ambivalence to gain social approval is efficient or not. With 
this in mind, we set out to study the perception of ambivalence and rapidly noticed that the 
relevant findings in the literature were as quite paradoxical. On the one hand, ambivalence has 
been mainly presented negatively. For instance, it has often been described as an 
inconsistency, whereas cognitive consistency has repeatedly been described as a valued 
component. Indeed, two lines of research reported that consistency could be preferred to 
inconsistency. Cialdini, Trost and Newsom (1995) demonstrated that, even if some 
individuals could endorse it more strongly than the others, on average people tend to value 
consistency. Moreover, Channouf and Mangard (1997) reported that consistency is socially 
valued in that it could give a positive image when people display consistency in front in an 
audience. On the other hand, ambivalence has been tied up with strategic behavior (Cavazza 
& Butera, 2008; Plambeck & Weber, 2010) and critical thinking (Piderit, 2000; Stoeckel, 
2013).  
As in our first research line, we viewed ambivalence has indicating that people are 
pondering the pros and the cons of an issue when they display such a form of attitude. Thus, 
we reasoned that ambivalent individuals could be perceived as being competent on the topic. 
It has been widely reported that two fundamental dimensions organize the social judgment of 
individuals (see Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2010 for a recent review). We consequently 
hypothesized that ambivalent individuals should be evaluated more positively on social utility 
(a dimension indicating people’s competence as well as the extent to which people will be 
likely to climb in social hierarchy; Beauvois & Dubois, 2009) than univalent individuals. We 
also hypothesized that the pro-normative attitudes should be preferred over ambivalent 
attitudes on the dimension of social desirability (a dimension indicating people’s sympathy as 
well as the extent to which people will be likely to be appreciated socially; Beauvois & 
Dubois, 2009). However, it is important to note that this should only be the case on 
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controversial attitude objects. Indeed, in this case, the expression of ambivalence could be 
recognized as indicating a deep reflection of the issue and thus be valued on complex issues 
such as controversial ones.  
A different dynamic was expected on consensual attitude objects. Consensuses imply 
that most people agree on what to think of the attitude object and, notably, in perceiving it 
positively or negatively. For instance, it has been reported that people tend to think that others 
think as they do (e.g. the false consensus effect; see Krueger, 1998 for a review) as well as 
that people value individuals who hold similar attitudes as theirs (see Ullrich & Krueger, 2010 
for instance). Thus, people should prefer pro-normative attitudes to ambivalent ones on 
consensual issues. Consequently, we hypothesized that we should observe linear effects on 
both dimensions (social utility and social desirability) for consensual attitude objects. More 
precisely, we predicted that the pro-normative attitude should be rated the highest on social 
utility and social desirability, than should be ambivalent attitudes (as they are a bit deviant) 
and, finally, counter-normative attitudes (as they are the most deviant attitudes).  
 
Structure of the dissertation 
The theoretical part of the dissertation consists of 3 parts where we first introduce the 
concept of attitudes and of attitudinal ambivalence and discuss about its measurement. In the 
second part, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of ambivalence and address what their 
function could be. We conclude the theoretical part by discussing the perception of 
ambivalent attitudes, presenting the paradigm that allows the study of social norms and end 
the section by presenting the objectives of the thesis. 
Two empirical parts present the data testing our hypotheses. We present eight 
experiments, organized in two lines of research and using two experimental paradigms. The 
first line of research focuses on the strategic function of ambivalent attitudes. The second line 
of research focused on the perception of people expressing ambivalent attitudes.  
In the final part of the dissertation, we first summarize the results and discuss their 
relative contribution to the literature of attitudinal ambivalence. We then discuss the limits 
and conclude by outlining the implications of this doctoral work. 
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 1. Attitudes and ambivalence 
In our everyday lives, without even noticing it, we are confronted with the expression 
of attitudes: media constantly run and publish opinion polls or interviews; adverts or 
information campaign are set to affect our attitudes (to change them or reinforce them when 
they are already in line with the targeted attitude object), and to further affect our behaviors 
(buying behaviors or voting intentions for instance). Also, our conversations often involve 
likes and dislikes or justifications of decisions we made.  
The concept of attitudes has always been considered central to Social Psychology 
(McGuire, 1985); for instance, Thomas and Znaniecki defined Social Psychology as "the 
study of attitudes" (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918; cited in Fazio & Olson, 2003b) and Allport 
(1954) considered attitudes as "probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in 
contemporary American social psychology" (p. 43). Research on attitudes has become really 
influential across time (more than 180 000 articles on attitudes were referenced on PsycINFO 
in 2005 for instance, see Albarracìn, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005). Before going into details and 
speak about attitudinal ambivalence, we will briefly summarize the major steps of the 
research on attitudes, whose history began in the 30's with Thurstone (1928) and Likert 
(1932).  
 
1.1 A short historical introduction to research on attitudes 
 Researchers were seeking for a way to assess individuals' attitude when Thurstone 
devised the first attitude measure. Measures of attitudes were necessary for political reasons 
(e.g. how a political candidate is likely to be perceived by the population? For which 
candidate are they more likely to vote for?), as well as for the anticipation of economic 
behaviors (e.g. how likely an individual is to buy a certain sort of car). In his famous article 
"Attitudes can be measured" in 1928, Thurstone considered attitudes as the "the sum total of a 
man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, 
and convictions about any specified topic" (p. 529) and proposed to assess attitudes using 
several dimensions associated with an attitude object. He illustrated this idea by developing 
further on the same page that "a man's attitude about pacifism means here all that he feels and 
thinks about peace and war". This method first required individuals to write out their opinions 
on the issue in question to make a list of statements. The list was further edited to range from 
a hundred to a hundred and fifty statements and, after a second editing, from eighty to a 
hundred. These were then classified into eleven piles; a scale value was assigned to each pile 
to further generate a scale from 1 to 11. Finally, after the exclusion of irrelevant and 
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ambiguous criteria, twenty to thirty statements were kept in the scale used for the attitude 
assessment. Individuals were then asked to report a minus if they disagree with a statement 
and a plus if they agree with it. Their attitude was obtained by averaging the value of all the 
statements they endorsed.  
However, this measure was rapidly criticized. Indeed, because of the required 
numerous steps, scholars considered it as tedious, complex and time consuming (Likert, 1932; 
Likert, Roslow, & Murphy, 1934). To cope with this, Likert devised another type of scale 
(now commonly known as the "Likert scales"). The original one was a 5-point scale. As in 
Thurstone's scale, participants had to put either a plus (+) if they agreed with a statement or a 
minus (-) if they disagreed with a statement. The signs were circled in case of a strong 
agreement or disagreement. The fifth point was a question mark (?). Participants circled it to 
either indicate that they "neither disagreed nor agreed" with the statement to evaluate (Likert, 
1932) or to report their indecision (Likert et al., 1934). For convenience, the signs were 
arbitrarily changed to numbers, thus constituting a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The score on all the statements were averaged, and the mean constituted the 
individuals' attitude.  
The development of these scales made the first national opinion polls possible: George 
Gallup ran the first "Gallup poll" in 1934 to assess voting intentions for the American 
presidential elections (a poll that revealed the preference of the voters for Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt). Numerous scales were further proposed and directed towards different attitude 
objects (attitude toward feminism by Kirkpatrick, 1936, or children's attitude toward their 
parents by Stagner & Drought, 1935 for instance). It also led to the first studies that aimed at 
predicting a further behavior. LaPiere (1934) ran his well-known experiment about the 
attitudes of the owners of hotels and restaurants towards Chinese people and their further 
observed welcoming behavior of a couple of Chinese customers. Corey (1937) assessed 
pupils' attitude towards cheating and observed their behavior by making them correcting their 
own tests themselves. Both studies concluded that attitudes did not accurately predict 
behaviors. Indeed, LaPiere observed that owners declared that they would not accept any 
Chinese customers (to the amazingly high rejection rate of 91% of restaurants owners and 
92% of hotels owners) whereas only one (out of 251) did indeed refuse to serve the Chinese 
couple when they were physically present. Corey observed that the only thing that predicted 
cheating was the amount of preparation for the exam or, in other terms, the less students were 
prepared for the exam and the more likely they would cheat. Attitudes did not reliably yield to 
further behaviors.  
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Despite the raise of numerous studies on attitudes, its measurement was again 
questioned for three reasons. First, Allport (1935) criticized the simplification of the attitude 
concept in its assessment. The original definition of Thurstone (1928) considered attitude as 
being multi-dimensional whereas Likert scales only assessed one dimension. Corey (1937) 
raised a similar point. As he was discussing the absence of relationship between attitudes 
toward cheating and the fact of cheating, he recognized that the available scales were quite 
easy to use but was concerned about the fact that they could be almost too neat. Corey indeed 
questioned the implications of such type of studies if they fail to observe the expected 
relationship between attitudes and behaviors. Consequently, scholars began to implement 
several components in the attitude measurement. An illustration of this can be found in Smith 
(1947), where he assessed both the cognitive component (i.e. what an individual thinks about 
an attitude object) and the affective component (i.e. how an individual feels about an attitude 
object) associated with an attitude object to better capture the attitude towards complex topics. 
Such approach was further taken up in the well-known "tripartite model of attitudes" 
(Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960), also labeled as the "multicomponent model of attitudes" 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This model includes the cognitive and the affective component 
associated with an attitude object, as well as a conative component (i.e. an intention). A study 
of Breckler (1984) ran on participants in front of a snake nicely illustrated the difference 
between these three components. The affective component was assessed both verbally (via 
checklist measures of mood, both positive and negative) and non-verbally (by recording the 
heart rate); an item that assessed the conative component consisted for instance of asking the 
distance to which the participant would be willing to approach the snake. The cognitive 
component was obtained by filling items such as ratings of snakes for instance. Breckler 
(1984) observed that the tripartite model of attitudes was more satisfactory than a single 
component model of attitudes and furthermore, he found that the three attitude components 
were only moderately correlated (.38 < r < .71).  
Second, Likert scales required individuals to evaluate specific statements to report 
their attitude toward an attitude object ("I think euthanasia should be made legal", for 
instance). A consequence of this method is that, due to the specific wording of the statements, 
it does not allow to compare attitudes across different attitude objects. Indeed, a score of 3.6 
toward euthanasia does not necessarily indicate that people hold a less positive attitude than 
when they obtain a score of 4.2 toward another attitude object (Maio & Haddock, 2010). It 
was consequently necessary to use a more neutral material, a material that would remain 
constant for all attitude objects and that would therefore allow the comparison of attitudes as a 
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function of the attitude object. Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) proposed to use the 
"semantic differential" measure for this purpose. Such measure displays a set of bipolar 
adjectives among a continuum (bad-good or cold-warm for instance). The answers on each set 
are then averaged; the mean represents the individual's attitude. However, even if Osgood's 
measure has been widely used in social sciences, this method did not offer a solution for the 
third problem associated with the available attitude measures of the 60's: the mid-point of 
attitude measures.  
 
1.2 The mid-point of the attitude measures: introducing the concept of 
attitudinal ambivalence.  
 
"Public opinions are infused with conflicting beliefs and feelings, in other words,  
political opinions are frequently ambivalent” (Basinger & Lavine, 2005, p. 171).  
 
 Scholars noticed quite rapidly that the meaning of the mid-point of the scales was 
ambiguous. For instance, this zone was considered as sometimes indicating indifference, 
sometimes neutrality (Thurstone, 1928; Thurstone & Chave, 1929) and sometimes indecision 
(Likert, 1932; Likert et al., 1935). The first to directly raise this point was Edwards (1946). 
Edwards reported that three meanings could be associated with this central point: neutrality, 
indifference and ambivalence. In fact, it seems to capture indifference, uncertainty and 
ambivalence (Klopfer & Madden, 1980; Martinez, Craig, & Kane, 2005). Indifference refers 
to the fact that an individual does neither hold a positive attitude nor a negative attitude. 
Uncertainty refers to an individual who cannot hold a reliable attitude due to a lack of 
knowledge towards the attitude object. Attitudinal ambivalence refers to "the extent to which 
one's reactions to an attitude object are evaluatively mixed in that both positive (favorable) 
and negative (unfavorable) elements are included" (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 
1995, p. 460) and implies the "simultaneous existence of positive and negative evaluations of 
an attitude object" (Conner & Sparks, 2002, p. 39). Klopfer and Madden (1980), who directly 
investigated the polysemy of the meaning in the mid-point answer, observed that the central 
point was used to report ambivalence most of the time.  
Thus, individuals usually circle the mid-point answer because they cannot report that 
they both possess a positive attitude and a negative attitude towards a same attitude object. 
Indeed, all the devised attitude scales (e.g. Likert's, Thurstone's and Osgood's) are bipolar and 
consequently opposing positive poles to negative poles along a continuum. On such scales, 
2- Theoretical Part 
   11
ambivalence can only be reported through the use of the central point of the scale. This 
reasoning can be found in Scott (1968) where, speaking about how the neutrality of the 
attitudes was apprehended, he wondered: "Are they midway between positive and negative 
attitudes? Should they be subdivided into indifferent and ambivalent attitudes? (...) The 
conception of favorable and unfavorable as "opposites" implies that persons will not be found 
with attitudes simultaneously at both ends of the dimension. (...) it is only by convention that 
the direction of an attitude is conceptualized as a single bipolar attribute" (Scott, 1968, pp. 
206).  
Kaplan (1972) took up this reasoning when he devised the single-adjective scales 
(more commonly called "split semantic differential scales", see Conner & Sparks, 2002 for 
instance). He proposed to use two single-adjective scales instead of a bipolar continuum. 
These scales are obtained by splitting the Osgood's differential scales at the neutral point. 
Hence, this method requires individuals to evaluate how positive their evaluation of an 
attitude object is from 0 (not at all positive) to 3 (extremely positive) while ignoring its 
associated negative aspects. They are then asked to do the same with the negativity with a 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all negative) to 3 (extremely negative), ignoring the associated 
positive aspects. The separation of the poles allows the report of four different attitudes. It 
first allows the report of univalent positive attitudes. Individuals can for instance circle one 
(or above) on the positive scale and zero on the negative scale. It also allows the report of 
univalent negative attitudes as individuals can conversely circle one (or above) on the 
negative scale and zero on the positive scale. Indifference (neutral attitudes) can be reported 
by circling zero on both scales. Finally, by circling one (or above) on both scales, one can 
report an ambivalent attitude.  
This method inspired a few researches that aimed at validating the occurrence of 
ambivalence toward different attitude objects. For instance, Costello, Rice, and Schoenfeld 
(1974) focused on alcohol and asked their alcoholic respondents to fill split-differential scales 
that questioned either a slide that presented a drinking scene or a neutral scene (e.g. a pastoral 
scene). Hence, their participants indicated the extent to which they evaluated the scene as 
being appetizing or repulsive or as being good or bad for instance. Participants displayed 
more ambivalence when responding to slides that presented a drinking content in comparison 
to the pastoral one. The presentation of a drinking scene thus yielded ambivalence. Gutman 
and McConaughy (1978) were concerned about the attitude toward television programs (such 
as toward the "little house in the prairie" for instance). They asked their participants to fill two 
split-differential scales and computed the "net affect" (i.e. the sum of the positive attitude; 
2- Theoretical Part 
   12
coded from 0 to +3; with the negative attitude; coded from -3 to 0) as well as their 
ambivalence (computed as the total affect minus the polarization; that is the absolute value of 
the sum). They observed that about 42% of the sample displayed some amount of 
ambivalence. Furthermore, they reported that, contrarily with what people would have 
concluded before Kaplan, 92% of the participants who had a net affect equal to zero were 
ambivalent and not indifferent. Thus, this research supports the fact that indifference and 
ambivalence are different as well as supporting that television programs are likely to elicit 
ambivalence.  
The measure devised by Kaplan also led to the first studies that investigated the 
consequences of ambivalence. For instance, Katz, Glass, Lucido and Farber (1977) 
investigated if ambivalence toward physically handicapped victims could be associated with 
their denigration. Their protocol required an experimenter (i.e. the real participant) and a 
confederate who have to communicate through ESP (ExtraSensory Perception). Four colored 
bulbs were displayed in front of the experimenter who had to think about a specific color. The 
confederate had to concentrate and to press a button that corresponded to the color he "felt". 
The experimenter was told to punish each error by sending a loud sound to the confederate. 
The confederate made fifteen mistakes out of the twenty trials. Two experimental conditions 
were set: the loud sound was either presented as being a punishing painful noise (the "loud 
noise" condition) whereas the same sound was introduced as being a mild tone in the other 
condition (the "mild tone" condition). In order to study the denigration of the handicapped 
victims, the confederate was either arriving at the laboratory in a wheelchair, in an 
experimental condition, or not, in a control condition. The confederate was evaluated on a 20-
item personality scale both before and after the completion of the ESP task. In line with their 
hypotheses, Katz et al. (1977) found that highly ambivalent participants evaluated the 
handicapped confederate more negatively after the ESP task in comparison with the non-
handicapped one, but only in the "loud noise condition". For the authors, this result sustains 
their hypothesis according to which ambivalent individuals tend to denigrate physically 
handicapped individuals more importantly than univalent individuals. Before going into more 
details about research on ambivalence and discussing its strengths and weaknesses, it is 
important to present the different methods developed to assess attitudinal ambivalence first. 
 
1.3 Measuring ambivalence 
 Overall, there are three ways to measure ambivalence. As we will see, these measures 
lead to qualitatively different types of ambivalence. The most recent one has been devised to 
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assess implicit ambivalence , the two others to determine potential ambivalence  and 
felt ambivalence.  
 
 1.3.1 Implicit ambiv alence 
Petty and colleagues proposed the idea of "implicit ambivalence" in their Meta-
Cognitive Model (MCM, see Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Petty & Briñol, 2009; 
for a recent review, see Petty, Briñol, & Johnson, 2012). They reasoned that our attitudes 
could change across time, although such change in attitudes would not erase our previous 
attitudes: prior associations between the attitude object and its evaluation will remain in our 
minds. For instance, one may have liked a band when young (and thus associating it with fun 
or with specific friends, for instance), but no longer now. Consequently, the evocation of the 
band is likely to generate ambivalence because of one’s former positive attitude and current 
negative one. In this type of approach, attitude is inferred from response times with a simple 
principle: the faster the association, the stronger the attitude. Indeed, Fazio (1995), who 
conceived attitudes as representations in memory, proposed that response times would 
indicate the extent to which an attitude would be accessible in people's mind. Response time 
is here considered as an indicator of attitude strength (Bassili, 1996). A strong attitude should 
be automatically activated in the presence of the attitude object and thus it should lead to short 
response time when people have to report their attitude. As a consequence, people who hold a 
strong univalent positive attitude towards an issue should associate the positive aspects of the 
issue faster than people who hold a weaker positive attitude.  
This approach is used in the implicit measures of attitudes such as the Implicit 
Associative Task for instance (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). However, 
ambivalent individuals hold both attitudes in their mind as they associate the attitude object 
with a positive attitude as well as a negative attitude. As a result, the positive and the negative 
aspects should be associated equally fast. Such associations were experimentally illustrated by 
de Liver, van der Pligt and Wigboldus (2007). In their study two, these researchers displayed 
attitude objects to their participants who were asked to associate them with positivity or 
negativity. Participants had to evaluate each attitude object after being either positively, 
negatively or not primed (i.e. being confronted to a neutral prime). They observed that 
positive attitude objects were more rapidly evaluated as being positive after a positive prime 
in comparison with a negative or a neutral one (i.e. a facilitation effect). Of interest, de Liver 
et al. (2007) found that attitude objects that are more likely to arouse ambivalence (such as 
"alcohol") were equally associated to positive and negative primes. This effect was neither 
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observed on attitude objects that are likely to lead to univalent positive attitudes (such as 
"love") nor on objects susceptible to activate univalent negative attitudes (such as "war"). 
Implicit ambivalence can thus be inferred through this mean.  
 We decided not to include this type of measure in our experimental studies, for two 
reasons. First, this type of measure is still not widely used, probably because it requires both 
specific softwares (as the use of Inquisit for example) and materials (e.g. target words). 
Second, and more importantly, as we will see, our research is concerned with the strategic 
expression of ambivalent attitudes (first line of research) and the perception of ambivalent 
attitudes (second line of research). As implicit attitudes have been formerly devised to be less 
affected by social desirability (Fazio & Olson, 2003a), they were not as fit as more classic 
measures of attitudinal ambivalence for the purpose of our research. Thus, we have focused 
on the two other types of measure of attitudinal ambivalence, namely on potential 
ambivalence and felt ambivalence.  
 
 1.3.2 Potential ambiv alence 
This term refers to the fact that people hold conflicting evaluations in their mind, 
conflicting evaluations that could potentially  lead in turn to ambivalence (Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). Potential ambivalence is assessed via "formula-based measures"; 
in other term, participants do not directly report their ambivalence. Rather, they simply report 
their degree of positivity as well as their degree of negativity towards an attitude object. A 
score of ambivalence is obtained through a formula that aggregates the positive and the 
negative poles. 
The measure devised by Kaplan (1972) is the first of the "formula-based" measures. As 
previously explained, participants had first to fill a scale to report the extent to which they 
associate an attitude object to positivity on a scale from 0 (not at all positive) to 3 (extremely 
positive) and then to do the same on negativity on a scale from 0 (not at all negative) to -3 
(extremely negative). Kaplan proposed to use these two scores to compute ambivalence. 
Ambivalence was the result of the difference between the total affect (the sum of positive 
component and the absolute value of the negative component) and the polarization (the sum 
of the positive and negative components):  
 
Ambivalence = (Pos + !Neg!) - (Pos + Neg) 
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This formula leads to a scale ranging from 0 (no ambivalence) to 6 (extreme 
ambivalence). Indeed, people who hold a strong positive attitude will circle 3 on the positive 
attitude scale and 0 on the negative attitude scale. Thus, their score of ambivalence will be 
equal to: Ambivalence =  (3 + !0!) - (3+0) = 3 - 3 = 0. Conversely, people who hold an 
extreme ambivalent attitude will circle 3 on the positive attitude scale and -3 on the negative 
attitude scale. Their score of ambivalence will thus be equal to:  Ambivalence  = (3 + !-3!) - 
(3-3) = 6 - 0 = 6.  
 This formula has been criticized mainly because it aggregates the positive attitude and 
the negative attitude in a single indicator whereas both are theoretically independent (see 
Ullrich, Shermelleh-Engel & Böttcher, 2008; or Locke & Braun, 2009, for recent discussion 
of these aspects). Several other formulas have been proposed for this purpose in response (see 
Breckler, 1994; Priester & Petty, 1996; or Riketta, 2000, for a review and a critique of the 
formulas). Despite these complex considerations, the most commonly used remains the so-
called "Griffin formula" (Thompson et al., 1995) in which:    
 
Ambivalence = !Pos + Neg!- !Pos - Neg! 
                                                                            2 
In this formula, the level of ambivalence increases when both the degree of positivity 
and the degree of negativity increase (the first part of the equation). The level of ambivalence 
also decreases as the difference between both poles increases (the second part of the 
equation).  If both a negative and a positive attitude is a pre-requisite of ambivalent attitudes, 
it is often suggested that both components have to be equally strong (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, 
Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991; Thompson et al., 1995). This formula accounts for these two 
points, as a high level of ambivalence can be obtained by endorsing both a strong positive and 
a strong negative attitude, and ideally equally strong. The score of ambivalence ranges from -
0.5 (no ambivalence) to 4 (extreme ambivalence). Indeed, people who hold a univalent strong 
positive attitude will circle 4 on the positive attitude scale and 1 on the negative attitude scale. 
Thus, their score of ambivalence will be -0.5: Ambivalence = !4 + 1!/ 2 - !4 - 1!= 2.5 - 3 = 
-0.5. Conversely, people who hold a strong ambivalent attitude will circle 4 on the positive 
scale and 4 on the negative scale. Their score of ambivalence will be 4: Ambivalence = !4 + 
4!/ 2 - !4 - 4!= 4 - 0  = 4. 
 Another way to measure ambivalence is to use an open-ended measure (Bell, Esses, & 
Maio, 1996). This open-ended measure has been devised in order to obtain spontaneous 
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answers (participants list the adjectives they associate with a specific attitude object without 
any other instructions), as well as to obtain less biased answers. Indeed, by asking participants 
to evaluate the positive component of an attitude object while ignoring its negative 
component (and conversely for the evaluation of the negative component), Kaplan’s 
procedure may lead them to artificially display more ambivalent attitudes. By allowing 
participants to list whatever they want, the suggestion bias can be neutralized (Refling, 
Calnan, Fabrigar, MacDonald, Johnson & Smith, 2013). Open-ended measures require two 
steps. First, the participants are asked to list the adjectives that they associate with a specific 
topic (e.g. Genetically Modified Organisms), up to a maximum of 10. In a second step, the 
participants are asked to evaluate each listed adjectives with a scale ranging from -3 
(extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive). As for Kaplan's measure, these scores will be 
averaged in a positive and a negative score. The level of ambivalence, however, is obtained 
after computing these two scores following this formula:  
 
Ambivalence = Pos + |Neg| – 2 | Pos – Neg | + k. 
 
k is a constant added to preclude negative ambivalence scores (if the maximum number of 
listed adjectives is 10, k will be equal to 30). Again, the level of ambivalence increases with 
both the increase of positivity and negativity (the first part of the formula) and decreases with 
the increase of the difference between the two poles. The score of ambivalence ranges from 0 
(extremely univalent) to 90 (extremely ambivalent) on this measure (see Bell et al., 1996). 
 Both the split semantic differential scales and the open-ended measures lead to the 
assessment of potential ambivalence (Conner & Sparks, 2002; Conner & Armitage, 2008). 
However, ambivalence can also be measured directly through self-report measures; this is 
commonly referred to as felt ambivalence.  
 
 1.3.3 Felt ambiv alence 
Self-report measures aim at assessing ambivalence as it is experienced. Individuals are 
consequently asked to self-report the extent to which they feel ambivalent toward an issue by 
answering a set of Likert scales. The most used set of questions is Priester and Petty's (1996). 
In their article, felt ambivalence was measured by asking participants to indicate to what 
extent they felt conflicted, hesitant and holding mixed feelings toward a certain attitude 
object, on a 7-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The score of 
ambivalence is obtained by averaging the score on these three items. Even if such measure 
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has never been formally validated through a standard procedure (as was the open-ended 
measure or Kaplan's one for instance), it is the most widely used to assess felt ambivalence 
(e.g. Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008; DeMarree, Morrison, Wheeler, & Petty, 2011). It is 
important to note however that several other authors pursued a similar approach. For instance, 
in their Bivariate Evaluations and Ambivalence Measures (BEAMs), Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntson (1997) generated a unipolar ambivalence scale with 9 items. This scale includes six 
items that are directly associated with contradictory information (muddled, divided, tense, 
contradictory, jumbled and conflicted) and three reversed that are associated to consistent 
information (consistent, uniform and harmonious). Jamieson (1988; cited in Thompson et al., 
1995) did quite the same by using 10 items (e.g. "I'm confused about (euthanasia) because I 
have strong thoughts about it and I can't make up my mind one way or another").  
 
 1.3.4 Relationship betw een potential ambiv alence and felt 
ambiv alence 
Felt ambivalence and potential ambivalence are supposedly assessing different 
qualitative aspects of ambivalence. Potential ambivalence is theoretically conceived of as an 
indicator of the potential conflicting associations towards an attitude object, whereas felt 
ambivalence concerns the extent to which people feel conflicted or torn regarding an issue. 
Felt ambivalence thus requires people's reflection and awareness to be assessed. It has 
consequently been discussed as being a "meta-psychological measure" (Holbrook & 
Krosnick, 2005). Potential ambivalence assesses ambivalence in a more traditional way. 
Indeed, as it was the case for attitudes that have been defined as associations in memory 
between an attitude object and a stimulus (see Fazio, 1995), the measure of potential 
ambivalence requires people to list their associations with the attitude object in question. It 
does not require any evaluation of the associations in the first place. In that, potential 
ambivalence has sometimes been referred to as an objective measure whereas felt 
ambivalence was identified as a subjective one (Priester & Petty, 1996).  
 Even if these two measures are different constructs that saturate on different latent 
factors in a confirmatory factor analysis (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2005), felt ambivalence is 
sometimes considered as being the consequence of potential ambivalence or at least to arise 
from it. Indeed, individuals cannot feel ambivalent if their attitude does not contain both a 
positive and a negative component (Newby-Clark et al., 2002). The relation between these 
two measures is generally moderately strong and oscillates between r = .21 and r = .40 
(Thompson et al., 1995; Priester & Petty, 1996). It is important to note that specific contexts 
2- Theoretical Part 
   18
have been highlighted as potentially increasing or decreasing the relationship between these 
two components. In a study on the stages of change about fat diet, Armitage and Arden (2007) 
reported for instance that only a low correlation was found between felt and potential 
ambivalence when people are thinking about changing their behavior to a healthier one. For 
instance, in pre-contemplation (a stage when people ignore that their behavior could possibly 
lead to unhealthy consequences), the observed correlation was of r = .12. Even when people 
are ready to change (i.e. in the stage of preparation), the association between both measures 
remains quite low (r = .17). However, it becomes way stronger when people are actually 
changing it (r = .63) and stays quite high in the stage of maintenance (r = .43). Thus, it is 
really when a change of behavior is happening that all the conflicting evaluations in people’s 
mind become salient and thereby more likely to produce felt ambivalence. Newby-Clark et al. 
(2002) also highlighted this salience effect. In their experiments, two conditions were set. 
Participants were either asked to report their felt and potential ambivalence as usual (low 
accessibility condition) or to report their potential ambivalence and then to copy their answers 
twice, on two different booklets before reporting their felt ambivalence (high accessibility 
condition). This was introduced to the participant as a way of giving an access of their 
answers to the other experimenters. A stronger relation was found between felt and high 
ambivalence in the high accessibility condition in comparison with the low accessibility 
condition (although these authors did not report the exact r values).  
 
Concluding comments 
 So, ambivalence can be assessed in two main ways. It can either be assessed by 
directly asking people to evaluate the extent to which they feel ambivalent toward an issue 
(the felt ambivalence). It can also be assessed indirectly by either asking people to fill two 
split-Likert scales or via an open-ended measure. The level of potential ambivalence is 
obtained after computation. Even if these two measures differ qualitatively, the Holy Grail of 
the  measure of ambivalence is yet to be found. Indeed, there is no consensus on which 
measure is better than the other (Conner & Armitage, 2008). Thus, a common practice is to 
include both measures in a research program or to use one or the other indistinctly. We 
personally decided to include both measures in our first research line.  
 
 2. The strengths and weaknesses of ambivalence 
As we will see, the literature on ambivalence has mainly presented this concept in a 
negative light. In point 2.1, we will refer to studies that discussed ambivalent attitudes as 
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weak attitudes, either because they are less likely to lead to further behavior (point 2.1.1) or 
because they are considered as aversive (point 2.1.2). In point 2.2.1, however, we will argue 
for the importance of studying the perception of ambivalent attitudes, and why such attitudes 
could be useful in 2.2.2. The point 2.2.3 will focus on the function of univalent and 
ambivalent attitudes. 
   
 2.1 Ambivalent attitudes as weak attitudes 
The strength of an attitude can be inferred from four indicators (Petty & Krosnick, 
1995). To be considered as strong, an attitude has to be stable over time (persistence), it 
should bias information processing (impact on information processing), it should guide 
behaviors and intentions in a consistent way (prediction) and it has to withstand an attack 
(resistance). This fourth indicator is the most relevant for this dissertation. Thus, we will treat 
the first three all together (as well as accessibility) and in a second part, we will focus more 
specifically on ambivalence and resistance. 
 
2.1.1 A ccessibility , persistence, prediction and information processing. 
The four factors of accessibility, persistence, prediction and information processing 
are intertwined, and for this reason we will present them together. Indeed, it is because people 
have been associating an attitude object with a specific evaluation (accessibility) for quite a 
while (persistence) that such attitudes will affect the way people will interpret new 
information towards it (information processing) and how they will most likely behave in the 
future (prediction).  
 
Accessibility 
 The question of the accessibility of an attitude has been matched with that of its 
strength in relevant research (Fazio, Chen, McDonel & Sherman, 1982). Indeed, attitudes are 
conceived as an association in memory between an attitude object and its evaluation, and thus 
a strong attitude refers to a strong mental association (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Consequently, 
it has been discussed that attitude strength can be deduced from reaction times. The reasoning 
is that the stronger the attitude, the more it will be mentally accessible and the fastest the 
attitude object will be associated with its consistent evaluation (Fazio, 1995; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). We mentioned earlier that de Liver et al. (1997) demonstrated that ambivalent 
objects were as strongly associated with positive words as with negative words. In other 
terms, they reported that reaction times between the attitude object and the positive words 
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were as fast as reaction times between the attitude object and the negative words. Thus, words 
that are susceptible to cause ambivalence are equally associated to both poles. However, 
Bargh, Chaiken, Govender and Pratto (1992) reported that the more an attitude object is 
evaluated as ambivalent and the longer it takes to be evaluated (i.e. ambivalent attitude 
objects caused higher response times). Ambivalence was therefore highlighted as being less 
accessible and thus as weaker than a univalent attitude (see also Brömer, 1998).  
It is important to mention here that such result has been reinterpreted as originating 
from integrative processes rather than due to a lower accessibility (see van Harreveld, van der 
Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004). Van Harreveld et al. (2004) pointed out that 
ambivalent individuals had to evaluate and rate incongruent attributes when they report their 
attitude whereas this is less the case for univalent individuals; univalent individuals have just 
to rate the extent to which they are either positive or negative toward the issue in question. 
This was shown by asking the participants to rate the extent to which they considered a list of 
attributes related to the issue of the experiment as being important for them. They observed 
that ambivalent individuals identified more components as being important than did their less 
ambivalent counterparts. Their higher response time was linked to the number of attributes (r 
= .61 for Experiment 1, for instance). Thus, Bargh et al. (1992) and van Harreveld et al. 
(2004) both found that reaction times are generally higher for ambivalent attitudes in 
comparison with more univalent ones. However, they disagree in their interpretation: Bargh et 
al. (1992) viewed it as an indicator of the weakness of ambivalent attitudes whereas van 
Harreveld et al. (2004) proposed that it could be due to a more effortful processing of 
information. The next sections will provide some elements that help understanding how both 
points of view could be sustained. Indeed, we will discuss attitude certainty and decision-
making (i.e. some further indicators of attitude strength; Bassili, 1996), and the increased 
processing of information that results from ambivalence. 
 
Temporal stability 
Because of the duality of their attitude, ambivalent individuals were also described as 
being less certain (Bassili, 1996; Meffert et al., 2004). If ambivalence leads to higher response 
times on associative tasks, such slowness was also found on decision-making tasks. Hence, 
ambivalent individuals were found to need more time to pick their political candidate in 
comparison with non-ambivalent individuals (Mutz, 2002; Nir, 2005), and to delay more the 
formation of voting intentions (Lavine, 2001). In line with this, ambivalent attitudes were 
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discussed as fluctuating over time (Zaller & Feldman, 1992; Craig et al., 2005), as well as 
increasing when a deadline is approaching (Jewell, 2003).  
Jewell (2003) focused on blood donation in his experiment and set up two 
experimental groups in a longitudinal design. Regardless of the condition, participants had to 
fill a questionnaire about their attitude toward blood donation as well as their intention to 
donate blood. In the first condition (the distant-deadline condition), they were invited to 
report their attitude and intention to donate blood to a campaign that would take place 26 
weeks after (wave 1). They were dismissed and then contacted 6 weeks later to fill the same 
questionnaire. Hence, they had to report their attitude and intention to donate to a campaign 
that would take place 20 weeks in the future (wave 2). In the second condition (the imminent-
deadline condition), participants were asked to do the same than in the other condition. The 
only change was that the campaign was no longer taking place 26 weeks (wave 1) or 20 
weeks later (wave 2) but it was presented as happening a month later (wave 1) and as taking 
place a week in the future (wave 2). An increase of ambivalence toward blood donation was 
found between wave 2 and wave 1 for the participants in the imminent-deadline condition 
whereas no difference was found for participants in the distant-deadline condition). As the 
deadline approached, participants in this experimental condition became more ambivalent 
(e.g. 67.2% of their participants showed an increase in their ambivalence toward blood 
donation). The correlation between their attitude and their intention to donate also decreased 
between wave 2 and wave 1 whereas this was not observed for the participants in the distant-
deadline condition. In other terms, participants in the imminent-deadline condition reported 
an increase of their ambivalence as well as a greater fluctuation in their behavioral intentions 
as the deadline was approaching. This was not found when the deadline was less salient (i.e. 
in the distant-deadline condition). Thus, as they tend to be less accessible and stable over 
time, ambivalent attitudes are considered as being weaker in comparison with univalent 
attitudes. 
 
Behavioral prediction  
We mentioned that one of the first reasons why researchers were interested in attitude 
assessment was to be able to better anticipate individuals’ behaviors (see LaPiere, 1936 or 
Corey, 1937 for instance). The idea was that people should behave in a consistent way with 
their attitudes. Indeed, holding a positive attitude towards a car, for instance, should logically 
increase the likelihood that one would buy this car. Because they combine both positive and 
negative attitudes, ambivalence and its relation with intentions and behaviors have been 
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widely investigated (see Armitage & Conner, 2004 for a review). It has been found that, in 
sum, all but one study reported a negative link between ambivalence and intentions or 
behaviors. This was found on pro-environmental intentions (Costarelli & Colloca, 2004), 
dieting intentions (Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner, Sparks, Povey, James, Shepherd, & 
Armitage, 2002; Povey, Wellens, & Conner, 2001), drinking alcohol intentions or excessive 
alcohol use behaviors (Armitage, 2003; Caballero, Carrera, Muñoz, & Sànchez, 2007), 
chocolate or meat consumption (Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 2001; Berndsen 
& van der Pligt, 2004), physical exercise (Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004), recycling 
(Castro, Garrido, Reis, & Menezes, 2009) or using personal protective equipment (Cavazza & 
Serpe, 2009).  
An exception can be found in Jonas et al. (1997) where the authors found a positive 
link between ambivalence and the intention to buy a fictitious shampoo; such effect has never 
been replicated. However, they nearly all demonstrated that ambivalence was a negative 
predictor of intentions and behaviors and in that, ambivalent attitudes was considered as a 
weaker form of attitudes as opposed to univalent ones. 
  
Information processing 
In a study on Chinese immigrants, Maio, Bell and Esses (1996) reported that 
ambivalent individuals were more affected by a strong positive message about immigration 
than by a less strong message, whereas non-ambivalent individuals were not differentially 
affected as a function of the message strength. In other terms, ambivalent individuals 
processed the strong positive message to a larger extent than the less strong one; this 
information processing led them holding a more positive attitude afterwards (i.e. a lower 
ambivalent attitude). The fact that ambivalent individuals were affected by argument quality 
supports the idea of greater information processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In their 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), Petty and Cacioppo (1986) proposed that a convincing 
message could change people's attitude as a function of its strength (e.g. the argument 
quality). It is assumed that people will elaborate some thoughts after reading a strong message 
and that their attitude's structure will change as a result (they will become more supportive of 
the issue for instance). Conversely, a weak message is viewed as containing superficial 
arguments that will lead people to generate little thoughts toward the issue in return (i.e. they 
will not be convinced). In sum, a message is convincing when it contains a strong argument 
that will make people think (e.g. process the information thoroughly). Jonas et al. (1997) 
reported indirect evidence of such greater processing. They indeed observed that ambivalent 
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individuals were less confident in their attitude and that this lower confidence led to more 
cognitive elaboration (e.g. the number of attribute-related thoughts increased). Petty et al. 
(2006) recently replicated the above results with implicit ambivalence. Their paradigm 
consists in two steps. They first conditioned their participants to hold a univalent attitude 
toward a fictitious target (i.e. "Eddie") and then submitted them to either congruent or 
incongruent information. Thus, they generated implicit ambivalence in participants who have 
been under contradictory information (Eddie was first presented as positive and then as 
negative), whereas this was not the case for participants who only received congruent 
information. After this conditioning procedure, their participants had to read Eddie's 
qualifications (either strong or weak) and then to evaluate the extent to which they would be 
willing to hire Eddie. They hypothesized that, as ambivalence leads to greater processing, 
implicit ambivalence should lead individuals to process the information more thoroughly. As 
a consequence, it was predicted that participants high in implicit ambivalence should be 
affected by strong arguments to a greater extent than by weak arguments whereas this was not 
expected for participants low in implicit ambivalence. Their results supported such 
hypothesis.  
Several other scholars focused more thoroughly on the processing of information of 
ambivalent individuals to highlight its function. They notably aimed at reporting that the bias 
in such processing was motivated and done in order to “resolve the ambivalence”. Clark et al. 
(2008) directly investigated the motivational component of the alleged biased processing. In 
their reasoning, ambivalent individuals are motivated to resolve their ambivalence and thus 
eager to pick a side. Consequently, they should process information to a larger extent than 
univalent individuals, but this should only apply to pro-attitudinal information. In other 
words, ambivalent individuals will resolve their ambivalence by endorsing the perceived 
"agreeable" point of view. Results confirmed this hypothesis: It was found that ambivalent 
individuals have been more strongly influenced by pro-attitudinal messages than by anti-
attitudinal messages whereas this was not found on less ambivalent individuals. They recently 
replicated such an effect by observing that ambivalent individuals processed attitude-
congruent information to a larger extent (Sawicki, Wegener, Clark, Fabrigar, Smith, & Durso, 
2013). However, these researchers extended this result by reporting that it was moderated by 
knowledge toward the topic. They observed that, when individuals did not feel enough 
knowledgeable, they processed attitude-congruent to a larger extent than did more 
knowledgeable ones, as previously observed. They did not find any evidence of greater 
processing of the information for more erudite individuals. Hence, ambivalence was not 
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resolved when individuals felt knowledgeable towards the issue. In other terms, ambivalent 
individuals who were aware of the issue have not been influenced by the messages of 
influence. The authors proposed that this lack of effect could be attributed to the fact that 
erudite individuals may have perceived familiar information as ineffective and thus less likely 
to be helpful for lowering their level of ambivalence.  
A further illustration of the biased information processing in ambivalent individuals 
can be found in Zhao and Cai (2008). In their paper, they focused on teenagers who entered at 
college. Prior to entrance, most students held a negative attitude toward smoking. However, 
college (through peers, ads or magazines) exposed some of them to positive information about 
smoking and as a result, this conflicting information yielded ambivalence. They observed that 
in such situations, ambivalent teenagers could focus to a larger extent on the negative aspects 
of smoking (their prior attitude) in order to fight against their ambivalence. They 
consequently sought more negative information toward smoking and expressed more negative 
thoughts in comparison with their non-ambivalent counterparts.   
 
Concluding comments 
In this section we reviewed the literature that focused on the accessibility of ambivalent 
attitudes, on their persistence over time, their link with intentions and behaviors and their 
impact on information processing in comparison with more univalent ones. Most of the 
evidence has been discussed as pointing to the weakness of ambivalent attitudes, but this 
conclusion does not seem warranted. For instance, if most of the studies that revealed the 
lower accessibility of ambivalent attitudes in comparison with univalent ones interpreted this 
result as indicating that ambivalent attitudes were weak attitudes (Bargh et al., 1992; Bassili, 
1996), an interesting reinterpretation of this effect has been formulated by van Harreveld et al. 
in 2004. As mentioned above, they proposed that in fact, the lower observed reaction times 
could be due to an integrative processing instead of a lower accessibility (as a reminder, a 
lower accessibility sustains that people do not hold a strong attitude). In comparison with 
univalent individuals, ambivalent ones could simply have to include more elements when they 
have to report their attitude, and therefore they would need more time to do so. If this is true, 
longer reaction times would no longer be indicative of a lack of accessibility.  
In a similar vein, the greater processing of information by ambivalent individuals has 
often been seen as indicating that they are eager to resolve their ambivalence (see Bell & 
Esses, 2002, for instance). However, results only indirectly support this hypothesis. Indeed, it 
looks like ambivalent individuals are not simply desirous to disprove their ambivalence as it 
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was postulated: Both Clark et al. (2008) and Sawicki et al. (2013), found that ambivalent 
individuals were only affected by “pro-attitudinal information”. Thus, they are concerned 
about the valence of the message when they decide to side with it. This implies that 
ambivalent individuals do not resolve their ambivalence by any means or otherwise a counter-
attitudinal information would have similarly influenced them. Furthermore, the biased 
processing of information was not replicated on ambivalent individuals who felt 
knowledgeable towards the issue. Therefore, ambivalent attitudes do not automatically lead to 
greater processing of information, but rather individuals are affected by messages that are 
positively perceived (i.e. attitude-congruent information, Sawicki et al., 2013), and only when 
they feel not enough competent on an issue. Thus, as ambivalent individuals purposely decide 
what affects them or not, they could be strategic when they side with an influence message. 
This point will be detailed in the next part. 
 
 2.1.2 Discomfort and influence 
Ambivalence and cognitive dissonance 
Ambivalent individuals were presumed to be negatively experiencing their 
ambivalence (i.e. to feel discomfort) and as a consequence, they should be striving to resolve 
it (by picking a side). Such reasoning parallels the theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 
1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Two elements are dissonant when they do not fit well 
together; in other terms, "X and Y  are dissonant if not-X  follows from Y " (Festinger, 1957, 
p.13). A famous illustration of dissonance is the "man-standing-in-the-rain" example: "if a 
person were standing in the rain and yet could see no evidence that he was getting wet, these 
two cognitions would be dissonant with one another because he knows from experience that 
getting wet follows from being out in the rain" (p. 14). The consequence of dissonance and 
more generally, of internal inconsistencies, is that they are experienced as unpleasant (Zanna 
& Cooper, 1974). As ambivalence stems from holding conflicting attitudes, it is assumed to 
be unpleasant for similar reasons than cognitive dissonance (McGregor, Newby-Clark & 
Zanna, 1999; Newby-Clark et al., 2002).  
Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey and Moore (1992) were the first to report results that 
support the positive relation between ambivalence and negative feelings. In a first phase, all 
participants had to run a “subliminal test”. In fact, this test was a disguised mood measure in 
which participants rapidly saw a word on a screen and then were asked to indicate which 
word it was. Four choices were offered each time, and 20 stimuli were presented. For 
instance, participants saw the word “LOWN” (non-sense word) and were then asked to 
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indicate if the word they saw was DAWN, DOWN, GOWN or TOWN. Words were pretested 
as being indicative of a positive or a negative mood. Then, participants were randomly 
attributed to one of two experimental conditions. The salience of their attitude towards Black 
was manipulated in one condition. Participants had to fill the Pro-Black Anti-Black 
questionnaire (PAAQ; Katz & Hass, 1988) and then to hear a tape about a recent racial 
episode. They computed an ambivalent score from the PAAQ score that was set as the 
product of the score on the pro scale by the score on the anti scale. The other condition was a 
control one where participants had to fill the Survey on Personal values where no items 
questioned their attitude towards Blacks. For instance, they were asked to indicate the extent 
to which they thought that the food we eat affects our health. Then both groups were invited 
to do the “subliminal task” again. This served as a post-manipulation indicator. Their results 
indicated that the racial manipulation did raise the amount of negative emotions. Furthermore, 
they found an interaction between racial ambivalent attitudes and the experimental conditions. 
Simple effects test revealed that the more the attitudes were ambivalent and the more the 
reported emotions were negative in the condition that made racial attitudes salient. No 
significant effect was found between ambivalence and negative mood in the control condition. 
Thus, racial ambivalence was related to negative mood but only when such attitudes were 
made salient. These authors interpreted this effect as indicating that when people are aware of 
their ambivalence (i.e. when ambivalence is salient), this would threaten them. For instance, 
incongruences should lower their self-esteem and raise their anxiety and, as a consequence, 
this should arouse psychological discomfort. 
A study by Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt (2006) made ambivalence salient 
(through a text that included both positive and negative environmental consequences of 
genetically modified food) and then set up two experimental conditions. In both conditions, 
participants had to take a pill that was presented as either leading to a tense state or as a calm 
state. Nordgren et al. (2006) then assessed the emotions of their participants by using the 
Positive and Negative affect Schedule (PANAS; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). 
Participants had to report for instance the extent to which they felt angry or anxious. Their 
results support the hypothesis according to which ambivalence leads to discomfort as they 
observed more negative thoughts as well as more negative emotions for their participants who 
could not attribute their discomfort to the pill. In other terms, more negative emotions were 
found when individuals took the relaxing pill. To test the hypothesis according to which 
ambivalence should lead to discomfort, Maio, Greenland, Bernard and Esses (2001) focused 
on skin conductance (i.e. arousal); arousal has indeed been highlighted as a good indicator of 
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discomfort (see Cresi, Castagno, Storm, Silvestro, Miniero, & Savino, 2012). Their 
hypothesis was that, as ambivalence should be an aversive state, ambivalent individuals 
should be more aroused. Contrary to their expectations, they found that ambivalence led to 
less arousal. This result was never replicated. These studies and the lack of consensus in their 
results lead to the question of when ambivalence is supposedly experienced as unpleasant. Of 
course, ambivalence cannot always be disagreeable (van Harreveld, van der Pligt & de Liver, 
2009a). For instance, an ambivalent smoker does not always feel at pain when he lights a 
cigarette. van Harreveld et al. (2009a) devised the MAID model to tackle this issue (MAID 
stands for “Manipulating Ambivalence Induce Discomfort”). In this model, ambivalence is 
considered as leading to discomfort when individuals have to make a decision. The fact of 
being forced to arrive at conclusion is what leads to regret anticipation, uncertainty and 
discomfort. Results of van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren and van der Pligt (2009b) 
supported this reasoning. They observed in two studies that compared to a control and a no 
choice condition, a choice condition yielded a significant raise in the skin conductance level 
(i.e. arousal). Thus, picking a side seems to be what creates discomfort for the ambivalent 
individual.  
The parallel between cognitive dissonance and attitudinal ambivalence has also been 
made regarding its resolution. In their classical experiment, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
invited their participants to perform two tedious tasks during half an hour each (for instance in 
one of the task, participants were in front of a square that contained 48 square pegs. The task 
was to turn each peg, one by one, a quarter turn clockwise during half an hour). Two 
conditions were then set. Participants were invited to explain the tasks to the next participant 
with a specific requirement: they had to present the upcoming tasks as being interesting. In 
other terms, participants had to lie to the next participant by positively presenting boring and 
tedious tasks. They were simply asked to offer this service: experimenters told them that it 
was possible for them to refuse but accepting would represent a nice help (such procedure is 
called the “forced compliance”). All but one accepted. Depending on the experimental 
condition, participants were either paid 1$ or 20$ for this service. After the presentation of the 
task, participants were asked to indicate how they perceived the task (for instance, they had to 
rate the extent to which they found the task as being interesting and of scientific importance). 
Results indicated that participants that were paid 1$ tended to find the tasks as both more 
interesting and more scientific than participants that had been paid 20$. The reasoning of 
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) is that lying to the participant created a state of dissonance. 
Indeed, the participants went against their value as they positively presented a task that was 
2- Theoretical Part 
   28
objectively annoying. The theory of cognitive dissonance states that dissonance generates 
discomfort and as consequence, one has to act in order to revert to a more comfortable state. 
One of the ways to do so is to re-evaluate the attitude toward the task in order to establish 
some correspondence with what people has done or said (Festinger, 1957; see Abelson, 1959 
for other resolution possibilities). Thus, participants who were paid 1$ evaluated the task less 
negatively in order to feel better about what they have said. This reasoning was not necessary 
for the participants in the 20$ condition: they could attribute their behavior to the fact that 
they were paid for that and hence, did not have to re-evaluate their perception of the task. 
Some researchers relied on this mechanism to explain why ambivalent attitudes were 
more sensitive to influence than more univalent ones (Hodson, Maio & Bell, 2001; Bell & 
Esses, 2002). For them, individuals engage in greater information processing in order to arrive 
at conclusion and hence, to "resolve their ambivalence". However, even if they are often 
brought together, attitudinal ambivalence and cognitive dissonance differ on an important 
point (van Harreveld et al., 2009a, 2009b). Attitudinal ambivalence is considered as mainly 
pre-decisional whereas dissonance happens after a decision or a behavior has been made or 
evoked. Furthermore, the causes of discomfort also seem to differ: it is the fact of deciding 
and picking a side that is conceived as leading ambivalent individuals to discomfort, whereas 
it is mainly driven by guilt for cognitive dissonance situations (see Kenworthy, Miller, 
Collins, Read, & Earleywine, 2011). Indeed, even if the causes of dissonance have been 
debated (see Clémence, 1991), it has been pointed out that people can be in a state of 
dissonance when they act against their values (as in Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957, for 
instance). This behavior can lead them to feeling guilty (and hence, unease) in return.  
We mentioned that a way to cope with cognitive dissonance is to re-interpret what has 
been done or said and hence, that they can reduce their feeling of dissonance by changing 
their attitude toward a stimulus (Elliot & Devine, 1994). Consequently, several researchers 
aimed at investigating if such attitude change could also be observed on ambivalent 
individuals. Indeed, if ambivalence is similar to dissonance and if dissonance can be reduced 
through attitude change, ambivalent individuals should also shift their attitude in order to feel 
better.  
 
Influence and pliability of attitudes 
 Hence, several studies directly focused on the pliability of ambivalent attitudes when 
being confronted with influence messages. The reasoning was that, as ambivalent attitudes 
stem from inconsistencies and conflicting information, they should be weakly anchored in 
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comparison with a strong attitude that is embedded in a "knowledge structure" (Armitage & 
Conner, 2000). As a consequence, they should more pliable than less ambivalent ones (the 
term “pliable” has been used to refer to the fact the an attitude changes as a consequence of a 
situation of influence). This effect has been found several times. For instance, in their study 2, 
Armitage and Conner (2000) submitted their participants to a message of influence. As a 
function of the experimental conditions, the message was either a basic message of influence 
(that presented the sources of fat in the diet for instance; their control condition) or a message 
that challenged their beliefs toward low-fat food diet (by saying that low-fat food is not 
tasteless for example). They observed that ambivalent individuals held a significantly more 
positive attitude after being submitted to the challenging message of influence than they did 
before. This was not observed in non-ambivalent individuals. Hence, ambivalent individuals 
have been significantly more affected by a strong message of influence than non-ambivalent 
individuals and consequently sided with it. Univalent individuals were not affected. This 
result supports the hypothesis according to which ambivalent attitudes are more pliable.  
In Hodson et al. (2001), the participants had to watch a debate on welfare attitudes and 
then to state by whom they had been the most convinced (i.e. the pro-welfare debater or the 
anti-welfare one). Participants had to answer on a booklet where 24 previous answers had 
been formulated: depending on the experimental condition, most of the answers were either in 
favor of the pro- or the anti-welfare debater. Results indicated again that ambivalent 
individuals were more sensitive to consensus information (i.e. to the agreement amongst 
previous answers) than were less ambivalent individuals. More precisely, it was found that 
ambivalent participants were influenced in the direction of the consensus information whereas 
less ambivalent participants changed in the opposite direction. Zemborain & Johar (2007) 
replicated this effect by observing that ambivalent individuals were more responsive toward 
interpersonal influence. Thus, these studies convincingly pointed out that ambivalent 
individuals were affected to a greater extent than univalent individuals in a situation of 
influence. However, if this effect is quite robust, its function was not directly assessed in the 
above experiments. Scholars viewed it as indicating that ambivalent attitudes were weaker 
than less ambivalent ones (Conner & Sparks, 2002) and assumed that change appeared in 
order to reduce discomfort (Hodson et al., 2001); however, a direct test of this hypothesis was 
not provided. In order to tackle this issue, Cavazza & Butera (2008) devised two experiments.    
In their article, Cavazza and Butera (2008) questioned the pliability of ambivalent 
attitudes and suggested another interpretation of this manifestation: they proposed that 
ambivalent individuals could in fact only comply in the face of an influence situation without 
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necessarily changing the structure of their attitude. They consequently aimed at comparing the 
pliability of high-ambivalent individuals in comparison with low-ambivalent individuals in an 
influence situation by highlighting on the one hand that high-ambivalent individuals could 
shift their attitude more importantly than low-ambivalent individuals as suggested in the 
literature as well as showing on the other hand that high-ambivalent individuals could resist in 
situations where low-ambivalent ones should be affected. They considered the level of 
influence to test such hypothesis; hence, they assessed attitude change at a direct level (the 
questioned topic is the one that has been targeted by the influence message; here, traffic 
reduction as a mean of reducing pollution) as well as attitude change at an indirect level (the 
questioned topic is linked with the influence message but it has not been directly targeted; 
here, the interdiction of Diesel oil because of its polluting effects) and submitted their 
participants to normative conflict. Normative conflict is a situation where people hold an 
opposite attitude than the attitude held by the ingroup majority (Pérez & Mugny, 1996). So, 
they hypothesized that high-ambivalent individuals should change accordingly with the 
influence message at a direct level whereas low-ambivalent individuals were expected to 
resist for consistency reasons.  
They also predicted that the reverse should happen at an indirect level. Low-
ambivalent individuals were indeed expected to shift their attitude at a greater extent than 
high-ambivalent individuals as a result of the normative conflict and its influence on their 
attitude. Their hypothesis was thus tested via a two-step paradigm. First, the participants’ 
attitude toward traffic restriction was assessed (amongst other filler topics); they generally 
agreed that traffic reduction could be an efficient mean to reduce pollution in the cities. Then, 
participants were confronted to the influence message. This message highlighted that the 
majority of the previous participants declared that traffic was not causing environmental 
damage in cities; hence, they displayed a message that was counter-attitudinal. Participants' 
level of ambivalence toward the topic was then assessed (through modified open-ended 
measures); they also had to report their attitude towards traffic restriction (amongst other filler 
items, e.g. evaluating the importance of the topic) a second time. The range of the scale was 
modified to confuse participants; it was a Likert in 21-points instead of the Likert in 7-points 
used in the first step. Results indicated that high-ambivalent individuals were significantly 
more affected than low-ambivalent ones at a direct level. Their attitude shifted in agreement 
with the message of influence whereas less-ambivalent individuals resisted. Though, they 
complied and sided with the attitude of the majority. However, the opposite was found at an 
indirect level: low-ambivalent participants did change their attitude in the direction of the 
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influence message whereas ambivalent individuals went back to their ambivalent attitudes. In 
other terms, ambivalent individuals did only superficially shift their attitude, as they reported 
no latent change. In the authors' words, ambivalent individuals bended but did not break in the 
face of an influence situation. Furthermore, Study 2 reported that the attitude shifting was 
stronger for high self-monitors than for low-monitors; self-monitoring refers to the tendency 
to exert control over the expression of reported attitudes and behaviors (Snyder, 1974). 
Hence, such effect suggested that attitude shifting could be have been done for self-
presentational concerns. 
 These results are inconsistent with the idea that ambivalent individuals are eager to 
resolve their ambivalence. Indeed, since the influence message offered a way to cope with the 
participants’ inconsistencies, why didn’t they also endorse it when the source of influence was 
less salient? Instead, this research provides support for the idea according to which 
ambivalent individuals can be strategic and consequently agree with a message of influence 
without holding a weak attitude or necessarily feeling discomfort. It seems indeed that instead 
of being done by people so that they feel better, people could shift in order to conform. This 
point will be detailed in the next section. 
  
Concluding comments 
 As we have seen, it is possible to find several articles that linked ambivalence to 
discomfort, but nevertheless van Harreveld and collaborators recently declared, "the direct 
empirical evidence regarding the assumption that ambivalence is unpleasant is inconclusive" 
(van Harreveld, Schneider, Nohlen, & van der Pligt, 2012, p. 269). Indeed, research reveals 
first that such link appears only under very specific conditions, and second that it has only 
been indirectly observed. Ambivalence has first to be activated or salient in people's mind in 
order to generate discomfort (Newby-Clark et al., 2002; van Harreveld et al., 2012). This is 
the reason why it has been activated in most studies; by filling a racial questionnaire and then 
seeing a controversial video (Hass et al., 1992), through repetition (Newby-Clark et al., 2002) 
or after the reading of a text that contained both positive and negative aspects toward an issue 
(Nordgren et al., 2006), for example. The second necessary condition is that ambivalent 
individuals have to decide to feel discomfort. van Harreveld and collaborators generally use 
the metaphor of the gun as an illustration of this reflection (see van Harreveld et al., 2009a, 
2009b, 2012). For them, holding an attitude is like aiming, in that it is a judgment, and 
decision-making is like pulling the trigger. They conceive that it is the fact of committing (i.e. 
pulling the trigger) that generates discomfort (van Harreveld et al., 2009a). Thus, ambivalence 
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is not inherently unpleasant: it potentially becomes unpleasant when people are aware of their 
inconsistencies and have to arrive at conclusion.  
 At this point, we would like to discuss some methodological aspects that could explain 
why van Harreveld et al. (2012) made such comment recently. Indeed, there seem to be some 
methodological issues in most of these studies. For instance, Nordgren et al. (2006) observed, 
through the use of a misattribution paradigm, that ambivalence leads to a more biased 
treatment of the information as well as more negative emotions when discomfort could not be 
explained (the calm condition) in comparison with a condition where there was a plausible 
external causal factor (a pill, the tense condition). However, this finding needs to be discussed 
because of two potential problems. First, this research failed to include a control condition 
(either with no pill or without the lecture of the ambivalent text). The expected discomfort can 
thus only be deduced from the reported negative emotions in the relaxed condition in 
comparison with the tense one. As we do not know the baseline, it is difficult to conclude that 
indeed ambivalence generated discomfort as it is assumed. Furthermore, except for Hass et al. 
(1992) who found an absence of relation, this research failed to include any positive affects in 
its experimental paradigm. This too can be problematic, because positive and negative affects 
have been described as not necessarily co-activated (see Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Larsen, 
McGraw & Cacioppo, 2001). In other terms, a positive affect does not necessarily lead to less 
negative affects. Thus, one can wonder if, as presumed, ambivalence does only cause more 
negative affects, or greater arousal and thus potentially both positive and negative affects. For 
instance, van Harreveld et al. (2009b) reported that more arousal was found for ambivalent 
individuals when they have to make a decision. However, if arousal seems to be a good 
indicator of discomfort (see Cresi et al., 2012), Koelsch, Skouras, Fritz, Herrera, Bonhage, 
Küssner and Jacobs (2013) recently reported that listening to joyful music and fearful music 
both led to similar arousal ratings. Hence, showing that ambivalence leads to greater arousal 
does not necessarily indicate people's discomfort. Furthermore, to our knowledge, the only 
other study that focused on ambivalence and arousal did report the reverse effect: Maio et al. 
(2001) indeed reported that ambivalence led to less arousal. Hence, more research is required 
in this area to validate or to refute the hypothesis according to which ambivalence leads to 
discomfort. In this part, we also reviewed the articles that focused on the pliability of 
ambivalent attitudes where we discussed, in reference to Cavazza and Butera (2008), that it 
seems plausible to think that ambivalent individuals could act strategically in a situation of 
influence. This point will be taken up in the next part. 
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2.2 The function of ambivalent attitudes: Why ambivalent attitudes could be 
expressed strategically? 
 The results of Cavazza and Butera (2008) suggest that ambivalent individuals could comply 
at a direct level in order to side with a majority influence source, without really changing at a 
more indirect level. This reflection about the adaptability of ambivalent attitudes led to 
questioning the reasons why ambivalent individuals would have to change their attitude 
instead of displaying their ambivalent attitude. Indeed, if they really act strategically, in other 
terms if they are aware of the fact that they should change their attitude expression in a 
situation of influence, this suggests that ambivalent attitudes could be negatively perceived. 
Our first part will thus focus on the question of the perception of ambivalence (point 2.2.1) 
and will aim at providing reasons why ambivalent attitudes could be evaluated more 
negatively than univalent attitudes. In a second point (point 2.2.2), we will present the 
literature that portrayed ambivalent attitudes as being potentially useful attitudes. The third 
point (point 2.2.3) will directly focus on the function of univalent and ambivalent attitudes.  
 
2.2.1 The negativ e perception of ambiv alence 
We did not manage to find any article that directly addressed how ambivalent attitudes 
could be socially perceived but still, several researches seem relevant for this reflection. We 
will discuss ambivalent attitudes in the light of cognitive consistency and then as a critique of 
bipolar assessments in a second step. 
 
Ambivalence and cognitive consistency 
Ambivalence stems from evaluative inconsistencies (see Armitage & Conner, 2000; 
Newby-Clark et al, 2002; Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). Cognitive consistency 
has been defined as “the degree to which the attitude is embedded within an attitude structure 
consisting of values and expectancies related to the event which is its focus” (Scott, 1959). 
Thus, cognitive consistency refers to the fact that we tend to behave in coherent ways: we 
ideally act in line with our set of beliefs and values (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; McGuire, 
1966). The theory of cognitive dissonance revolved around the idea that cognitive consistency 
is a fundamental need (Festinger, 1957; Gawronski & Strack, 2012). As mentioned above, 
when two elements do not fit together, this creates dissonance in the individual, which is 
conceived of as an aversive state that leads individuals to act in order to attain a more 
balanced situation (Abelson, 1959). Cognitive consistency is not only assumed to be useful 
for the personal well being, it has also been discussed as necessary for intergroup relations. 
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For instance, interpersonal consistency facilitates the formation of social groups and leads to a 
more efficient communication between group members (Park, Tindale, & Hinsz, 2012). 
Furthermore, formation impression is facilitated by consistency. Indeed, it helps people 
anticipating how others will react in situations as a function of how they reacted in the past 
and of their values. Thus, cognitive consistency is socially valued.  
Moreover, several studies on consistency effects have shown that people may be 
aware of such value, to the extent that consistency effects appeared to be contextual and 
related to impression-management concerns. For instance, Schlenker observed in 1975 that 
individuals presented themselves in line with a feedback of performance: They described 
themselves as more competent after a positive feedback and less so after a negative feedback. 
However, this feedback effect only appeared when the individuals thought that their 
upcoming performance would be public. No feedback effect was found when the performance 
was expected to be private. In a similar vein, Baumeister (1982) mentioned that appearing 
consistent in the eyes of others could potentially please an audience. In order to provide a 
better understanding of why consistency effects could be difficult to be replicated, Cialdini, 
Trost and Newsom (1995) proposed that consistency could be variably valued, and depending 
on whether individuals uphold it or not, they could display consistency effects or not. In other 
terms, they proposed to control the extent to which individuals value consistency. The 
question of the value of consistency has been assessed in two different research programs.  
First, Cialdini and collaborators proposed that there could be individual differences in 
the preference for consistency. In other terms, consistency is considered at an individual level 
in this research program (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995, Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010). To 
support their claim, Cialdini et al. (1995) developed their "Preference for Consistency" scale 
(PFC). As they presumed, they found some variability in the extent to which individuals tend 
to give more or less importance to being consistent (on a 9-point scale, the mean was equal to 
5.43; SD = 1.19). Of interest, they observed that, on average people tended to value 
consistency (i.e. the observed mean was above the mid-point of the scale). 
In another research program, consistency was expected to be valued at a social level. 
Thus, the authors of this line of research conceived the value of cognitive consistency as 
being socially based (Channouf & Mangard, 1997; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). In other terms, 
they viewed the expression of consistency as being socially normative. To support this 
conception, they invited their participants to portray themselves under specific experimental 
demands. It has been highlighted that individuals could be motivated to give a specific image 
of themselves when they answer a questionnaire (i.e. the social desirability effect; see 
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Edwards, 1957; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Individuals could thus modify their answers in 
order to appear in a more positive light for instance (this point will be detailed in 3.1). 
Channouf and Mangard (1997), as well as Jouffre, Py and Somat (2001) used this social 
desirability effect in order to see if, actually, individuals could put consistency forward in 
order to give a good image of themselves. Both studies observed that indeed, individuals 
decided to display more consistent answers in order to give a positive image of themselves, in 
comparison with individuals who had been asked to answer so as to give a bad image of 
themselves, and with individuals in a neutral situation without self-presentation instructions. 
This result provided support for the idea that cognitive consistency could be socially valued, 
and that people are aware of this value. In sum, at an individual or at a social level, 
consistency tends to be positively valued. Conversely, and because ambivalence has been 
referred to as cognitive inconsistency (see Newby-Clark et al., 2002 for instance), attitudinal 
ambivalence should not be positively perceived.  
 
A critique of bipolar considerations 
Ambivalence could also be negatively perceived because it implies the fact of not 
picking a side (van Harreveld et al., 2009a). We mentioned in the historical part about 
attitudes the fact that the first attitude measures only offered bipolar continuums (Likert, 
1932; Osgood et al., 1957). In this part, we would like to evoke that this could be due to the 
fact that there could be a natural tendency to dichotomize the world (in order to simplify the 
environment) and then to consider the two created sides as opposed (Laponce, 1974; 
Weisbrode, 2012). Hence, the fact that people tend to view opposites as mutually exclusive 
has been suggested (see also Cacioppo, Berntson & Gardner, 1997). As an illustration of such 
spontaneous considerations, we would like to remind the fact that Scott proposed the 
existence of ambivalent attitudes in 1968. In other terms, it took forty years to raise the 
possibility for attitudes not to be necessarily bipolar. Similarly, the existence of ambivalent 
emotions (i.e. the possibility of being both happy and sad at the same time) has been 
demonstrated in 2001 (Larsen, McGraw & Cacioppo, 2001) whereas the first bipolar model of 
affect has been proposed in 1980 (Russell, 1980). We believe that this tells us about the fact 
that ambivalent attitudes are intuitively considered as rare, or as “abnormal”.  
Furthermore, this reasoning is supported by the results of Bell and Esses (2002). In the 
second study of their paper, Bell and Esses investigated if response amplification (i.e. the fact 
that ambivalent individuals respond more strongly to an influence message in comparison 
with univalent ones) was moderated by motivational factors. For the test of such hypothesis, 
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they randomly attributed their participants to two conditions: one where ambivalence was 
presented positively and the other where it was presented negatively. The usual observed 
response amplification effect appeared only in the condition where ambivalence was 
perceived as something negative (the negative motive condition) but not when ambivalence 
was perceived as something positive (the positive motive condition). Thus, it suggests that 
ambivalence can indeed be seen as something negative.  
 However, if ambivalent attitudes could be mostly negatively perceived, several studies 
showed that they could lead to positive effects. In the next part, we will review literature on 
ambivalence that sustains the idea that ambivalent attitudes could be seen as useful attitudes. 
  
 2.2.2 The useful side of ambiv alence 
 Even if the pliability of ambivalent attitudes is often negatively evaluated, it can be 
profitable to help changing negative behaviors. Hence, the fact that ambivalent individuals are 
more responsive to influence situations than less ambivalent individuals could lead to positive 
consequences and in that, they could be useful. For instance, Lipkus and collaborators 
(Lipkus, Green, Feaganes, & Sedikides, 2001; Lipkus, Pollak, McBride, Schwartz-Bloom, 
Lyna, & Bloom, 2005) reported that being ambivalent toward smoking could be helpful in the 
effort to quit smoking. Indeed, despite their tobacco use (and hence, the fact that they hold a 
positive attitude toward cigarettes), smokers have been shown to generate more arguments 
against smoking than in favor of smoking (Falomir, Mugny & Pérez, 2000). In line with that, 
ambivalence appeared to be related with a strong desire to quit smoking among teenagers. In 
this line of research, ambivalence is conceived as a step between the positive attitude and the 
expected endorsement of a negative one. In other terms, ambivalence is viewed as an 
intermediate between univalent positive attitudes and univalent negative attitudes, and thus as 
being proper in helping to change people’s attitude. Focusing on health-related messages, 
Brömer (2002) reported that ambivalent individuals were more responsive than less 
ambivalent individuals. For instance, they had stronger intentions to follow low-fat diets or to 
exercise after being submitted to a negatively framed health message such as “not exercising 
regularly increases your risk of developing a serious heart disease”. Zhao and Capella recently 
found similar effects (2008): ambivalent adolescents responded more importantly to 
negatively framed messages about marijuana use than less ambivalent ones. They reported 
more negative attitudes toward marijuana and lower intentions to smoke after message 
exposure such as “getting high makes you lazy and irresponsible”. Thus, the pliability of 
ambivalent attitudes can sometimes lead to a greater good: for instance, being ambivalent 
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about negative behaviors (such as behaviors that can cause health problems for instance) can 
facilitate the behavioral or attitudinal change in comparison with individuals who are only 
negatively opposed. 
 Hänze (2001) viewed the fact that ambivalent individuals suffer from decision-making 
situations as indicating that they are deeply thinking before acting. He indeed proposed that 
ambivalence could act as a "stop signal" when people deal with a complex situation (such as 
supporting a military intervention or not); for him, this signal would then prompt individuals 
to thoroughly consider the situation. Ambivalence could thus be adaptive in that it would help 
individuals pondering the pros and the cons about an issue.   
Ambivalence can also be profitable in inter-personal relationships. In his article about 
prejudice expression, Costarelli (2011) claimed that expressing ambivalence toward the out-
group could protect the self. By this means, it is possible to criticize members of the out-
group and describe them in negative terms while acknowledging some of their competences at 
the same time. He observed that prejudice expression leads to more positive affect for the 
ambivalent participants. Out-group ambivalence was conceived as a more "defensible, 
balanced and realistic reaction" (pp. 51-52) to the relevant stereotypic traits of out-group 
members. Expressing ambivalence in a complex situation could thus be the optimal solution. 
Actually, it has been recently found that, as opposed to univalent influence message, mixed 
messages toward out-groups (immigrants or Arabs in France) were indeed evaluated as the 
most balanced, realistic and acceptable ones (Brauer, Er-Rafiy, Kawakami, & Phills, 2012). 
Pagliaro, Alparone, Pacilli and Mucchi-Faïna (2012) threatened the identity of their 
participants in their experiment and set two conditions for this purpose. In a low-threat 
condition, their Italian participants were opposed to Senegalese and presented as succeeding 
better. In a high-threat condition, they were compared to British and presented as succeeding 
worse. This experiment is rooted on previous research in inter-group relations that highlighted 
that low-status members tend to perceive members of their in-group as being similar (i.e. the 
in-group homogeneity effect, Simon & Brown, 1987) and on the fact that generally people 
prefer members of their in-group than members of the out-group (the intergroup bias, see 
Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, for an account). Pagliaro and colleagues observed that 
participants in the high-threat condition tended to describe their group in a more ambivalent 
way than participants in the low-threat condition. Thus, participants who had to face an 
identity threat portrayed the in-group in an ambivalent way: instead of being univalently 
positive toward their in-group, as they would have been in a more neutral situation, they 
included some negative aspects in their in-group description. Ambivalence was again used as 
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being protective for the image of the group; indeed, they still described their in-group 
positively while they were also acknowledging some weaknesses.  
 Lastly, ambivalence has been, mainly in the management literature, paired with 
mindfulness, knowledge and creativity. We have mentioned previously that ambivalence 
could lead to greater processing of the information, thus it is not absurd to imagine that such 
deep processing could have other positive consequences than “resolving the ambivalence”, 
that is conceived as merely siding with influence message. For instance, a greater processing 
of the information can lead people to being more cautious on an issue. For Weick (1998, 
2002, 2004), ambivalence constitutes a wise attitude that represents the “optimal 
compromise” between knowledge and doubt. Fire crews that obey to the LCES system when 
they are fighting fires illustrate this reasoning; LCES stands for Lookouts, Communication 
links, Escape routes and Safety zones. Fire crews consistently have to evaluate the situation 
when they fight a fire and, notably, they have to take into account what they know (for 
instance, the placement of the exits) while keeping in their mind what they do not necessarily 
know (such as the location of safety zones or what will be behind a door for example). Thus, 
being cautious of the situation and recognizing the incomplete knowledge of the big picture is 
considered as being helpful in that it can allow a fast adaptation to varying situations and 
helps pondering the pros and the cons of each possible choice. Competing tendencies in a 
changing environment are seen as possibly preventing from unwarranted persistence while 
providing both confidence and cautiousness (Weick, 2004). Piderit (2000) argued that 
ambivalence could stem from changing situations (such as when a company merges with 
another) and that the mix of fear and excitement that results from them, could prevent from 
the oversimplification of an issue. Also, ambivalent individuals are expected to be more likely 
to raise their voice and express their concerns in debates; ambivalence could thus be useful as 
diverging opinions (and even dissent) can play a positive role for the renewal and the 
adaptation of organizations in changing situations (Piderit, 2000). Fiol & O’Connor (2003) 
also discussed ambivalence as potentially leading to mindful decisions. They mentioned for 
instance that bandwagon behaviors could be associated with both concerns about success and 
concerns about failure and that the co-occurrence of these two preoccupations could lead 
greater mindfulness. 
Ambivalence can also be linked with knowledge and strategic decisions. For instance, 
Plambeck and Weber (2010) reported that strategic ambidexterity leads to more ambivalence; 
that is, the more an organization includes both offensive and defensive strategic orientations 
(strategic ambidexterity), the more ambivalent it will be when it will make a decision.  
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Stoeckel (2013) recently observed that both objective knowledge and media consumption lead 
to more ambivalence. Results indicated that the more individuals knew about Europe, the 
more ambivalent they were about this issue. In sum, ambivalence and knowledge could be 
linked (see also Mutz, 2002; Meffert et al., 2004; Sawicki et al., 2013).  
The link between ambivalence and knowledge could be tied up with the research of 
Grabowski, Wojciske and Brömer (2005), who reported that we tend to be more ambivalent 
toward individuals with whom we are still in contact, in comparison with individuals whom 
we no longer see. They reported for instance that when there is no more contact with 
someone, our attitude toward the person tends to be polarized (either positively or negatively 
as a function of how the individual is remembered) and thus, ambivalence decreases. Finally, 
Fong (2006) reported that ambivalent emotions (such as being happy and sad at the same 
time) allowed individuals to make more connections when they were asked to complete the 
Remote Associative Task (RAT; Mednick, 1962). In her experiment, Fong began by asking 
the participants to either recall an event of their lives that produces happiness, sadness or 
ambivalence. Participants then had to perform the RAT, that is a task where three words are 
displayed and people have to find a fourth word that is associated with the three first ones. For 
example, people who seen the words ENVY GOLF and BEANS had to write down GREEN 
as the solution. Fong argued that novelty arises from the ability to connect two elements that 
others did not see as related; this task is thus conceived as a creativity task. Results revealed 
that participants who recalled an ambivalent event (and thus where ambivalent emotions were 
primed) made more associations in comparison with participants who recalled a positive or a 
negative event.  In other terms, emotional ambivalence has led them to more creativity.  
 In sum, ambivalence is not only linked with hesitations or delaying decision-making. 
As we have seen, ambivalence could also be resulting from complex and strategic situations.  
 
 2.2.3 The function of (ambiv alent) attitudes  
 Attitudes have repeatedly been conceived of as helping people to appraise the attitude 
objects (Fazio, 2000; Fazio & Olson, 2003b). Indeed, once they have been formed, people can 
rely on their attitudes to efficiently process the numerous stimuli of the environment. For 
example, they can facilitate the categorization of attitude objects or persons (Fazio, 2001; 
Haire, 1950; Smith, Fazio, & Cejka, 1996). An illustration can be found in Haire (1950) 
where it was demonstrated that people's attitudes toward products could directly impact their 
perception of the buyer. In her study, participants were asked to describe a woman after 
reading her shopping list. Two experimental conditions were set; in a condition the shopping 
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list contained "Maxwell House Coffee (drip ground)", whereas it contained "Nescafé Instant 
Coffee" in the other condition. The other elements of the list did not vary as a function of the 
condition. Haire (1950) observed that 48 % of the participants described the woman who 
bought "Nescafé instant coffee" as someone lazy and less organized, whereas only 4% and 
12% of the sample respectively gave these descriptions when she bought "Maxwell House 
Coffee (drip ground)". Hence, participants categorized the target-individual based on their 
perception of the product; in 1950, instant coffee was likely to be perceived as indicating that 
people do not give enough attention to the other (sharing a coffee was indeed seen as sharing 
an intimate and relaxing moment, and thus, such moment required coffee-making to be made 
seriously).  
The fact that attitudes facilitate the categorization process has further been described 
as freeing cognitive resources. Indeed, as people have to process information to a lesser extent 
when they rely on their pre-formed attitudes, they can allocate their cognitive resources 
elsewhere. Fazio and Powell (1997) observed that students who held attitudes toward diverse 
academic domains before their entry at University seemed to cope better with stressing factors 
during their first university year. Their study included a two-step paradigm. First, they 
measured the initial physical and mental state of their participants, as well as their attitude 
toward many academic domains. Then, participants were asked to fill the same mental and 
physical indicators two months later. The authors logically reported that participants with an 
initial bad state of health recovered as the amount of stress declined; however, interestingly, 
they observed that this was amplified by attitude accessibility. That is, the more participants 
held an accessible attitude toward the academic domains and the more likely they recovered. 
For the authors, this result supports the idea according to which holding an attitude freed 
some cognitive resources that were further used to cope with stressing events.  
Attitudes can also ease decision-making (Blascovich, Ernst, Tomaka, Kelsey, 
Salomon, & Fazio, 1993; Fazio, Blascovich, & Driscoll, 1992). Fazio et al. (1992) reported 
for example that participants who developed an attitude toward abstract paintings in a first 
step were faster to indicate the painting they preferred when a set of paintings was presented 
in a second step. Attitudes also serve a social-identity function (Shavitt & Nelson, 2000; 
2001). Through the expression of attitudes, people can affirm their core values and position 
themselves within social groups (Katz, 1960). Katz actually proposed that attitudes could 
serve four functions. The first one is the knowledge function, in that it helps individuals 
process their environment, as we just discussed. The second function is an ego-defensive 
function, in that an attitude can prevent the individual from having internal conflicts. Holding 
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a negative attitude toward a minority outgroup can bolster people's self-esteem for instance 
(Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009). Attitudes also have a utilitarian function. People can 
adapt to their environment and hence, try to maximize the benefits and reduce the costs. It has 
been discussed that people develop a positive attitude toward attitude objects that are the most 
likely to be beneficial to them (such as developing a positive attitude toward job performance 
for instance). The fourth function is the value-expressive function. Attitudes can be beneficial 
for the people's self-concept in that it can help them to portray the image of themselves that 
corresponds the most to what they identify with. For instance, people who value power (i.e. 
human domination) have been found to be more likely to hold a positive attitude toward 
genetically modified food and a negative attitude toward organic food. The reverse pattern 
was found for people who value universalism (Dreezens, Martijn, Tenbült, Kok, & De Vries, 
2005).  
However, it is important to note that attitude objects can elicit different values and 
hence, that they can serve different functions (Maio & Olson, 2000). Furthermore, the 
expression of a certain kind of attitudes can be strengthened by social norms (as will be 
discussed in 3.1). McConahay, Hardee and Batz (1981) reported for instance that individuals 
are perfectly able to ponder their attitude toward Blacks when they are answering to a Black 
experimenter in comparison with when they are doing so with a White experimenter because 
they know that the expression of negative racial attitudes is socially perceived as negative. In 
sum, it is because attitudes help people to rapidly pick a side, hold a clear position and act in 
line with it, that attitudes are considered as functional. They facilitate the processing of the 
information as well as people's social adaptation. 
 These considerations directly suggest that ambivalent attitudes should be detrimental 
for individuals (Maio & Olson, 2000). Indeed, if univalent attitudes provide a useful 
predisposition, ambivalent attitudes should consequently be confusing. In fact, as we 
discussed above, the function of ambivalent attitudes is still not crystal-clear. We proposed to 
contribute in this debate by contending that ambivalent attitudes could act as a self-regulating 
device. By being associated with the two sides of an issue, ambivalent attitudes could in fact 
provide two possible ways to deal with the situation and hence, be more adaptive than 
univalent ones. Fazio and Ledbetter (1998; cited in Fazio, 2000) indeed reported that once a 
univalent attitude has been formed, individuals have trouble in processing counter-attitudinal 
information. Therefore, and as will be detailed in point 3, we proposed that a function of 
ambivalent attitudes could be to provide the opportunity to strategically portray the expected 
type of attitude in an evaluative situation. More precisely, we contended that ambivalent 
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attitudes could serve a social function in that it could help people to adapt to a situation of 
influence as well as conveying a good image of themselves. 
  
 Concluding comments 
In this section, we discussed several articles that suggest that attitudinal ambivalence 
may not be socially perceived as positive. As mentioned above, cognitive consistency has 
been repeatedly been described as socially desirable, and picking a side also seems to be 
socially approved. Thus, univalent attitudes seem to be preferred to ambivalent attitudes. 
However, we have also discussed that ambivalent attitudes have been related to a profound 
comprehension and analysis of complex issues. They have been portrayed as wise attitudes 
and considered as being adaptive in rapidly evolving situations. Their perception thus does 
not seem to be so clear-cut. We concluded by introducing our reflection on what the function 
of ambivalent attitudes could be: namely, a self-regulating device that could help people adapt 
in evaluative situations. 
 
 3. Our approach 
« Ayant vécu 2 ans en Asie, je pense que les OGM pourraient être la solution à la famine...  
mais je suis dubitative car je pense que ça nuit en même temps à la biodiversité...  
J'ai donc des sentiments contradictoires, p-e suis-je mal informée » 
Participante anonyme (2011). 
 
The above analysis of the literature on ambivalence points to a paradox. Indeed, 
ambivalence has been repeatedly portrayed as a negative form of attitude in many lines of 
research. However, if we follow such assessment, we can wonder why ambivalence is such a 
widespread phenomenon (Breckler, 2004). Indeed, the observed ratio of ambivalent 
individuals within a sample sometimes represents more than 40 % of the total. Breckler 
(2004) reported for instance that over 41.1% of his students’ sample reported some degree of 
ambivalence toward nuclear power; Gutman and McConaughy (1978) highlighted that 42% 
of their participants were ambivalent toward television programs. Moreover, we also reported 
several lines of research showing that ambivalence can be related to discernment and critical 
thinking. Thus, depending of the line of research, ambivalent attitudes could be either weak 
attitudes that people want to suppress or attitudes that lead them to being more critical and 
wise.  
We consequently proposed to cope with this paradox by studying the function of 
ambivalent attitudes. We considered that ambivalent attitudes could be negatively perceived 
in most cases, mainly because of the preference for consistency and the fact that we tend to 
2- Theoretical Part 
   43
arrive at conclusion; however, we also considered that ambivalence could suggest that people 
are pondering the pros and the cons of an issue. In other terms, we assumed that ambivalent 
attitudes could be socially valued. We supposed that, because of this potential value, 
displaying ambivalence or not could correspond to a self-presentation strategy. In other terms, 
it seemed plausible to think that people know when pondering an issue will be beneficial for 
them and when it should be less likely the case. We extended this reflection by studying how 
ambivalent individuals were effectively socially perceived. We wanted to make sure that 
indeed, the display of such attitudes could be socially perceived as positive. This reflection 
has been pursued in two lines of research that will be detailed in 3.3. Before presenting our 
specific hypotheses, we will present the common paradigms that are used by research that 
focuses on social norms and social values (part 3.1.1) and speak about the two fundamental 
dimensions of social judgment (part 3.1.2). In a second section (3.2), we will specify the 
conditions according to which ambivalence could be more or less likely to be displayed as 
well as being socially valued. 
 
3.1 How to study social norms and their associated valued components.  
It has been reported that individuals could strategically adapt their behaviors or their 
answers in evaluative situations. For instance, people are more likely to fake their answers 
when they apply for a job: 15% of job applicants declared to have occupied jobs they did not 
in fact occupy (Goldstein, 1971). Likewise, individuals have been reported as being able to 
strategically alter their answers when they fill a questionnaire. 
 
3.1.1 Social desirability  
Edwards and Horst (1953; cited in Lemaine, 1965) have approached this problem by 
focusing on personality tests (namely on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; 
MMPI). They noticed that several questions of this personality test were tainted by social 
desirability. In other terms, because what they were assessing was valued (either positively or 
negatively), individuals were more likely to answer according to such value instead of 
answering in line with their personality as expected. It has been later pointed out by Messick 
and Jackson (1961) that people are indeed motivated by gaining social approval through their 
answers on this questionnaire. Researchers have consequently attempted to identify and 
control the social desirability of questionnaires with the aim of obtaining more “sincere” 
answers.  
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Crowne and Marlowe (1960) devised a social desirability scale for this purpose (an 
example of item could be “I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake”). This scale 
allows identifying the degree of variance in the answers due to social desirability effects and 
thus, after being controlled for, the observed responses should be more reliable. Several other 
studies were conducted in order to compare the tests to identify the more permeable 
questionnaires (i.e. the most subject to faking) and the ones that do not vary much as a 
function of social desirability effects (see Alliger & Dwight, 2000 for instance) whereas other 
focused on identifying the type of individuals who are more likely to fake (see McFarland & 
Ryan, 2000 for example). In sum, a lot of research has been devoted to identifying who would 
be the most likely to fake, as well as trying to control the degree of social desirability of 
questionnaires in order to obtain more reliable measures.  
It is important to note that the function of such desirability effects has been recently 
criticized: Uziel (2010) proposed that social desirability scales could be indicative of people’s 
self-control. He reported that the propensity to easily adapt in social situations was done in 
order to gain social approval, and thus as being inter-personally oriented instead of being 
done for satisfying the self.  Social desirability would thus be directed toward others and used 
to appear in a better light in the eyes of others. Notwithstanding the importance of such lines 
of research, they do not take into account what people decide to portray in order to gain social 
approval and though, do not help in identifying the socially valued constructs (Lemaine, 
1965). Indeed, they simply highlighted that questions could be tainted by social desirability 
and that answers that depend on them could be faked without especially focusing on what is 
most likely to be presented when people are motivated in appearing in a good light in the eyes 
of others. We will now present researches that did aim at doing so. 
 
3.1.2 A  presentation of the common paradigms  
Jellison and Green (1981) devised three paradigms to identify the value of the answers 
that are displayed when participants fake. However, we will only detail two of them in this 
section. Indeed, the third paradigm (i.e. the “identification paradigm”) is the paradigm that 
has been the least used of the three paradigms in the literature (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003) and 
furthermore, we did not took it into consideration in any of our experiments.  
The first paradigm is the “self-presentation paradigm”. In this paradigm, individuals 
are either invited to answer a questionnaire in a self-enhancement condition (that is in order to 
give a good image of themselves) or in a self-depreciation condition (that is in order to give a 
negative image of themselves). The rationale is that, if people know what answer is valued 
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(what the social norm is), then they should be able to purposely alter their answers as a 
function of the condition. Thus, through this means, it is possible to deduce if the answers are 
affected by social desirability by looking at the difference in the answers as a function of the 
condition. Indeed, a question can be considered as not being neutral (i.e. as being subject to 
social desirability) if people do not answer the same when they try to give a bad image of 
themselves in comparison with when they try to give a good image of themselves (Paulhus & 
Vazire, 2007). Furthermore, it is possible to identify the direction of the value: for instance, if 
people display more professional experience than they really have when they apply for a job, 
this suggest that professional experience is indeed positively perceived in such situation. By 
this mean, Jellison and Green (1981) observed for instance that individuals endorsed more 
internal explanations than external ones in a positive self-presentation condition. An example 
of an internal explanation could be to attribute success to hard work whereas an external 
explanation would be to attribute it to luck for instance. Consequently, internality (the 
attribution of the responsibility of events to the self) has been identified as a valued 
component. Numerous studies further replicated the fact that under evaluative conditions, 
people were more likely to display internal explanations in comparison with more external 
ones (Dubois, 2003; Dubois & Aubert, 2010; Cambon, 2006).  
Dubois (1988, cited in Gilibert & Cambon, 2003) slightly modified this paradigm by 
adding a “standard” condition. Indeed, before being invited to answer in one of the two self-
presentation conditions, individuals are requested to answer without any specific instructions. 
This condition serves as a baseline even if the answers of such conditions are generally quite 
close to the ones observed in the self-enhancement condition (see Jouffre, Py, & Somat, 2001 
for instance). Indeed, even in a standard condition, individuals could already be motivated to 
present a positive image of themselves (Bressoux & Pansu, 2007). This paradigm can be used 
in two ways. First, the self-presentation conditions can be set as a between-participants 
variable: two groups will be randomly attributed to either the self-enhancement condition or 
the self-depreciation condition (Dubois, 2000). The difference between the two conditions 
will suggest what the participants have valued: in other terms, if individuals displayed more 
internal answers in the self-enhancement condition than they did in the self-depreciation 
condition, this suggests that they attributed some value to internality. Manipulating the person 
to whom one has to present oneself could also be an effective procedure. For instance, Esnard 
& Jouffre (2008) asked their pupils to answer in order to be evaluated by either their teachers, 
their parents, or their peers.  
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A second way to proceed is to display such conditions as a within-participants 
variable. In this case, participants will have to fill in the questionnaire three times. First, they 
will answer in a standard condition and then, in turn, under a self-enhancing instruction or 
under a self-depreciation instruction. The two self-presentation conditions are commonly 
counterbalanced but the order does generally not impact the answers (see Jouffre et al., 2001 
for instance). Using the self-presentation instructions as a within-participants variable allows 
identifying the respondents’ “normative clear-sightedness” (i.e. the extent to which 
individuals are aware of the social norm). Individuals can indeed easily shift their answers as 
a function of the instructions and move from an opposite to the other (they can easily display 
an extremely positive answer on a socially valued item and then an extremely negative answer 
to the very same item for instance). The self-presentation paradigm set as a within-
participants design presents an advantage in comparison with when it is set as a between-
participants design. It is convenient to investigate the extent to which individuals answer 
strategically when they fill a questionnaire. By looking at the difference in the answers as a 
function of the condition it is possible to conclude that individuals did purposely portray a 
specific trait to a greater extent. When it is set in a between-participants design, it is not 
possible to be sure that the difference in the endorsement of a trait has indeed been done 
strategically and is not due to different samples for instance. However, both procedures allow 
the identification of the desirable component of a scale.  
Thus, the self-presentation paradigm is helpful in identifying the type of component 
that people will display to a greater extent when they are motivated to appear positively. 
However, it does not tell anything about the efficacy of such behavior. Indeed, it is not 
because an individual decides to put a specific trait forward in a self-presentation condition 
that such trait is necessarily socially valued (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). For instance, we can 
imagine a boy who describes himself as being aggressive, when aggressiveness is generally 
not accepted and negatively perceived. Trying to influence others by faking one’s answers is 
thus not necessarily beneficial. The “judge paradigm” has been devised in order to test if the 
faking strategy is effective in influencing others.  
The judge paradigm allows to directly identify the valued component or a social norm 
(Jellison & Green, 1981). In order to test if internal attributions were more socially approved 
and valued than external attributions as presumed, Jellison & Green (1981) asked their 
participants to give their impression of students who filled in the Rotter's Internal-External 
Locus of Control Scale that is composed of 23 items (Rotter, 1966). The experimenters in fact 
filled in the scale.  It was done in such a way as to create a low-internality condition (one item 
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reflecting an internal response out the 23 items was circled), a moderate-internality condition 
(thirteen items reflecting an internal response were circled), a high-internality condition 
(twenty items reflecting an internal response were circled) and a very-high internality 
condition (where all the items reflected internal responses). Thus, bogus answers to a 
questionnaire were presented to the participants and they were invited to judge the alleged 
former participants after reading how they answered a questionnaire. The comparison of the 
impressions as a function of the internality condition allowed the identification of the most 
valued component; internal explanations were evaluated as the most desirables in comparison 
with less internal ones. Hence, this paradigm lies on the same rationale than the self-
presentation paradigm: people will know if a component is valued. In sum, the more this 
component is displayed in the answers and the more positive the individual will be evaluated. 
As the present paradigm involves a form of social judgment, it seems relevant to discuss the 
literature that has identified two dimensions in social judgment. 
 
3.1.3 The fundamental dimensions of social judgment  
Two main dimensions seem to shape people's perception of individuals, groups 
(stereotypes) and objects (for a recent review, see Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2010). Fiske 
(2011) argued for instance that it is essential to know other’s intention when they are 
encountered. For instance, people need to know if they are dealing with a friend or a foe and 
hence, if the other holds sympathetic or hostile intentions. The other important characteristic 
is whether the other can be helpful or not or in other terms, if the other will display any kind 
of competence or not. These two dimensions have been variously termed across time, for 
instance value versus dynamism (Osgood, 1962); social desirability versus intellectual 
desirability (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968); self-profitability versus other-
profitability (Peeters, 1992); communion versus agency (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007); warmth 
versus competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) and social desirability versus social 
utility (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005) to name a few designations. However, if these different 
terms refer to similar concepts, they lead to different approaches in the study of the social 
judgment (Beauvois & Dubois, 2009). Social desirability corresponds to the individuals’ 
ability to engender a positive evaluation in others, while social utility corresponds to the 
ability to satisfy the requirements of a given social environment and thus to the individuals’ 
chances of success in social life (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).  
The approach of Beauvois and collaborators (Beauvois, 1995; Beauvois & Dubois, 
2009) has been highly influential among the researchers who used the judge paradigm. 
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Consequently, in most of these studies, participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
bogus participants appeared to be high on social desirability as well as on social utility as a 
function of their answers (see Cambon, Djouari, & Beauvois, 2006; Dompnier, Darnon, 
Delmas & Butera, 2008; Dubois & Beauvois, 2011 for instance). This distinction allows 
specifying the perception of traits displayed by a target. Indeed, people can evaluate that 
displaying more internal explanations for instance in comparison with another individual 
gives the impression of an agreeable individual. Such person should be more likely to appear 
desirable in the eyes of others. The other dimension assesses the extent to which people who 
display the same trait are evaluated as being competent. Social value is conceived as 
indicating that people who endorsed such valued trait are people who are the most likely to 
attain a position of power (i.e. to climb in the social hierarchy). In line with this, it has been 
observed that components that have been highlighted as valued and normative were valued on 
the social utility dimensions. For instance, people who agreed to a greater extent to items in 
favor of consistency or to items in favors of the belief in a just world were evaluated as the 
most competent (Sénémeaud, Mange, Gouger, Testé & Somat, 2011, Alves & Correia, 2010).  
 
Concluding comments 
In this section, we started by pointing to a paradox in the literature on ambivalence. 
Ambivalence is on the one hand described as being aversive and unstable and on the other 
hand it is described as a wise form of attitude that is encouraged because it allows adaptation 
and increases mindfulness. Ambivalent individuals have been described as weak individuals 
who are easily influenced, but also as strategic individuals who adapt to the pressure of the 
environment, and thus, as individuals who could know when displaying ambivalence could be 
more or less likely to be accepted. We proposed to tackle this point by arguing that 
ambivalent attitudes could hold a specific social value. Indeed, we proposed to view 
ambivalence as indicating that one is pondering the pros and the cons about an attitude object; 
in this respect, individuals who display an ambivalent attitude could be positively judged. The 
two dimensions of social judgment allow to specify this reasoning: because ambivalent 
attitudes represent a compromise between knowledge and doubts as well as a wise attitude in 
relation to strategic issues, ambivalence could be evaluated positively on social utility. 
Voicing both positive and negative evaluations of an issue may be seen as a form of critical 
thinking, and could indeed sustain their image of competence in the domain, in comparison 
with voicing more univalent evaluations.  
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The valorization of ambivalent attitudes should specifically be observed on the social 
utility dimension. Indeed, social norms and social desirability are often associated in the 
literature (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; Johnson & van de Vijver, 2003), and therefore pro-
normative attitudes should be evaluated as the most desirable. Ambivalent attitudes should be 
less valued than pro-normative ones in terms of desirability, as they represent a certain degree 
of deviance, and counter-normative attitudes should be the least valued on desirability, as they 
are the most deviant. Also, because of the above paradox, we do not believe that the 
expression of ambivalence will always be well perceived in terms of social utility. 
Ambivalent attitudes could only be valued when they are expressed on complex attitude 
objects, on issues where weighting would indeed indicate that people are reflecting on the 
issue and not contesting it. Controversial attitude objects appeared ideal for this purpose. 
 
3.2 Controversy 
As just mentioned, we assumed that ambivalence should not be positively perceived 
on any attitude objects but that it should be more likely the case on controversial ones. Indeed, 
when there is a controversy about an attitude object, positive and negative aspects of the issue 
are debated. For instance, the publication of the article by Séralini, Clair, Mesnage, Gress, 
Defarge, Malatesta, Hennequin and Spiroux de Vendômois (2012), which revealed that 
genetically modified maize could be detrimental for the health, has stimulated numerous 
articles about whether the results of research on genetically modified food and their health-
related problems were reassuring or worrying (see Peeples, 2012, for instance). Thus, 
pondering over an issue could be socially valued. The reasoning is that, because controversy 
divides the opinions, the expression of ambivalent attitudes should be more positively 
perceived in such situations as it amounts to acknowledging both sides of an issue. For 
instance, being cautious about the publication of Séralini seems to be wise (ambivalence can 
indeed prevent from oversimplifications; Piderit, 2000). It is hence plausible to think that 
displaying an ambivalent attitude could make people appear more competent in comparison 
with people who are more extreme in their attitude.  
The idea that ambivalence could be more positively perceived in case of controversial 
issues had been already mentioned by Maio and Haddock (2004): “it is possible that social 
norms make it occasionally desirable to have high ambivalence in an attitude, such as when 
the issue is controversial. In this situation, people who appear ambivalent may give the 
impression of being fair and knowledgeable. These individuals may also be inoffensive to 
others because they “agree” with everyone to some extent” (p. 435; see also Maio & 
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Haddock, 2010, pp. 41-42). However, they simply evocated this possibility and neither 
provided any data in favor or against it, nor formulated an explanation for this possibility. In 
our work, we set out to experimentally account, and explain, this possibility. Thus, we 
decided to take into account the controversy associated with attitude objects in our 
experiments; a controversial issue was here conceived as one that elicited a heated debate and 
a polemic disagreement. As a reminder, we hypothesized that the expression of ambivalent 
attitudes could be more likely than that of univalent attitudes to be valued on social utility, but 
not on social desirability, when being expressed on controversial issues in comparison.  
 
3.3 Overview of the studies 
We will present two lines of research in this dissertation. The first of these was 
designed to investigate if, indeed, ambivalence could be strategically displayed to a greater or 
a lesser extent as a function of self-presentational concerns. Our general hypothesis was that, 
if people consider that ambivalence could have some value, then they would be able to adapt 
the expressions of their level of ambivalence to the situation. For this purpose, we decided to 
use the self-presentation paradigm (Jellison & Green, 1981; Dubois, 1988), as this paradigm 
is convenient to investigate the extent to which individuals answer strategically when they fill 
a questionnaire. Indeed, when the self-presentation conditions are set as a within-participants 
variable, participants have the opportunity to purposely shift their answer in line with 
instructions. If individuals are strategic when filling ambivalence measures, we should 
observe a difference as a function of the self-presentation conditions. Thus, we predicted that 
individuals could exert some control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence 
(Hypothesis 1). This control was assumed to be exerted for self-presentation purposes, in that 
people could try to display a positive image of themselves when filling measures of 
ambivalence. Specifically, we hypothesized that the difference in the level of ambivalence 
should be observed in the self-depreciation condition in comparison with the standard 
condition and the self-enhancement one (Hypothesis 2). Indeed, it has been shown that 
individuals are generally already motivated to give a positive image of themselves in a 
standard condition and thus, there is either a high correlation between the score in the 
standard condition and the self-enhancement one (Bressoux & Pansu, 2007) or no difference 
at all (see Jouffre et al., 2001). The third hypothesis took the controversy of the attitude object 
into account. If it is true that ambivalence has some value because it may indicate that people 
are pondering the pros and the cons of an attitude object, then people should purposely decide 
to display more ambivalence in both a standard condition and a self-enhancement condition in 
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comparison with a self-depreciation condition on controversial attitude objects. We 
hypothesized that the reverse should happen on more consensual issues as they strongly imply 
what should be expressed. Hence, we hypothesized that people should purposely decide to 
display less ambivalence in both a standard condition and a self-enhancement condition in 
comparison with a self-depreciation condition on consensual attitude objects.  
These hypotheses have been tested in four experiments. The first two were devoted to 
testing hypotheses 1 and 2 on a controversial attitude object. We decided to focus on 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in these studies. GMOs were chosen because 
controversies about them are quite vivid and frequent (see Peeples, 2012) and they were 
indeed evaluated as being controversial in a pilot study ran on a sample of Swiss students. 
The third experiment was run on a consensual attitude object in order to show that indeed, if 
people strategically adapt their level of ambivalence on this attitude object as well, they 
should display more ambivalence in order to give a negative image. The fourth experiment 
was run in order to manipulate the degree of controversy associated with the attitude object, 
and directly test hypothesis 3. We thus run a fourth experiment on GMOs but we set up two 
experimental conditions: in one condition, we introduced GMOs as being consensually 
negatively perceived in Switzerland whereas in a second condition GMOs were introduced as 
being subject to a heavy debate and thus as a controversial attitude object. 
The second line of research has been carried out to extend the implications of the first 
line of research. We wanted to investigate how ambivalent individuals would be judged when 
expressing their ambivalence in comparison with univalent individuals, as we proposed that 
the expression of ambivalence could also be socially valued by an external perceiver. We thus 
reasoned that ambivalent individuals could be evaluated as more competent and intelligent  
(social utility) than their univalent counterparts (as this might signal that people have been 
pondering the issue), but not necessarily more nice and agreeable (social desirability). This 
was also rooted on the fact that social norms and social desirability are often tied (Gilibert & 
Cambon, 2003; Johnson, & van de Vijver, 2003). Moreover, as for the first line of research, 
we assumed that this effect should be more likely to happen on controversial attitude objects. 
More specifically, Hypothesis 1a specified that people displaying ambivalence on 
controversial attitude objects should be rated the highest on social utility in comparison with 
people displaying univalent attitudes (either in favor or against the attitude object). 
Hypothesis 1b predicted a linear effect on social desirability in that that people who display 
the pro-normative attitude on controversial attitude objects should be evaluated as the most 
desirable, the ambivalent one should be less valued (as it is a bit deviant from the pro-
2- Theoretical Part 
   52
normative attitude) and the counter-normative one should be the least valued (as it is the most 
deviant attitude). We assumed that the valorization of ambivalent attitudes would be more 
likely to be observed on controversial attitude objects. Indeed, consensus implies that most 
people agree on what to think of the attitude object and, notably, in perceiving it positively or 
negatively (Pérez & Mugny, 1996; Krueger, 1998). We thus expected that pro-normative 
attitudes would be preferred to ambivalent ones on both dimensions. Hypothesis 2a thus 
specified that we should observe a linear effect on social utility for consensual attitude 
objects: people who display the pro-normative attitude should be evaluated as the most useful, 
the ambivalent one should be less valued and the counter-normative one should be the least 
valued. Hypothesis 2b postulated the same effect on social desirability: people who display 
the pro-normative attitude should be evaluated as the most desirable, the ambivalent one 
should be less valued and the counter-normative one should be the least valued.  
These hypotheses have been tested in four experiments. We chose the attitude objects 
as a result of a pilot study and thus, ran Experiments 5 and 6 on controversial issues and 
Experiments 7 and 8 on consensual issues. More precisely, Experiment 5 dealt with death 
penalty, Experiment 6 on immigration, Experiment 7 on recycling and Experiment 8 on 
organic products. 
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The Social Value of Being Ambivalent: Self-Presentational Concerns 
in the Expression of Attitudinal Ambivalence 1 
 
Abstract 
 We tested whether individuals can exert control over the expression of attitudinal 
ambivalence and if this control is exerted with self-presentational concerns. Using the self-
presentation paradigm, participants reported more ambivalence about Genetically Modified 
Organisms ("GMO") in a standard and a self-enhancement (present yourself positively) 
conditions than in a self-depreciation (present yourself negatively) condition, on both felt 
(Experiments 1a and 2a) and potential ambivalence, in its cognitive (Experiments 1b and 2b) 
and affective components (Experiments 1b and 2c). The role of ambivalent attitudes in 
conveying a positive social value was confirmed by the fact that the above effect was found 
on a controversial attitude object (GMOs) but the opposite appeared on a non-controversial 
one (e.g. tooth brushing, a truism; Experiment 3). Such a reversal was obtained by directly 
manipulating the perception of controversy on GMOs (Experiment 4). Attitudinal 
ambivalence may thus serve an adaptive function, i.e. achieving a positive social value. 
 
 Keywords: ambivalence, attitudes, social value, self-presentation, controversy. 
 
  
                                                
1 Published as Pillaud, V., Cavazza, N., & Butera, F. (2013). The social value of being ambivalent: Self-
presentational concerns in the expression of attitudinal ambivalence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
39, 1139-1151. 
!
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The Social Value of Being Ambivalent: 
Self-Presentational Concerns in the Expression of Attitudinal Ambivalence 
 In September 2012, a wave of debate on the safety of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) flooded most media when a scientific study showed that a variety of GMO corn 
produced by an international food company increased cancer rate in mice. The findings were 
immediately compared with other scientific studies showing no impact of GMO on human 
and animal health (e.g. Peeples, 2012), leaving the public wondering whether in front of such 
a complex matter one should be in favor or against GMOs. We are frequently asked to 
express our opinion on various subjects in our everyday life, and it can appear in some cases 
that we hold simultaneously both positive and negative views on the debated topic. For 
example, one can be against genetically modified food because it could have disastrous 
consequences for the environment, but also in favor because it could help feeding people in 
need (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2006). This phenomenon has been referred to as attitudinal 
ambivalence (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). Interestingly, ambivalent attitudes have 
traditionally been treated as weak forms of attitude, and described as being malleable and 
influenced by persuasive communication (Armitage & Conner, 2000), as well as by consensus 
information (Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001) or interpersonal influence (Zemborain & Johar, 
2007). However, more recent research (e.g. Cavazza & Butera, 2008) has questioned this 
view by indicating that ambivalent individuals only change their attitude at a manifest level 
when facing a persuasive message, but not at a more latent level. 
 Thus, the question that still remains unanswered in the literature on attitudinal 
ambivalence is whether ambivalent attitudes are weaker, more malleable attitudes, or attitudes 
that have a specific function. Indeed, the debate has mainly revolved around the question of 
the weaknesses of attitudinal ambivalence, and has failed to ask and systematically study the 
question of its function. In this article, we aim at contributing to this debate in two 
complementary ways. Firstly, in order to address the question of what the function of 
attitudinal ambivalence might be, we adopted a self-presentational approach by contending 
that attitudinal ambivalence is an adaptive self-regulatory device and proposing the 
hypotheses that, if this contention is true, it should be possible to show that (a) individuals can 
exert some control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence and that (b) this control is 
exerted with self-presentational purposes, namely displaying a positive social value. 
Secondly, this research will also propose and test the process that might be responsible for the 
hypothesized effects, by showing that (c) attitudinal ambivalence may convey positive social 
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value in that it may communicate that one has thoughtfully pondered the issue, and should 
therefore be expressed for self-presentational purposes on controversial attitude objects but 
not on non-controversial attitude objects.  
 
The Functions of Attitudinal Ambivalence 
 Notwithstanding the vast literature on attitudinal ambivalence, some authors have 
pointed to the need for additional research that would directly address the functions fulfilled 
by ambivalent attitudes (Costarelli, 2011; Maio & Olson, 2000). Indeed, the studies conducted 
with this aim led to diverging conclusions as to the function of attitudinal ambivalence. The 
most consensual conclusions focused on the consequences of ambivalence, more specifically 
on the weakness of ambivalent attitudes in comparison with univalent attitudes, mainly 
because the former is less likely to predict intentions or further behaviors than the latter (see 
Armitage & Conner, 2004 for a review). Several studies reported indeed that being 
ambivalent weakens the link between attitude and behavior (e.g. Armitage, 2003; Conner, 
Povey, Sparks, James, & Shepherd, 2003; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004), as well as 
between attitude and intentions (Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 2001). 
Moreover, it has been recently discussed that ambivalent individuals feel discomfort in 
decision-making situations (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 
2009; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009). In sum, the majority of the studies 
available in the literature portray attitudinal ambivalence as a weak form of attitude. 
However, some researchers reported results indicating that attitudinal ambivalence 
could serve an adaptive function. For example, ambivalence was found to be related with a 
strong desire to quit smoking (Lipkus, Pollak, McBride, Schwartz-Bloom, Lyna, & Bloom, 
2005). In a similar vein, Fong (2006) has shown that inducing ambivalent emotions (i.e. 
sadness and happiness) helped the participants being creative. In a nutshell, even if 
ambivalent attitudes are a widespread phenomenon (Breckler, 2004), it has been noted that 
little is known about the antecedents of ambivalence (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005; Keele & 
Wolak, 2008).  
It is worth noting, in this respect, that some personality-based factors, also named top-
down processes by Conner and Armitage (2008; e.g. Need for Cognition, Personal Fear of 
Invalidity), have been reported to be associated with more or less ambivalence (Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Thompson & Zanna, 1995). Moreover, specific contexts (or 
bottom-up processes, Conner & Armitage, 2008) have been reported as leading individuals to 
be more or less ambivalent, as for example interpersonal discrepancy (Priester & Petty, 2001) 
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or the anticipation of conflicting situations (Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007). However, 
notwithstanding the importance of the above research, the motivational conflicts underlying 
the expression of attitudinal ambivalence still need to be clarified, as suggested by Crano and 
Prislin (2006). In this article, we aim for the first time at directly investigating how 
ambivalence can be used to present oneself as a function of the pressures of one’s social 
environment. 
This is the first original contribution of the present research. Indeed, to the best of our 
knowledge, only two articles reported research specifically aimed at investigating the 
influence of social norms on attitudinal ambivalence. However, both of these studies did so 
indirectly, and did not use a manipulation that allows to directly identify self-presentational 
concerns. Mucchi-Faina, Pacilli, Pagliaro and Alparone (2009) reported that individuals 
indicated less ambivalence toward an out-group (e.g. the elderly) when this out-group was 
protected by the fairness norm in comparison with a less protected group (e.g. the adults). 
Cavazza and Butera (2008) have shown in a study on persuasion that ambivalent participants 
could act strategically when facing a persuasive message. Their ambivalent participants 
changed attitude and agreed with the attitude of the majority at a direct level more than 
univalent participants, sustaining that ambivalent individuals can be influenced to a higher 
extent than univalent individuals. More interestingly, however, Cavazza and Butera (2008) 
also observed that unlike univalent participants, ambivalent participants maintained their 
initial attitude at an indirect level (where the link between attitudes and the source’s message 
was less salient). Thus, ambivalent participants seemed to be able to adapt themselves to the 
persuasive pressure of the majority and to strategically control the expression of their attitude, 
without really changing it.  
The above research raises the question of why one would express ambivalence in 
order to achieve a positive self-presentation. The answer to this question represents our 
second contribution. There is evidence that such a controlled expression of ambivalence may 
depend on the consensus attached to an attitude object. Green, Visser and Tetlock (2000) 
reported that individuals who were accountable to conflicting points of view toward the free 
fair trade issue (a topic on which there is no obvious solution according to these researchers) 
were the most integratively complex (i.e. more ambivalent) in comparison with individuals 
accountable to unified point of views. Furthermore, the idea of a link between controversy 
and ambivalence is suggested by Zhao and Capella (2008). Speaking about marijuana (a 
highly controversial drug in the United States), these authors evoked that the high ratio of 
ambivalent adolescents toward this drug could result from heated debates and consequently 
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from a lot of conflicting information over the years about marijuana in society. Likewise, 
Stoeckel (2013) reported that the disagreement among the elites on the attitude towards 
Europe could lead to more ambivalence in the population. However, one can wonder whether 
and to what extent these responses expressed ambivalence or a way to present oneself as 
ambivalent.  
Hence, in line with Maio and Haddock (2004, 2010), we believe that expressing an 
ambivalent attitude on controversial attitude objects could be positively valued, whereas this 
should not be the case on non-controversial, consensual ones. These authors, indeed, 
suggested—but did not test—that through ambivalence individuals may give the impression 
of being fair and knowledgeable when the object is controversial (Maio & Haddock, 2010, p. 
42); however, consensual attitude objects are associated with definite social norms, and in this 
case individuals may be more motivated to express clear-cut univalent attitudes. 
 
Attitudinal Ambivalence and Self-Presentation 
 If it is true that attitudinal ambivalence is adaptive in that it allows to modify one’s 
attitude as a function of the normative pressures of the environment, then it should be 
demonstrated that (a) individuals can exert some control over the expression of attitudinal 
ambivalence and that (b) this control is exerted for self-presentational purposes. To the best of 
our knowledge, such hypotheses have never been tested, probably because research on 
attitudinal ambivalence has historically focused on its weakness and not on its function, as 
noted above. In this respect, these hypotheses represent an important contribution to the 
literature on attitudinal ambivalence, in that they would represent a critical test of the 
existence of a strategic component in attitudinal ambivalence.  
How to test these hypotheses? The “self-presentation paradigm”, designed by Jellison 
and Green (1981) appears to be the perfect tool for this purpose, and indeed it has been 
developed to make it possible to uncover the presence of specific intentions in the expression 
of attitudes. In order to test whether individuals are able to strategically manipulate the 
expression of an attitude with self-presentational intentions, Jellison and Green (1981) asked 
their participants to answer an attitude scale either in such a way as to be positively evaluated 
by a fictitious reader (self-enhancement) or in such a way as to be negatively evaluated (self-
depreciation). Thus, the experimental protocol consists of a set of blatant instructions that 
directly ask individuals to voluntarily and strategically modulate their answers (Gilibert & 
Cambon, 2003). The rationale behind this method is that if the attitude score in the self-
enhancement condition is significantly different from that in the self-depreciation condition, 
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this means that the respondents know the social norms that regulate the expression of that 
attitude and they can deliberately adapt their answers to be positively (or negatively) 
evaluated. The self-presentation paradigm has been successfully used in several studies to 
detect people’s awareness of various social norms (e.g. the norm of internality, Dubois & 
Beauvois, 2005; Jellison & Green, 1981; the norm of consistency; Jouffre, Py, & Somat, 
2001). This paradigm was also used to identify the components put forward for self-
presentation purposes in the endorsement of several constructs (e.g. achievement goals, 
Darnon, Dompnier, Delmas, Pulfrey, & Butera, 2009; comparative optimism, Tyler & Rosier, 
2009). Thus, the self-presentation paradigm allows to test our first hypothesis that (a) 
individuals can exert some control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence: If this is 
true, then individuals asked to answer an attitudinal ambivalence measure in such a way as to 
present themselves positively (self-enhancement) should display a different level of attitudinal 
ambivalence in comparison with a situation in which they have to present themselves 
negatively (self-depreciation condition).  
 Another important property of the self-presentation paradigm is that it allows to test 
whether by default people are motivated by self-presentational concerns when answering a 
given questionnaire (see Gilibert & Cambon, 2003 for a discussion of this aspect). Indeed, in 
a study on the ability of respondents to detect a social norm, Bressoux and Pansu (2007) have 
shown that the standard measure (respondents answer without specific instruction) and the 
pro-normative one (self-enhancement) are more strongly correlated than are standard and 
counter-normative (self-depreciation), suggesting that by default people try to obtain positive 
evaluations when answering a questionnaire. Thus, the self-presentation paradigm allows to 
test at the same time our second hypothesis that (b) the control over the expression of 
attitudinal ambivalence is exerted for self-presentational purposes: If this is true, then 
individuals should display a different level of attitudinal ambivalence when asked to answer 
an attitudinal ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves negatively (self-
depreciation condition) in comparison with both a situation in which they have to present 
themselves positively (self-enhancement) and a situation in which they answer an attitudinal 
ambivalence measure without specific instructions (standard). 
 The third hypothesis aims at providing an explanation of the predicted strategic change 
in level of ambivalence, thereby providing an indication as to the direction of the attitude shift 
as a function of the self-presentation conditions. We propose that (c) attitudinal ambivalence 
may be used to convey a positive image of oneself, because—as mentioned above—it may 
imply a form of thoughtful reflection, a balanced view of the issue at hand that shows that one 
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is considering both positive and negative aspects. If this is true, individuals should present 
themselves as more ambivalent in order to present themselves positively only when the 
attitude object is controversial, and not when the attitude object is not controversial, as this is 
a situation in which a balanced view may signal that the individual is considering the 
complexity of the issue. As a consequence, it is when the attitude object is controversial that 
individuals are expected to report less ambivalence when asked to answer an attitudinal 
ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves negatively (self-depreciation 
condition) in comparison with both a situation in which they have to present themselves 
positively (self-enhancement) and a situation in which they answer an attitudinal ambivalence 
measure without specific instructions (standard). Interestingly, this idea is supported by an 
insightful comment formulated some years ago by Maio and Haddock: “It is possible that 
social norms make it occasionally desirable to have high ambivalence in an attitude, such as 
when an issue is controversial” (2004. p.435). When the attitude object is non-controversial, a 
positive image of oneself is achieved through expressing a clear-cut pro-normative attitude 
(either positive or negative, as a function of the consensus). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this insight has never been put to the test.  
 
 Overview 
 The hypotheses are tested in four series of experiments on two different measures of 
attitudinal ambivalence. Firstly, ambivalence can be tapped through a measure of subjective 
ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996), also named “felt ambivalence”(Newby-Clark et al., 
2002). This measure requires the participants to indicate to what extent they hold conflicting 
evaluations toward a specific issue. Secondly, ambivalent attitudes can be assessed indirectly 
in order to measure a “potential ambivalence”, by assessing the positive and negative 
components of the attitude separately. For example, the method selected for the present 
research uses an open-ended measure (Bell, Esses, & Maio, 1996), and asks the respondents 
first to write down a list of adjectives (cognitive component) or emotions (affective 
component) related to the topic of interest, and then to attribute a valence to each written 
adjective or emotion from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive), as explained in 
detailed in the method section. As there is no consensus in the literature on the most effective 
way to measure attitudinal ambivalence (Conner & Armitage, 2008; Conner & Sparks, 2002), 
we used both measures in our experiments.  
 In order to test our hypotheses, we needed a controversial attitude object and a non-
controversial one. We selected genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as our controversial 
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attitude object. First, Gaskell and his colleagues reported that Europeans were quite 
ambivalent about GMOs and biotechnologies (see Gaskell, 1997; Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, & 
Allum, 1999) and several previous studies on ambivalence used this attitude object (e.g. 
Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, 
Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004). Secondly, even if the production and commercialization of 
GMOs began in 1994, controversies about genetically modified organisms are still quite vivid 
and frequent (e.g., Peeples, 2012). As a non-controversial attitude object, we decided to use a 
truism, an issue on which there is such a consensus that there is no need to debate (here, tooth 
brushing; McGuire, 1961). Experiments 1 and 2 used the controversial attitude object and 
Experiments 3 the non-controversial one. Experiment 4 directly manipulated the perception of 
controversy versus consensus on the same attitude object (GMOs).  
 
Pilot Study 
 Participants and Method. A hundred and twenty-one students of a medium-size 
Swiss university volunteered in this pilot study ran on the Internet with LimeSurvey. To 
ensure that the participants' perception of both attitude objects was in line with the literature, 
participants were asked to indicate their perception of controversy or consensus toward 
several attitude objects, among which tooth brushing and GMOs. More precisely, they were 
asked to fill three 7-point bipolar scales devised for this pilot study, for each attitude object. 
The first bipolar scale ranged from 1 (consensus) to 7 (controversy), the second from 1 (no 
debate) to 7 (debate), and the third from 1 (a mutual agreement) to 7 (a polemic 
disagreement). The Cronbach’s alpha was " = .84 for GMOs and " = .89 for tooth brushing; 
therefore, we computed the mean of the answers provided on the three items. The range of the 
scale varies from 1 (perception of consensus) to 7 (perception of controversy). 
 Results and Discussion.  To test our hypothesis according to which GMOs should 
be perceived as controversial and tooth brushing as consensual, we conducted t-test analyses 
against the mid-point of the scale (i.e. 4). The two t-tests supported our hypotheses: GMOs 
were indeed clearly evaluated as being controversial (M = 5.26), t(120) = 11.76, p <  .001, #2 
p
 = .53, and tooth brushing as consensual (M = 1.34), t(120) = -39.33, p < .001, #2 p
 = .93. 
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 Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants and design. This experiment has been conducted on the Internet using 
LimeSurvey. The students of a medium-size Swiss university have been solicited by an e-mail 
presenting the experiment as a survey on genetically modified food. Five hundred and twenty 
three participants took part on a voluntary basis. The sample of Experiment 1a consisted of 
244 females and 128 males; the mean age was 23.87 years (SD = 4.92). The sample of 
Experiment 1b comprised one hundred and fifty one participants; two participants were 
dropped from the analysis because of uncommon studentized deleted residuals (Judd & 
McClelland, 1989). The final sample consisted of 98 females and 51 males; the mean age was 
23.54 years (SD = 4.74). Preliminary analyses revealed that sex and age had no impact on the 
studied effects, all ps > .10; thus, age and sex were not included in the reported analyses. As 
this is true for all the other experiments, this information will not be repeated. The self-
presentation conditions were set as a within-participants variable with three levels: Standard, 
Self-Enhancement and Self-Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. In Experiment 1a, participants were asked to complete 
the three items used in Priester and Petty’s (1996) research to assess felt ambivalence (for 
example, “to what extent do you hold an indecisive attitude toward GMOs”), adapted in 
French, on a 7-point Likert scale. In Experiment 1b, the participants had to write the 
adjectives coming to their mind when thinking about genetically modified food (max. 10) in a 
standard condition. Once the list was completed, they had to attribute a score ranging from -3 
(extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive) to each adjective of the list, according to their 
perception of those adjectives (for example “dangerous” would be coded as -3, while 
“awesome” would be coded as +3), as in the method set forth by Bell et al. (1996). They were 
then asked to write down emotions coming to their mind when thinking about genetically 
modified food (max. 10) as in Bell et al. (1996). 
 For both experiments, participants first responded in a standard condition, that is 
without any specific instruction. They were then asked to do it again in order to be positively 
evaluated by a teacher (self-enhancement condition). We used the same instructions as 
Darnon et al. (2009) and told them “As you fill in the following questionnaire we would like 
you to try to generate a good image of yourself, that is, to answer in such a way as to be 
judged in a positive way by your teachers. More specifically, as you indicate your level of 
agreement with each of the following propositions, you should be trying to generate a good 
image of yourself”. Finally, they followed the process in a self-depreciation condition. The 
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same instructions as the above one were used except for the words good and positive 
respectively replaced by bad and negative. The standard condition was always presented as 
first; the order of self-depreciation and self-enhancement instructions was counterbalanced. 
The order of presentation did not yield any significant effect, ps > .05, and it has not been 
included in further analyses, either in these or in the other experiments. 
 Measures. The score of felt ambivalence (Experiment 1a) was computed by averaging 
the score of the 3 items. The Cronbach’s alpha was " = .69 for the standard condition, " = .72 
for the self-enhancement condition and " = .69 for the self-depreciation condition. Two 
scores of potential ambivalence (both cognitive and affective; Experiment 1b) have been 
computed using the following formula (Bell et al., 1996): attitudinal ambivalence = P + N – 2 
| P – N | + k. In this formula, P represents the value of the positive dimension score, N the 
absolute value of the negative dimension score and k is a constant added to preclude negative 
ambivalence scores for both the adjectives and the emotions (here, k = 30). Thus, the score of 
ambivalence ranges from 0 (extremely univalent) from 90 (extremely ambivalent). However, 
in order to facilitate the readability of Tables 1 and 2 reporting five experiments on GMOs, 
we transformed the mean score in each experiment by computing the Percentage Of 
Maximum Possible score (POMP; Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999). POMP = [(observed 
- minimum)/(maximum - minimum)] ! 100, where observed refers to the observed score for a 
single participant and minimum (maximum) refers to the minimum (maximum) possible score 
on the scale. Thus, regardless of the measure, the score of ambivalence ranged from 0 
(extremely univalent) to 100 (extremely ambivalent). Potential cognitive ambivalence and 
potential affective ambivalence were significantly correlated, r  = .372, p < .001. Despite this 
correlation, we separately treated these two variables as they relate to different components of 
ambivalence (see Mucchi-Faina et al., 2009).  
 
Results  
 To test our hypotheses that (a) individuals can exert some control over the expression of 
attitudinal ambivalence and that (b) this control is exerted with self-presentational concerns, 
we should find that both the self-enhancement and standard condition should elicit a different 
level of ambivalence than the self-depreciation condition. To test this effect, we designed a 
within-participant planned contrast whereby the score in the self-depreciation condition (2) 
has been tested against both the score in the standard condition (-1) and the score in the self-
enhancement condition (-1) following the approach proposed by Furr & Rosenthal (2003). 
Moreover, the score in the standard condition (1) was tested against the score in the self-
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enhancement condition (-1) in an orthogonal contrast; the score in the self-depreciation 
condition was set as 0. Results of Experiment 1a and 1b are reported in Table 1. The proper 
use of contrast analysis requires the planned contrast testing the hypothesis to be significant 
and the orthogonal contrast testing the residual to be non-significant (Judd & McClelland, 
1989).  
 Experiment 1a: Felt ambivalence. The test of the planned contrast supported the 
hypotheses, F(1,371) = 9.84, p = .002, !2 p
 = .026. Participants reported significantly more 
ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-
depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was not-significant, F(1, 371) < 1, p > .05. 
 
 Experiment 1b. 
 Potential cognitiv e ambiv alence. Considering the cognitive component of the 
potential ambivalence, the same planned contrast as in Experiment 1a reached significance, 
F(1,148) = 14.52, p < .001, #2 p
 = .09. Participants reported more ambivalence in the standard 
condition and the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The 
orthogonal contrast was not significant, F(1, 148) = 3.08, p > .05.  
 Potential affectiv e ambiv alence. We replicated the above effects considering the 
affective component of the potential ambivalence. Participants reported more ambivalent 
attitudes in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-
depreciation condition, F(1,148) = 17.77, p < .001, #2 p
 = .11. The orthogonal contrast was not 
significant F (1, 148) < 1, p >.05. 
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Table 1.     
Mean ambivalence scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) as a function of the self-
presentation conditions and the type of measure (Experiments 1a and 1b).  
    Self-presentation conditions 
Type of measure Standard Self-Enhancement Self-Depreciation 
Experiment 1a (N = 372):   
Felt Ambivalence 49.09a 48.01a 40.87b 
    (25.94) (30.21) (32.20) 
Experiment 1b (N = 149):   
Potential Cognitive Ambivalence 28.60a 27.04a 24.79b 
  (9.62) (8.47) (9.06) 
     
Potential Affective Ambivalence 30.67a 30.01a 28.02b 
    (7.03) (5.87) (6.73) 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share the same subscripts differ at p < .05 in the 
contrast analysis. 
 Discussion  
 These two experiments have been designed to test that individuals can exert some 
control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence and that this control is exerted with 
self-presentational concerns (hypotheses a and b). Consistently with these hypotheses, 
contrast analyses indicated in both experiments that participants reported significantly more 
ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-
depreciation condition. The hypotheses received support with both the measure of “felt 
ambivalence” (Experiment 1a) and the measure of “potential ambivalence” (Experiment 1b, 
with both adjectives and emotions).  
 One might argue that an important limitation of this experiment is the use of an Internet-
based questionnaire. Indeed, several scholars questioned the replicability of studies ran on the 
Internet in comparison with paper-and-pencil studies (Joinson, 1999; Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava, & John, 2004). In order to assess whether the present results are method-
dependent, we ran the same experiments using a paper-and-pencil paradigm, within the more 
controlled environment of lab cubicles. To avoid the mutual influences in the expression of 
affective and cognitive ambivalence, we separated these two components in two distinct 
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experiments (2b and 2c).  
 Experiment 2 
Method 
 Participants and design. This experiment took place at the end of a course. Forty-
five first-year Psychology students enrolled in a medium-size Swiss university volunteered in 
Experiment 2a. Thirty-four women and 9 men constitute the sample with a mean age of 21.91 
years (SD = 5.92). Two participants did not indicate their sex and age. Twenty women and 7 
men participated in Experiment 2b with a mean age of 21.96 years (SD = 6.31). One 
participant did not indicate his sex and age. Twenty-five women and 6 men volunteered in 
Experiment 2c with a mean age of 21.42 years (SD = 4.56). Two participants did not indicate 
their sex and age. The self-presentation conditions were set as a within-participants variable 
with three levels: Standard, Self-Enhancement and Self-Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. Participants of Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c were asked to 
complete the same steps as in Experiment 1. However, participants of Experiment 2b only 
reported adjectives associated with GMOs and the ones of Experiment 2c only reported 
emotions. The control condition was always presented first followed by the self-depreciation 
and self-enhancement conditions, which were counterbalanced. 
 Measure. The index of felt ambivalence (Experiment 2a) was computed by averaging 
the score on the same 3 items as in Experiment 1a. The Cronbach’s alpha was " = .78 for the 
standard condition, " = .69 for the self-enhancement condition and " = .61 for the self-
depreciation condition. A score of potential ambivalence (potential cognitive ambivalence in 
Experiment 2b; potential affective ambivalence in Experiment 2c) has been computed using 
the Bell et al. ‘s formula (Bell et al., 1996) as for Experiment 1b. We again transformed and 
computed the percentage of maximum possible (POMP).   
 
Results 
 Results of Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c are reported in Table 2.  
 Experiment 2a: Felt ambivalence. The test of the planned contrast corresponding 
to our hypothesis yielded a significant effect, F(1, 44) = 4.89, p = .032, #2 p
 = .10. Once again, 
participants reported significantly more ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-
enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was 
not significant, F(1, 44) = 2.56, p > .05. 
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 Experiment 2b: Potential Cognitive ambivalence. The test of the planned 
contrast corresponding to the hypothesis reached significance, F(1, 27) = 17.69, p < .001, #2 p
 
= .39. Participants reported more ambivalent attitudes in the standard condition and in the 
self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast 
was not significant, F(1, 27) = 2.57,  p > .05.  
 Experiment 2c: Potential Affective ambivalence .  The planned contrast 
corresponding to the hypotheses was significant, F(1, 32) = 7.47, p = .01, #2 p
 =  .19. 
Participants reported more ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement 
condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was not significant, 
F(1, 32) = 2.88, p > .05. 
 
Table 2.    
Mean ambivalence scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) as a function of the type of 
measure and the self-presentation conditions (Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c).  
  Self-presentation conditions 
Type of measure Standard Self-Enhancement Self-Depreciation 
Experiment 2a (N = 45):       
Felt Ambivalence 55.06a 45.68a 36.42b 
  (24.90) (30.19) (31.03) 
Experiment 2b (N = 28):    
Potential Cognitive Ambivalence 31.86a 28.73a 23.49b 
  (6.53) (9.26) (7.19) 
Experiment 2c (N = 33):    
Potential Affective Ambivalence 34.24a 31.92a 30.24b 
  (6.46) (8.94) (8.48) 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share the same sub-scripts differ at p < .05 in the 
contrast analysis. 
 
Discussion  
 The results of Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c amounted to a full replication of Experiments 
1a and 1b. Indeed, across our three paper-and pencil experiments, carried out in lab cubicles, 
contrast analyses revealed that participants reported significantly more ambivalence in the 
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standard and in the self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition. The 
hypotheses received support with the measure of “felt ambivalence” (Experiment 2a), and the 
measure of “potential ambivalence”, with both adjectives (Experiment 2b) and emotions 
(Experiment 2c).  
 We hypothesized that such results should only be observed on controversial attitude 
objects, as such objects require considering the diversity of their aspects. A consequence of 
this reasoning, and the basis for Hypothesis (c), is that when the attitude object is non-
controversial, attitudinal ambivalence is useless in terms of self-presentational purposes, and a 
positive image of oneself is achieved through expressing a clear-cut attitude. Two 
experiments have been carried out to test this hypothesis. The first, experiment 3, uses tooth 
brushing as the attitude object; as tooth brushing is a truism, a totally consensual attitude 
object according to our pilot study and McGuire’s (1961) work, everybody is expected to hold 
the same attitude. Thus, in order to generate a positive self-image, participants should express 
a clear-cut attitude, which should results in participants reporting lower level of ambivalence 
in the standard and self-enhancement conditions, as compared with the self-depreciation 
condition. The second test comes from experiment 4, that directly tests hypothesis (c) by 
manipulating the perception of controversy versus consensus within the same experiment and 
with the same attitude object (GMOs). If the above reasoning is correct, we should find higher 
levels of ambivalence in the standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-
depreciation condition when the instructions tell the participants that there is some 
controversy on the issue (as in experiments 1 and 2), and lower levels of ambivalence in the 
standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition when the 
instructions tell the participants that there is consensus (as in experiment 3). Experiment 3 
uses a felt ambivalence measure and experiment 4 a potential ambivalence measure (in its 
cognitive component). 
 Experiment 3 
 From an operational point of view, in this experiment using a measure of felt 
ambivalence, we predict that participants should present themselves as less ambivalent in both 
a standard and a self-enhancement situation than in a self-depreciation condition. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Twenty-seven first-year Psychology students enrolled in a 
medium-size Swiss university volunteered in this experiment at the end of a course. Twenty 
women and 4 men constitute the sample with a mean age of 22.38 years (SD = 5.55). Three 
participants did not indicate their sex and age. The self-presentation conditions were set as a 
3- Empirical Part: First Research Line 
   69
within-participants variable with three levels: Standard, Self-Enhancement and Self-
Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. Participants were asked to complete the same steps as in 
Experiments 1a and 2a. The control condition was always presented first followed by the self-
depreciation and self-enhancement conditions, which were counterbalanced.  
 Measure. The index of felt ambivalence was computed by averaging the score on the 3 
items (" = .78 for the standard condition, " = .85 for the self-enhancement condition and " = 
.81 for the self-depreciation condition). We computed the percentage of maximum possible 
(POMP) as for the previous experiments.   
 
Results 
 Results of Experiment 3 are reported in Table 3. The test of the planned contrast 
corresponding to our hypothesis yielded a significant effect, F(1, 26) = 107.15, p < .001, #2 p
 = 
.80. As predicted, participants reported significantly less ambivalence in the standard 
condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The 
orthogonal contrast was not significant, F(1, 26) < 1, p > .05. 
 
Table 3.     
Mean ambivalent scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) as a function of the type of 
measure and the self-presentation conditions (Experiment 3).  
    Self-presentation conditions 
Type of measure Standard Self-Enhancement Self-Depreciation 
Experiment 3 (N = 27):   
Felt Ambivalence 14.20a 10.70a 85.18b 
    (21.14) (21.62) (25.13) 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share the same sub-scripts differ at p < .05 in the 
contrast analysis. 
 
Discussion  
 These results complement those of experiments 1 and 2 to support our hypothesis that 
attitudinal ambivalence is used for self-presentational purposes by increasing the level of 
reported ambivalence when the attitude object is controversial, and lowering it when the 
attitude object is not controversial. In Experiment 3, indeed, with a felt ambivalence measure, 
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participants presented themselves as holding a less ambivalent attitude when asked to present 
themselves in the standard and in the self-enhancement conditions, as compared with the self-
depreciation condition. Although these results are clear-cut, and the pilot study has clearly 
indicated the profound difference in level of controversy between GMOs and tooth brushing, 
support to hypothesis 3 comes from the comparison of the effects obtained in separate 
experiments (reversed effects in experiment 3 as compared with experiments 1 and 2). To 
ensure that individuals use ambivalence to display a positive image of themselves when there 
is a controversy and not when there is a consensus, the perception of controversy or consensus 
needs to be directly manipulated rather than being inferred through the use of different 
attitude objects. Experiment 4 was designed for this purpose.    
 
 Experiment 4 
 From an operational point of view, we predict higher levels of ambivalence in the 
standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition when the 
instructions tell the participants that there is some controversy on the issue, and lower levels 
of ambivalence in the standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation 
condition when the instructions tell the participants that there is consensus. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Sixty-one students enrolled in a medium-size Swiss 
university volunteered in this experiment at the end of a course. Six participants have been 
excluded from the analyses, for noncompliance to the instructions (they disregarded the self-
presentation conditions). Forty-two women and 13 men thus constituted the sample with a 
mean age of 21.46 years (SD = 4.95). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions (either the consensus or the controversy condition) that were set as a 
between-participants variable (respectively, 25 and 30 participants). The self-presentation 
conditions were set as a within-participants variable with three levels: Standard, Self-
Enhancement and Self-Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. In the consensus condition, we presented GMOs as an 
attitude object that does not lead to any controversy, that is not really debated as most 
individuals reported being against GMOs. Below this explanation, a graph was displayed in 
order to reinforce the manipulation. This bogus graph, entitled the "representation of the 
attitude of the Swiss towards GMOs" presented 89% of the Swiss against, and 11% in favor 
of GMOs. In the controversy condition, GMOs were introduced as a controversial attitude 
object that is really debated, as there are almost as many individuals who are in favor of 
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GMOs as individuals who are against it. Below, a bogus graph entitled as before presented 
51% of the Swiss against and 49% in favor of GMOs.  
 Because of time constraints, participants were asked to report the adjectives they 
associate with GMOs by selecting them from a list of ten positive and ten negative adjectives 
(cf. Cavazza & Butera, 2008). We selected the 10 most frequent positive adjectives and the 10 
most frequent negative ones from the ones generated by participants in Experiment 1b. The 
positive adjectives were: improved, promising, innovative, productive, beneficial, healthy, 
required, cost-effective, hardy and scientific; the negative adjectives were: useless, unsure, 
uncontrollable, dangerous, harmful, manipulated, worrying, unknown, doubtful and 
transgenic. 
 Measure. A score of potential cognitive ambivalence has been computed again using 
the Bell et al.’s formula (Bell et al., 1996), transformed into POMP. 
  
Results and Discussion 
 Results of Experiment 4 are reported in Figure 1. Our prediction was tested via the 
interaction between the experimental condition and the contrast opposing the self-depreciation 
condition (2) against the standard (-1) and the self-enhancement (-1) conditions. This analysis 
resulted in a significant interaction, F(1, 53) = 13.86, p < .001, !2 p
 = .21. An analysis of 
simple effects revealed that in the controversy condition, participants indeed significantly 
displayed more ambivalence in both the standard (M = 27.52, SD = 12.31) and the self-
enhancement conditions (M = 25.15, SD = 11.83) than in the self-depreciation condition (M = 
19.96, SD = 12.89), F(1, 53) = 10.50, p = .002, #2 p
 = .16. The orthogonal contrast was not 
significant, F(1, 53) < 1, p > .05. Conversely, participants in the consensus condition 
displayed significantly less ambivalence in both the standard (M = 23.29, SD = 11.69) and the 
self-enhancement conditions (M = 21.24, SD = 12.25) than in the self-depreciation condition 
(M = 26.76, SD = 10.91), F(1, 53) = 4.34, p = .042, #2 p
 = .07. The orthogonal contrast was 
not significant, F(1, 53) < 1, p >.05. In sum, and in line with hypothesis (c), these results show 
that participants used ambivalence to display a positive image of themselves on a 
controversial attitude object and not when the object was consensual.  
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Figure 1. Level of ambivalence as a function of the self-presentation conditions and the 
experimental conditions (Experiment 4). Error bars are based on Standard Error of the mean. 
 
 General Discussion 
 Attitudinal ambivalence has long been considered as a weak form of attitude; for the 
first time, the present research investigated the possibility for people to use attitudinal 
ambivalence strategically, with a view to achieving some social value. The seven experiments 
presented in this article have been designed to investigate whether the expression of 
ambivalent attitudes can be controlled and whether this control may have the purpose of 
achieving a socially valued self-presentation. Furthermore, we extended our reasoning and 
tested the process supposedly responsible of this effect: Ambivalence is used to generate a 
positive self-image when it can be considered as a positive feature, namely to the extent that 
the attitude object is controversial or presented as being controversial.  
 Our first hypothesis predicted that individuals asked to answer an attitudinal 
ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves positively (self-enhancement) 
should display a different level of attitudinal ambivalence in comparison with a situation in 
which they had to present themselves negatively (self-depreciation condition). In other words, 
the expression of attitudinal ambivalence should be controllable, and could be adapted to meet 
relevant social norms (here the demands set forth by the experimenter). The second 
hypothesis predicted that ambivalent attitudes may be used with self-presentational concerns, 
and that therefore individuals should display a different level of ambivalence when asked to 
answer an attitudinal ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves negatively 
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(self-depreciation condition) in comparison with both a situation in which they have to 
present themselves positively (self-enhancement) and a situation in which they answer an 
attitudinal ambivalence measure without specific instructions (standard). In other words, by 
default individuals would use the expression of ambivalent attitudes as a way to achieve a 
positive self-presentation. Finally, the third hypothesis considers that attitudinal ambivalence 
may be used to convey a positive image of oneself, because it may communicate a balanced 
view of the issue at hand that shows that one is considering both positive and negative 
aspects. If this is true, hypotheses one and two should hold for a controversial attitude object; 
when the attitude object is non-controversial, attitudinal ambivalence is useless in terms of 
self-presentational purposes, and a positive image of oneself is achieved through expressing a 
clear-cut pro-normative attitude. 
 Results supported these three hypotheses. On a controversial attitude object, namely 
GMOs (Experiments 1 and 2), we observed that individuals indeed reported a higher level of 
ambivalence in the standard and the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation 
condition, which supports hypotheses one and two. On a non-controversial attitude object, 
namely tooth brushing (Experiment 3), individuals expressed a less ambivalent attitude in the 
standard and the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition: They 
endorsed a more univalent position on the felt ambivalence measure, which indirectly 
supports hypothesis 3. Direct support for this hypothesis comes from Experiment 4, where the 
reversal of effects observed from Experiments 1 and 2 (controversial) to Experiment 3 
(consensual), was replicated within the same experiment by manipulating the alleged 
controversy versus consensus on the same attitude object (GMOs). 
 These results contribute to the literature on attitudinal ambivalence by providing for the 
first time a direct test of the suggestion made by Cavazza and Butera (2008) and Mucchi-
Faina et al. (2009) that the expression of attitudinal ambivalence may have the function of 
meeting salient social norms. The present results, indeed, reveal that the expression of 
attitudinal ambivalence serves the purpose of achieving a positive self-presentation when 
there is a controversy, since both by default (standard) and in order to be positively evaluated 
(self-enhancement), people report a higher level of ambivalence than the one reported in the 
self-depreciation condition. However, when there is a clear consensus on the attitude object, 
ambivalent attitudes are no longer useful for self-presentation, and straightforward pro-
normative attitudes are used instead. In sum, these results contribute to the contention that 
attitudinal ambivalence may serve an adaptive function, as individuals appear to be able to 
strategically control the expression of ambivalence with a view to achieving a valued self-
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presentation. This may open the way to several lines of research aiming at uncovering other 
social functions that attitudinal ambivalence may serve. 
 The present results also support the idea of a positive link between heated debates (i.e. 
controversy) and ambivalence (see Zhao & Capella, 2008; Stoeckel, 2013), as the participants 
of Experiment 4 purposely displayed more ambivalence when they had to express themselves 
to achieve a positive image of themselves on a controversial attitude object. Consequently, it 
seems plausible to think that the expression of attitudinal ambivalence could be socially 
valued when being expressed on such attitude objects. Although displaying a positive image 
of oneself is a fundamental goal in the life of individuals, recent research has shown that 
social value can be achieved through different categories of self-presentational concerns, 
namely social desirability (or warmth) and social utility (or competence; cf. Darnon et al., 
2009; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). If it is true that ambivalence is 
valued in controversial issues—as shown in the present research—because it conveys the 
notion that one is pondering alternative aspects of the same problem, then it should be found 
that ambivalence is valued especially when assessing people’s social utility, as opposed to 
social desirability. Thus, as they are pondering the pros and the cons associated with the 
attitude object, ambivalent individuals could then be evaluated as the most competent ones 
(i.e. the highest on social utility) in comparison with univalent individuals. This is, we 
believe, a promising hypothesis for future research and would represent a new approach of 
ambivalence in the literature.  
 Interestingly, the present results also contribute to the literature on self-presentation. 
Attitudinal ambivalence is traditionally opposed to cognitive consistency (see Gawronski, 
2012), as it results from evaluative inconsistencies (Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). 
Seen through the lens of cognitive consistency, individuals should not put ambivalence 
forward: Indeed, if cognitive consistency is considered as a fundamental need (Festinger, 
1957; Gawronski & Strack, 2012), research has also shown that the conditions of its 
expression appeared to be contextual and related to impression-management concerns (e.g., 
Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971; Schlenker, 1975). Appearing consistent in the eyes of 
others was proposed and found to being linked with social value (i.e. as potentially pleasing 
an audience; Baumeister, 1982; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). This research tradition, thus 
suggest that individuals should be less likely to express their ambivalence and even less so to 
present themselves positively. However, if this is most often the case (i.e. when there is a 
consensus on what to think of an attitude object), it might not be the case when controversial 
attitude objects are concerned. Our results indeed show that individuals do display more 
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ambivalence to present a positive image of themselves, when the attitude object is 
controversial. This is coherent with the recent literature on inter-group relations showing that 
the expression of ambivalence toward out-groups (e.g. immigrants, a controversial issue) was 
evaluated as being more balanced, realistic and acceptable than univalence (Brauer, Er-Rafiy, 
Kawakami, & Phills, 2012; Costarelli, 2011). Thus, the present research shows that 
consistency is not the only possible response to impression-management concerns, and that 
ambivalence could be used when the issues are complex or controversial. 
 It is important to note that the present results appear to be quite robust as they were 
found in seven experiments that used two different methods (web-based and paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires) and two different measures to assess ambivalence. Indeed, results supported 
our hypotheses when ambivalence was measured with a direct measure (subjective or felt 
ambivalence), as well as when ambivalence was measured with a more indirect measure 
(potential ambivalence). We considered these two different measures of ambivalence as there 
is no consensus in the literature about which one should be preferably used (Conner & 
Armitage, 2008; Conner & Sparks, 2002) even if they are qualitatively different. In line with 
this, our results indicate that, actually, both measures appeared to be permeable to social 
desirability effects, as individuals were able to control the expression of their attitude when 
they reported both their felt and their potential ambivalence. 
 A methodological issue needs to be mentioned. One could argue that setting these 
experimental conditions as a within-participant variable may have maximized the observed 
difference in the self-enhancement and self-depreciation conditions, in comparison with a 
more natural situation. However, presenting either the self-enhancement or the self-
depreciation condition in first position never had an effect on our planned contrast—the 
effects including order of presentation were always non-significant. Furthermore, the rationale 
behind the self-presentation paradigm (Dubois, 2000; Jellison & Green, 1981) is that when a 
difference is observed precisely in the within-participant comparison between the self-
enhancement condition and the self-depreciation condition, it should be inferred that the 
respondents know the social norms that regulate the expression of that attitude and can 
strategically adapt their answers to be positively (or negatively) evaluated. We observed such 
strategy in all our experiments. 
 Two limitations need to be discussed, as they may open new avenues for research. First, 
these experiments were conducted with university students, and University tends to attribute 
particular value to critical thinking (Guiller, Durndell, & Ross, 2008); as ambivalence 
requires the individual to evaluate both the positive and the negative components of an 
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attitude object, ambivalence could indirectly be particularly valued at university. Thus, it 
would be interesting to conduct an experiment similar to the present ones that compares 
students to other samples. Second, only two attitude objects were considered in this paper. 
Thus, it would be interesting for future researches to apply the same reasoning to other 
attitude objects, but also to extend the debate, for example by studying how attitudes can be 
affected when a celebrity or a political figure is targeted by a controversy. Similarly, it would 
be interesting to focus on how inter-personal relationships can be modified as a function of 
polemic disagreements.   
 Notwithstanding these limitations, the present results bring convergent and robust 
support to a view of attitudinal ambivalence as an adaptive mechanism, as they reveal that 
individuals can control the expression of ambivalence and use it strategically for self-
presentation purposes. After two decades of research that points to its weaknesses and pitfalls, 
the present research might open the way to the study of the strengths of attitudinal 
ambivalence.
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The Social Utility of Ambivalence: 
Being Ambivalent on Controversial Issues is Recognized as 
Competence 2 
 
Abstract 
 We tested the contested hypothesis that the expression of attitudinal ambivalence could 
be positively valued, if it signals careful consideration of an issue. More specifically, we 
hypothesized that the expression of ambivalence should be judged higher than clear-cut 
attitudes on social utility (competence), but not on social desirability (warmth). This should 
be the case on controversial (vs. consensual) issues, where ambivalence can signal the 
expression of competence. Participants indeed evaluated ambivalence as higher than clear-cut 
(normative and counter-normative) attitudes on social utility, when expressed on controversial 
issues such as immigration (Experiments 1) and death penalty (Experiment 2), whereas pro-
normative attitudes were evaluated highest on social desirability. On consensual issues, 
organic products (Experiment 3) and recycling (Experiment 4), pro-normative attitudes were 
judged as highest on both social utility and social desirability. Attitudinal ambivalence can 
thus be positively valued because perceived as indicating competence when the expression of 
criticism is socially accepted.  
 
 Keywords: ambivalence, attitudes, social value, judgment, controversy 
  
                                                
2 Submitted as Pillaud, V., Cavazza, N., & Butera, F. (2013). The Social Utility of Ambivalence: Being 
Ambivalent on Controversial Issues in Recognized as a Competence. Manuscript under review at the Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology. 
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The Social Utility of Ambivalence: 
Being Ambivalent on Controversial Issues is Recognized as Competence.  
It has been more than 40 years now that Scott (1968) and Kaplan (1972) introduced 
the concept of attitudinal ambivalence to describe the possibility that an individual could hold 
both positive and negative attitudes toward the same attitude object. Following their seminal 
work, an important body of research has been devoted to better understand the consequences 
of holding an ambivalent attitude on a wide range of outcomes, from predicting behavior to 
well being (e.g. Conner & Armitage, 2008); this has been a very valuable research effort, as it 
appears that ambivalent attitudes are a widespread phenomenon (Breckler, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the importance of the phenomenon and the wealth of research that has 
investigated the consequences for those who hold ambivalent attitudes, only a limited number 
of studies provide insights about how the expression of ambivalence could be socially 
perceived, and none has focused on whether it could be perceived as having some social 
value. The present paper aims at filling this gap in the literature by directly examining how 
individuals expressing attitudinal ambivalence are judged in comparison with individuals 
expressing univalent attitudes; more precisely, we hypothesize that ambivalence could be 
valued on controversial attitudes objects in that pondering the pros and cons of an issue 
signals a competent judgment.  
  
Attitudinal Ambivalence: Strength or Weakness? 
Attitudinal ambivalence has primarily been studied as a dimension of attitude strength 
(Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995; for a review, see Conner & Sparks, 2002). In 
comparison with univalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes have been shown to be less stable 
over time, more pliable, less likely to guide information processing and less predictive of 
intentions and further behavior (for a review; see Armitage & Conner, 2004). In this 
perspective, ambivalent attitudes are presented as weak attitudes (Sawicki, Wegener, Clark, 
Fabrigar, Smith, & Durso, 2013). Furthermore, as ambivalence derives from mixed attitudes 
that rely on conflict and indecision, it has often been associated with cognitive dissonance 
(Priester & Petty, 1996; Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & 
de Liver, 2009). Consequently, as for individuals in cognitive dissonance, ambivalent 
individuals have been described as willing to "solve their ambivalence" (Festinger, 1957; 
Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). In line with this 
view, holding an ambivalent attitude has been considered as an aversive state (Nordgren, van 
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Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006), that potentially generates psychological discomfort in 
decision-making situations (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 
2009). Thus, the above results, combined with the finding that ambivalent individuals seem to 
be motivated to reduce their ambivalence (e.g., Bell & Esses, 1997, 2002), should lead to 
predict that the expression of an ambivalent attitude may be negatively viewed. However, 
other lines of research discussed attitudinal ambivalence in a more positive light.  
 Mixed attitudes can also lead to some benefits. If attitudinal ambivalence is generally 
known to be a poor predictor of further behavior, as discussed above, it can increase the 
likelihood of changing some specific behaviors (Armitage & Conner, 2000; Armitage & 
Arden, 2007). For example, Lipkus, Pollak, McBride, Swartz-Bloom, Lyna and Bloom (2005) 
reported that attitudinal ambivalence was positively linked with the desire to quit smoking 
among teen smokers. Ambivalence can then be seen as adaptive when it focuses on 
contributing to changing negative behaviors. Ambivalence can also provide advantages in 
intergroup relations: Pagliaro, Alparone, Pacilli and Mucchi Faina (2012) investigated how 
low-status individuals can cope with social identity threats (namely, when Italians were 
disadvantageously compared to the British) as a function of their identification toward their 
ingroup, and found that low-identifiers, as compared with high-identifiers, perceived their 
ingroup as more variable (consisting of various positive and negative, as opposed to only 
positive traits). Interestingly, these authors interpret such attitudes as an adaptive form of 
social creativity in the face of identity threat. Finally, Costarelli (2011) recently described 
ambivalence toward out-groups as a more "defensible, balanced and realistic reaction" to the 
relevant stereotypic traits of the out-group members (pp. 51-52). The reasoning behind this 
statement is that endorsing an ambivalent attitude allows the individuals to express negative 
attitudes that fulfill their "need to be prejudiced" toward out-group members while at the same 
time expressing positive attitudes, which results in a balanced position that might be 
positively perceived by others. Therefore, some recent research suggests that the expression 
of ambivalent attitudes could also be positively perceived in some cases. Which cases? 
 
The Social Value of Attitudinal Ambivalence 
 Some attitude objects are more likely to arouse ambivalence than others (Conner, 
Povey, Sparks, James, & Shepherd, 1998; Dahl, Darke, Gorn, & Weinberg, 2005). For 
example, Breckler (2004) reported that 41.1% of the students identified themselves as 
ambivalent on nuclear power whereas they were only 11% to be ambivalent about legalized 
abortion and 15.1% about gun control laws. Such different ratios could be the result of the 
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salience of the social norm associated with the attitude objects: When there is a clear social 
norm (consensus), an ambivalent attitude could then be seen as a deviant attitude in 
comparison with the socially valued (univalent) one, and subsequently could be less 
positively perceived. Conversely, when there is a strong debate and competing arguments 
regarding an issue, holding a certain degree of ambivalence could be positively valued, as it 
might signal that one is aware of the complexity of the issue.  
 Thus, as Maio and Haddock (2004, 2009) suggested it, ambivalent attitudes could be 
valued when being expressed on controversial issues. And indeed, recent research by Pillaud, 
Cavazza, and Butera (2013) provides direct support for this reasoning. These authors reported 
that individuals displayed a more ambivalent attitude when they had to present themselves in 
a positive way, and that they did so especially when they had to express themselves on a 
controversial attitude object, as opposed to a consensual attitude object. In sum, contrary to a 
longstanding tradition that views attitudinal ambivalence as a weak form of attitudes and an 
aversive state, recent research revealed that individuals could express ambivalent attitudes 
when they want to be positively evaluated, to the extent that the attitude object is 
controversial.  
 
Why Can Attitudinal Ambivalence Provide Value? 
 Why can one be positively valued when expressing ambivalent attitudes? In the 
reasoning presented above, we suggested that expressing ambivalence when treating a 
controversial issue might signal that one is pondering the pros and the cons, which might 
imply some sort of competence. However, to date no research has demonstrated that 
attitudinal ambivalence is associated with competence. This lack of direct evidence 
notwithstanding, research on social judgment might provide indirect support for this 
hypothesis.  
 A now well established line of work has shown that people's judgments about 
individuals, groups (stereotypes) and objects tend to be organized according to two main 
dimensions (for a recent review, see Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2010). These two dimensions 
have been variously termed, for instance value versus dynamism (Osgood, 1962), social 
desirability versus intellectual desirability (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968), self-
profitability versus other-profitability (Peeters, 1992), communion versus agency (Abele & 
Wojciszke, 2007), warmth versus competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and social 
desirability versus social utility (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). If these different terms cover 
similar concepts, they lead to different approaches in the study of the social judgment 
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(Beauvois & Dubois, 2009). The approach proposed by Beauvois and Dubois (Beauvois, 
1995; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005) better fits the general purpose of the present research, to the 
extent that social desirability and social utility refer to the “social worth” conveyed by 
individual during an evaluative process (Beauvois & Dubois, 2009), and in the present 
research we want to study precisely why individuals expressing attitudinal ambivalence can 
be valued. Social desirability corresponds to the individuals’ ability to engender a positive 
evaluation in others, while social utility corresponds to the ability to satisfy the requirements 
of a given social environment and thus to the individuals’ chances of success in social life 
(Darnon, Dompnier, Delmas, Pulfrey, & Butera, 2009; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).  On the 
basis of this distinction, it is then possible to argue that—if it is true that expressing 
ambivalence on a controversial issue may be understood by an observer as evidence that one 
is pondering the pros and cons, in other words, displaying competence—it should be found 
that attitudinal ambivalence can be valued in terms of social utility, but not necessarily in 
terms of social desirability. 
 An analysis of the literature on the effects of attitudinal ambivalence provides some 
indirect support to this idea. On the one hand, research in which ambivalence has been studied 
for its higher proclivity to being influenced by the others could be linked with social 
desirability. In particular, some research by Bell and Esses (1997, 2002) is in line with this 
reasoning. These researchers reported in a first study that ambivalent individuals are more 
influenced by positive and negative information (i.e. response amplification) than less 
ambivalent individuals: They strongly endorsed a positive/negative attitude after the 
presentation of positive/negative information. More interestingly, response amplification was 
further proven to be motivated by social desirability, to the extent that it was greater when 
ambivalence was described as negative than when it was described as positive (Bell & Esses, 
2002, Study 2). In other words, individuals complied with the influence message only when 
ambivalence was presented as being negative. In support to this reasoning, Cavazza and 
Butera (2008) reported that more ambivalent individuals purposely sided with a normative 
source of influence on topics that were directly related to the source’s message, but not on 
topics more indirectly related to this message, unlike less ambivalent individuals. Thus, the 
proclivity of ambivalent individuals to being influenced—quite a frequent phenomenon (see 
Armitage & Conner, 2000; Hodson et al., 2001 for instance)—might be a sign of the attempt 
to avoid the social undesirability of attitudinal ambivalence.  
  On the other hand, the aforementioned research by Cavazza and Butera (2008) also 
suggests that attitudinal ambivalence may be linked to social utility, to the extent that it may 
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be instrumental to adapting to the social environment, for instance to resisting persuasive 
pressure of the majority, since ambivalent participants comply at a direct, but not indirect 
level. Similarly, Weick (2002, 2004) approached the concept of ambivalence as being an 
"optimal compromise" in his theoretical papers. Ambivalence was conceived of as a wise 
attitude that allows equilibrium between knowledge and doubts (Weick, 1998, 2004). Indeed, 
in a changing environment (such as fire crews fighting fires for instance), competing 
tendencies can prevent from unwarranted persistence, while providing both confidence and 
cautiousness. In other terms, ambivalence is considered as being helpful in that it can allow a 
fast adaptation to varying situations. In line with this idea, it also has been suggested that 
ambivalence could be linked with critical thinking, namely by enhancing mindfulness (Fiol & 
O' Connor, 2003). For instance, Piderit (2000) argued that the expression of ambivalence is 
more likely to generate dialogue in comparison with the expression of support or opposition. 
Likewise, Green, Visser and Tetlock (2000) reported that the coexistence of conflicting 
attitudes could lead to higher message scrutiny and integrative complexity. Focusing on 
creativity, Fong (2006) reported that emotional ambivalence could lead individuals to make 
more associations (i.e. to be more creative) in comparison with happy or sad participants. 
Finally, ambivalence toward Europe was recently found to be positively related with objective 
knowledge and news media consumption (i.e. political sophistication; Stoeckel, 2013). 
Attitudinal ambivalence could therefore be perceived as a form of competence, and then be 
perceived as socially useful.  
If it appears possible that attitudinal ambivalence is associated with competence, it still 
needs to be determined in which cases, and in particular whether it is plausible that attitudinal 
ambivalence would be associated with competence in case of controversial issues, as 
proposed above. This idea is indirectly supported by the recent work of Stoeckel (2013), who 
reported that the disagreement among the elites on the attitude towards Europe did increase 
the citizens' probability of being ambivalent by 16.5 percent. The reasoning is that if elites are 
divided over an issue, their positions will be more differentiated and more likely to be in 
competition with one another. In return, citizens will be more likely to be ambivalent toward 
the issue. Similarly, Plambeck and Weber (2010) observed that strategic ambidexterity in an 
organization (i.e. the inclusion of both offensive and defensive strategies) lead to more 
ambivalence in a decision-making situation. Indeed, as Larsen pointed out, ambivalence can 
indicate that one is "coming to grips with the complexity of the world" (Larsen, cited in 
Wang, 2010).  
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In sum, the vast majority of research to date in social psychology considers that 
attitudinal ambivalence is a weak form of attitude and an aversive state; in other words, a 
form of attitude that should not be valued by individuals. However, some recent research (in 
social psychology and in other research areas) has shown that attitudinal ambivalence may 
have a positive impact (such as enhancing mindfulness, wisdom or creativity) and allow 
resisting influence. Furthermore, a recent article reported that individuals might express 
attitudinal ambivalence to achieve a positive image of themselves, when the issue is 
controversial (Pillaud et al. 2013). To the best of our knowledge, no research has investigated 
whether expressing attitudinal ambivalence in case of controversial issues does indeed 
generate a positive image in observers, and if it does, why. Four experiments have been 
designed for this purpose. 
 
 Hypotheses and Overview 
On the basis of the reasoning presented in the previous section, we hypothesized that 
the expression of ambivalence should be judged higher on social utility in comparison with 
univalent attitudes, when ambivalence is expressed on controversial attitude objects 
(Hypothesis 1a). This should not be the case on social desirability: Given that social norms 
and social desirability are often associated in the literature (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; 
Johnson & van de Vijver, 2003), and as we view ambivalent attitudes as potentially indicating 
competence, we reasoned that ambivalent attitudes cannot be judged higher on social 
desirability than pro-normative attitudes. Thus, we hypothesized that we should observe a 
linear effect on social desirability as a function of the displayed attitude: the pro-normative 
attitude should be evaluated as the most desirable, ambivalence should be less valued (as it is 
a bit deviant from the pro-normative attitude) and the counter-normative attitude should be 
the least valued (as it is the most deviant attitude) (Hypothesis 1b).  
As non-controversial, consensual attitude objects imply that there is a strong 
consensus on what the expressed response should be (Pérez & Mugny, 1996), we reasoned 
that the pro-normative attitude should be evaluated the highest, regardless of the judgment's 
dimension. Thus, we hypothesized that pro-normative attitudes should be evaluated as higher 
on social utility than the ambivalent ones, which should in turn be evaluated as more useful 
than the counter-normative one (Hypothesis 2a). We expected to find the same linear effect 
on social desirability (Hypothesis 2b).  
 In order to test our hypotheses, we used the so-called "judge paradigm" (Jellison & 
Green, 1981; Dubois, 1988).  This paradigm has been widely used to study the value of 
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psychological constructs. For instance, it has been successfully used to investigate the social 
value of the preference for consistency (Channouf & Mangard, 1997; Sénémeaud, Mange, 
Gouger, Testé, & Somat, 2011), of intrinsic motivation (Cassignol-Bertrand, Baldet, Louche, 
& Papet, 2006), of the belief in a just world (Alves & Correia, 2010), of individualism and 
collectivism (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Green, 2006), of achievement goals (Darnon et al., 
2009), and of organizational citizenship behavior (Esnard & Jouffre, 2008). In one of the 
versions of this paradigm, participants are invited to evaluate several targets who vary in their 
endorsement of the investigated trait (see Cambon, Djouari, & Beauvois, 2006). In our 
research, we presented three profiles of three alleged previous participants (namely, a bogus 
attitude questionnaire supposedly filled in by the target), presenting a target with a positive 
attitude, one who holds a negative attitude and one displaying ambivalence. Participants were 
required to judge each profile on both social desirability and social utility.  
 Our two hypotheses will be tested on different attitude objects (Experiments 1 to 4). 
More precisely, Experiments 1 and 2 will test Hypothesis 1 on controversial attitude objects 
(immigration and death penalty), and Experiments 3 and 4 will test Hypothesis 2 on non-
controversial attitude objects (organic products and recycling). The level of controversy of 
these attitude objects has been assessed in a pilot study with a sample of Swiss students 
comparable to that of the main experiments. Furthermore, an analysis of the literature 
revealed which, of the positive or the negative attitudes, are pro or counter-normative, which 
may be evident for consensual issues, but needs to be studied for controversial issues. As far 
as controversial issues are concerned, it has been found that, although this issue is recognized 
as controversial, Swiss citizens are on average in favor of new immigration and hence, tend to 
hold a positive attitude towards it (Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009). Moreover, like most 
Europeans, Swiss citizens predominantly reported to hold a negative attitude toward death 
penalty (Unnever, 2010). As far as consensual issues are concerned, several papers 
convincingly highlighted the social normativeness of holding a positive attitude towards 
recycling and pro-environmental behaviors (e.g. Turaga, Howarth, & Borsuk, 2010; Schwab, 
Harton, & Cullum, 2013). This effect was also observed on organic products (Aertsens, 
Verbeke, Mondelaers, & Van Huylenbroeck, 2009), were most consumers were shown to 
hold a positive attitude (Saba & Messina, 2003; Kihlberg & Risvik, 2007).  
 
Pilot Study 
 We conducted a pilot study to ascertain that immigration and death penalty are indeed 
considered as controversial issues and that organic products and recycling are considered as 
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non-controversial issues by a sample comparable to the participants recruited in the main 
experiments. 
 Participants and Method. A hundred and twenty-one students of a medium-size 
Swiss university volunteered in this pilot study ran on the Internet with LimeSurvey. Among 
several other attitude objects, participants were asked to indicate their perception of 
controversy or consensus toward immigration, death penalty, organic products, and recycling. 
More precisely, they were asked to fill in three 7-point bipolar scales devised for this pilot 
study, for each attitude object. The first bipolar scale ranged from consensus (1) to 
controversy (7), the second from no debate (1) to debate (7), and the third from a mutual 
agreement (1) to a polemic disagreement (7). The Cronbach’s alphas were comprised between 
" = .75 (for immigration) and " = .90 (for death penalty); therefore, we averaged the answers 
provided on the three items for each attitude object and considered it as our dependent 
variables. The range of the scale varies from 1 (perception of consensus) to 7 (perception of 
controversy). 
 Results and Discussion.  To test whether these attitude objects should be perceived 
as controversial or as consensual, we conducted t-test analyses against the mid-point of the 
scale (i.e. 4). The analyses revealed that immigration and death penalty were evaluated as 
being controversial. We respectively obtained (M = 5.92, SD = .90), t(120) = 23.52, p < .001, 
#p
2 = .82 for immigration and (M = 4.38, SD = 1.88), t(120) = 2.20, p = .030, #2 p
 = .03 for 
death penalty.  Moreover, organic products and recycling were evaluated as consensual. We 
respectively obtained (M = 3.26, SD = 1.22), t(120) = -6.69, p < .001, #2 p
 = .27 for organic 
products and (M = 3.20, SD = 1.65), t(120) = -5.31, p < .001, #2 p
 = .19 for recycling.  
  
 Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants and design. This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey. The 
students of a medium-size Swiss university have been solicited to participate in the 
experiment as part of psychology tutorials. Fifty-two participants (34 females, 18 males) filled 
in the questionnaire; their mean age was 22.06 years (SD = 2.91). Preliminary analyses 
revealed that sex and age had no impact on the studied effects, all ps > .1. The type of attitude 
profiles was set as within-participants variable, with a random presentation order: Participants 
had to evaluate three alleged previous participants with a positive attitude, a negative attitude 
and an ambivalent attitude toward the same attitude object. No effect of the order was 
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observed on the evaluations, all ps > .1. Therefore, order of presentation has not been 
included in the reported analyses, as for age and sex. This is true for all the other experiments 
and this information will not be repeated.  
 Procedure and materials.  The experiment was introduced as the follow-up of a 
previous study about attitudes. In this bogus study, participants were allegedly asked to fill 
eight items to assess their attitude toward immigration using 7-point Likert scales (from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much). In fact, the experimenter had filled out the questionnaire in 
advance and generated three specific profiles of participants. A first profile displayed a 
univalent positive attitude toward immigration (positive condition) by always circling either 6 
or 7. A second profile reported a univalent negative attitude (negative condition) by only 
circling 1 or 2. The third profile presented an ambivalent attitude by agreeing on four of the 
items (circling 6 or 7) and disagreeing on the four others (circling 1 or 2). This profile 
constitutes the ambivalent condition.  
 Participants were asked to report their evaluation of each profile on the basis of the 
answers provided (i.e. as a function of the profile). To do so, 8 traits were presented: four 
measured social desirability (nice, likable, appreciable and pleasant) and 4 other assessed 
social utility (competent, smart, gifted and likely to succeed academically), using the same 
materials as Dompnier, Darnon, Delmas and Butera (2008). Evaluations were made on a 7-
points Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) for each of these traits. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for social desirability ranged from .96 to .98, depending on the profile; 
alphas varied between .94 and .97 for social utility. Therefore, we averaged the four traits for 
each dimension and used them as dependent variables.  
Results and Discussion.  
 Since immigration has been shown in the Pilot Study to be a controversial attitude 
object, we hypothesized on the one hand that the ambivalent profile should be rated the 
highest on social utility in comparison with the two other profiles (H1a). On the other hand, 
given that on average Swiss individuals are open to new immigration (Meuleman et al., 
2009), we hypothesized that we should observe a decreasing linear trend on social desirability 
from the positive to the ambivalent and to the negative profiles (H1b). 
 Social utility.  To test our hypothesis 1a, we designed a within-participant planned 
contrast whereby the score in the ambivalent condition (2) has been tested against both the 
score in the positive (-1) and in the negative condition (-1). Moreover, the score in the 
positive condition (1) was tested against the score in the negative condition (-1) in an 
orthogonal contrast; the score in the ambivalence condition was set as 0. The proper use of 
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contrast analysis requires the planned contrast testing the hypothesis to be significant and the 
orthogonal contrast testing the residual to be non-significant (Judd & McClelland, 1989).  
 The test of this planned contrast reached significance, F(1, 51) = 4.93, p =. 031, #2 p
 = 
.08. In comparison with both the positive (M = 4.00) and the negative (M = 3.75), the 
ambivalent profile (M = 4.31) was evaluated as significantly higher in social utility. The 
orthogonal contrast was not significant, F < 1.  
 Social desirability.  To test our hypothesis 1b on this dimension, we designed a 
within-participant planned contrast whereby the score in the positive condition (1) has been 
tested against the score in the negative condition (-1), the score in the ambivalent condition 
was set as 0 in order to test the expected linear relation. Moreover, the score in the 
ambivalence condition (2) was tested against the score in the negative (-1) and in the positive 
condition (-1) in an orthogonal contrast.  
 The test of our planned linear contrast yielded a significant effect on social desirability, 
F(1, 51) = 12.44, p < .001, #2 p
 = .19. Being in favor of immigration was rated as more 
desirable (M = 4.40) than being ambivalent (M = 4.10), than being against immigration (M = 
3.28). The test of the orthogonal contrast did not reach significance, F(1, 51) = 2.43, p > .10. 
These results provide support for our first hypothesis: The ambivalent profile was judged the 
highest on social utility whereas we observed a linear decrease on social desirability moving 
from the positive attitude to the negative one (see Figure 1a).  
 
 
Figure 1a. Social Utility and Social Desirability as a function of the profiles' attitude and the 
controversy level of the attitude object. Error bars are based on Standard Error of the mean. 
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 Experiment 2 
Method 
 Participants and design. This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey, and 
tested the same hypotheses as Experiment 1. Participants have been solicited to contribute in 
an experiment about death penalty—again a controversial issue according to the pilot study— 
through social network websites. Sixty-nine participants filled in the questionnaire; their mean 
age was 23.96 years (SD = 6.55). The design was identical to that of Experiment 1. Four 
participants have been dropped from the analysis because of too large a Cook's distance 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). The final sample consisted of 45 females and 20 males; their 
mean age was 24.08 years (SD = 6.72). 
 Procedure and materials.  The experiment was introduced as a study about attitudes 
toward death penalty. The same procedure was used as for Experiment 1, that is to judge three 
alleged participants of a previous study. A profile displaying a positive attitude, an ambivalent 
attitude and a negative attitude were presented in a random order to the participants who had 
to evaluate each profile with the same four social desirability and four social utility traits as 
before. The Cronbach’s alphas for social desirability ranged from .95 to .97 depending on the 
profile; alphas varied between .92 and .95 for social utility. Therefore, we averaged the four 
traits for each dimension and considered these variables as our main dependent variables.  
Results and Discussion.  
 Since death penalty has been shown in the Pilot Study to be a controversial attitude 
object, we hypothesized on the one hand that the ambivalent profile should be rated the 
highest on social utility in comparison with the two other profiles (H1a). On the other hand, 
given that most Swiss individuals are against death penalty (Unnever, 2010), we hypothesized 
that we should observe a decreasing linear trend on social desirability across the positive, the 
ambivalent and the negative profiles. 
 Social utility. The score in the ambivalent condition (2) has been tested against both 
the score in the positive (-1) and in the negative condition (-1). The test of this planned 
contrast (H1a) yielded a significant effect, F(1, 64) = 4.74, p =.033, #2 p
 = .06. In comparison 
with both the positive (M = 3.56) and the negative (M = 3.76), the ambivalent profile (M = 
3.96) was evaluated the highest on social utility. The evaluation of the positive profile and the 
negative profile, the orthogonal contrast, did not differ significantly, F < 1.  
 Social desirability . The test of a linear contrast (H1b) yielded a significant effect on 
social desirability, F(1, 64) = 8.33, p = .005, #2 p
 = .11. Being against death penalty was rated 
as more desirable (M = 4.09) in comparison with being ambivalent (M = 3.89) or favorable 
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(M = 3.28). The test of the orthogonal contrast did not reach significance, F(1, 68) = 2.65, p > 
.10. These results provide support for our first hypothesis with a different controversial 
attitude object: The ambivalent profile was again judged the highest on social utility whereas 
we observed a linear decrease on desirability moving from the negative attitude to the positive 
one (see Figure 1b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Social Utility and Social Desirability as a function of the profiles' attitude and the 
controversy level of the attitude object. Error bars are based on Standard Error of the mean. 
 
 Experiment 3 
Method 
 Participants and design. This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey, to 
test Hypothesis 2. This time participants have been solicited to contribute, through social 
network websites, to an experiment about organic products, a non-controversial attitude 
object. Thirty-five participants (28 females, 7 males) filled in the questionnaire; their mean 
age was 29.49 years (SD = 16.38). 
 Procedure and materials.  The experiment was introduced as a study about attitudes 
toward organic products. The same procedure was used as for previous experiments; a profile 
displaying a positive attitude, an ambivalent attitude and a negative attitude were presented in 
random order to the participants who had to evaluate each profile with the same four social 
desirability and four social utility traits as before. The Cronbach’s alpha for social desirability 
ranged from .96 to .98, depending on the profile; alphas varied between .89 and .97 for social 
utility.  
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Results and Discussion.  
 Social utility.  In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that for a non-controversial attitude 
objects we should observe a linear trend on both social utility and social desirability. 
Consequently, the score of social utility should be the highest for the positive profile—a 
positive attitude toward organic products is pro-normative (Aertsens et al., 2009) —and the 
lowest for the negative profile, with the ambivalent profile in the middle. Contrast analyses 
revealed that the linear contrast was indeed significant, F(1, 34) = 31.93, p <. 001, #2 p
 = .48. 
Participants evaluated the positive profile the highest (M = 4.46), followed by the ambivalent 
profile (M = 3.77), and the negative profile (M = 3.21). The orthogonal contrast did not reach 
significance, F < 1.  
 Social desirability.  The test of a linear contrast yielded a significant effect, F(1, 34) 
= 22.68, p < .001, #2 p
 = .40. Being in favor of organic products was judged as being more 
desirable (M = 4.28) in comparison with an ambivalent (M = 3.57) and a negative profile (M 
= 3.12). The orthogonal contrast did not reach significance, F < 1.  
As predicted by Hypotheses 2a and 2b, the positive profile was rated the highest on both 
social desirability and social utility, followed by the ambivalent and the negative profiles (see 
Figure 1c).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1c. Social Utility and Social Desirability as a function of the profiles' attitude and the 
controversy level of the attitude object. Error bars are based on Standard Error of the mean. 
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 Experiment 4 
Method 
 Participants and design. This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey, again 
to test Hypothesis 2. This time participants have been solicited to contribute, through social 
network websites, to an experiment about recycling, a non-controversial attitude object. Fifty-
one participants (38 females, 13 males) filled in the questionnaire; their mean age was 25.39 
years (SD = 10.08). 
 Procedure and materials.  The participants were told that we were conducting a 
study about attitudes toward recycling. The same procedure was used as for previous 
experiments; three profiles displaying a positive attitude, an ambivalent attitude and a 
negative attitude were presented in a random order to the participants who had to evaluate 
each profile with the same four social desirability and four social utility traits as before. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for social desirability ranged from .92 to .96, depending on the profile; 
alphas varied between .83 and .82 for social utility. Therefore, we calculated the mean of the 
four traits for each dimension, and used them as our dependent variables.  
Results and Discussion.  
 Social utility . We hypothesized a linear trend on both social utility and social 
desirability, as recycling appeared as non-controversial in the Pilot Study, with the positive 
attitude being the most positively evaluated since social norms encourage pro-environmental 
behaviors (Turaga et al., 2010; Schwab et al., 2013). The test of a linear contrast yielded a 
significant effect, F(1, 50) = 67.04, p < .001, #2 p
 = .57. Being in favor of recycling was 
judged as more useful (M = 4.68) in comparison with an ambivalent profile (M = 3.79), which 
in turn was judged more useful than a negative profile (M = 2.75). The orthogonal contrast 
was not significant, F < 1.  
 Social desirability. The test of a linear contrast yielded a significant effect, F(1, 50) 
= 64.23, p < .001, #2 p
 = .56. The profile presenting a positive attitude was evaluated more 
desirable (M = 4.86) than the ambivalent profile (M = 3.59), which in turn was evaluated 
more desirable than the negative profile (M = 2.61). The orthogonal contrast did not reach 
significance, F < 1. As for organic products, the positive pro-normative profile was rated the 
highest on both social utility and social desirability, followed by the ambivalent and the 
negative profile (see Figure 1d).  
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Figure 1d. Social Utility and Social Desirability as a function of the profiles' attitude and the 
controversy level of the attitude object. Error bars are based on Standard Error of the mean. 
  
 General Discussion 
 The vast majority of research on attitudes to date considers that attitudinal 
ambivalence is a weak form of attitude and an aversive state; in other words, a form of 
attitude that should not be valued by individuals. However, some recent research has shown 
that individuals may express attitudinal ambivalence to achieve a positive image of 
themselves, when the issue is controversial (Pillaud et al., 2013). Therefore, the present 
research was designed to provide an answer to this riddle, and investigate the social 
perception of ambivalence. Two elements make this research necessary. First, the fact that 
individuals display ambivalence in the attempt to achieve positive self-presentation (Pillaud et 
al., 2013), although interesting in and of itself, does not imply that such attempt is successful 
and that the display of ambivalent attitudes is indeed socially valued by an observer (Beauvois 
& Dubois, 2005). Second, we have noted above that, although some theoretical analyses have 
suggested that ambivalence may be valued, no research so far has provided empirical 
evidence that this may be the case, nor investigated why expressing attitudinal ambivalence 
may generate a positive image in observers. We devised this research program to overcome 
this gap in the literature.  
 In this article, we proposed that ambivalence could fill a specific function when being 
expressed on controversial issues: that of signaling competence. This reasoning has been 
rooted on several studies that linked ambivalence and a wide array of cognitions, such for 
instance critical thinking and wisdom (Piderit, 2000; Weick, 1998, 2004), amount of 
knowledge (Stoeckel, 2013), and strategic thinking (Plambeck & Weber, 2010). Furthermore, 
%!
%$&!
#!
#$&!
(!
($&!
&!
)*+,-,./!
0--,-12/!
034,.56/7-!
0--,-12/!
8/95-,./!
0--,-12/!
3- Empirical Part: Second Research Line 
   94
ambivalence has been shown to achieve some adaptive function. Indeed, ambivalent attitudes 
were discussed as providing equilibrium in complex situations (Costarelli, 2011; Pagliaro et 
al., 2012), and allowing individuals to resist majority influence (Cavazza & Butera, 2008). 
Thus, we hypothesized that on controversial issues individuals expressing ambivalent 
attitudes could be valued on social utility, as compared with individuals expressing univalent 
attitudes.  
 More specifically, we hypothesized that an individual expressing ambivalent attitudes 
on controversial attitude objects should be judged higher on social utility in comparison with 
an individual expressing univalent attitudes, be them pro-normative or counter-normative, as 
ambivalence could be perceived as the expression of critical thinking (Hypothesis 1a). We 
consequently predicted that the benefit of the display of ambivalent attitudes should not be 
observed on social desirability. We indeed hypothesized that pro-normative attitudes should 
be preferred to them and expected to observe a decreasing linear effect from the pro-
normative to the ambivalent attitude, the counter-normative attitude being the less desirable 
(Hypothesis 1b). Because consensual attitude objects imply a strong consensus on what the 
expressed response should be (Pérez & Mugny, 1996), we hypothesized that the pro-
normative attitude should be rated the best on both social utility and social desirability. 
Hence, we predicted that they should be evaluated as more useful than the ambivalent one, 
which should in turn be evaluated as more useful than the counter-normative one on 
consensual attitude objects (Hypothesis 2a). The same trend was expected for social 
desirability (Hypothesis 2b). 
 Results supported both hypotheses. On controversial attitude objects, namely both 
immigration and death penalty (Experiments 1 and 2), we observed that ambivalence was 
significantly evaluated the highest on social utility when compared to univalent positive and 
univalent negative attitudes, in line with Hypothesis 1a. However, in line with Hypothesis 1b, 
we observed a linear decrease going from the pro-normative attitude, to the ambivalent one 
and finally to the counter-normative one, on both immigration and death penalty ai. The 
pattern of result was different on consensual attitude objects, namely organic products and 
recycling (Experiments 3 and 4). We found the expected linear trend on both social utility and 
social desirability, whereby the univalent positive attitude (in both cases the pro-normative 
attitude) was rated higher than ambivalent attitudes, which in turn was evaluated higher than 
univalent negative attitude.  
 These results contribute to the recent literature on attitudinal ambivalence by providing 
for the first time the evidence that the expression of ambivalent attitudes could be socially 
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valued by an observer, while providing insight as per the mechanism responsible for this 
attribution of value. The present results, indeed, reveal that the expression of attitudinal 
ambivalence is recognized as competence (i.e. more socially useful) when it is expressed on a 
controversial attitude object. It has recently been reported that individuals could display more 
ambivalence on controversial issues with the aim to gain social approval (Pillaud et al., 2013); 
the present research complements these findings by showing that indeed, by doing so, 
individuals are evaluated as more competent than individuals displaying univalent attitudes 
(both pro- and anti normative ones).  
 In fact, our results allow going a step further as they show that ambivalence may indeed 
be perceived as bearing some social value, to the extent that it can be interpreted as a form of 
competence, as it is the case for attitudes regarding controversial issues. Such results are 
directly in line with, and provide the lacking empirical evidence for, the literature that 
portrayed ambivalence as being linked with wisdom, mindfulness and knowledge: By 
acknowledging both sides of controversial attitude objects, the expression of ambivalence is 
recognized as competence. They also may help in interpreting the results of Costarelli (2011) 
and Brauer, Er-rafiy, Kawakami and Phills (2012), who showed that the expression of 
ambivalence or mixed messages is considered as the most balanced, realistic and acceptable 
when being expressed toward out-groups: As attitude expression toward out-groups is quite 
complex, mixed attitudes could then have been perceived as the most competent solution.  
 The above reasoning is sustained by the result that ambivalent attitudes have been 
valued on social utility only when they were expressed on controversial issues: when 
consensual issues were at stake, pro-normative attitudes were preferred over ambivalent and 
anti-normative attitudes. Such results could contribute to understand why, in the history of 
research on attitudes, ambivalence has mainly been studied as something negative. First, if 
ambivalent attitudes are quite prevalent (Breckler, 2004), controversies around attitude 
objects are quite rare: although the media may depict many of the daily reported issues as 
controversial for marketing reasons, most people strive for holding consensual positions, to 
such an extent that Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) have termed this tendency a “conformity 
bias”. We thus believe that in most cases, ambivalent individuals could feel a social pressure 
that would push them to pick a side. It has been argued by Laponce (1974) that we tend to 
dichotomize the world and then to view its parts as being opposed. Because ambivalence is 
associated with inconsistencies and fluctuations (see Lavine, 2001; Fabrigar, MacDonald, & 
Wegener, 2005) and because consistency is valued (for a review see Guadagno & Cialdini, 
2010), ambivalence can therefore be seen as "abnormal" when it is held on consensual issues. 
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Consequently, ambivalent individuals could be motivated not to present themselves as 
ambivalent, and therefore be more likely to express univalent attitudes.  
 Such reasoning can also provide a better understanding of why ambivalent individuals 
can indeed feel conflicted. If we acknowledge that decision-making situations could generate 
discomfort in themselves (as sustained by van Harreveld et al., 2009), discomfort could also 
stem in part from social considerations. In line with the above argument, ambivalent 
individuals could see themselves as deviant individuals on consensual issues, and decision-
making situations could highlight this feeling (Janis, 1972). Future research should 
consequently address this question by assessing discomfort of ambivalent individuals in 
decision-making situations by taking the level of controversy of the attitude object into 
account. It seems plausible to expect that individuals should experience more discomfort 
when they perceived a strong consensus on the attitude to be expressed, but less so when the 
attitude object is perceived as controversial.  
 A limitation needs to be mentioned as it could open avenue for new research. In this 
article, we used different attitude objects, chosen after a pilot study that revealed their 
different level of controversy; however, future research could aim at manipulating the 
perception of controversy within the same attitude object, as in Pillaud et al. (2013). 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to pursue the present research with a longitudinal 
perspective, to study how the perception of ambivalence could fluctuate as a consequence of 
controversies. For instance, it would be interesting to focus on political figures or on social 
issues (such as gay marriage or gun control) that are more or less controversial at different 
times. The study of such phenomena could represent a dynamic approach to the study of the 
perception of ambivalence.  
 Notwithstanding these limitations, the present results bring convergent and robust 
support to a view of attitudinal ambivalence as useful attitudes. When being expressed on 
controversial issues, ambivalent attitudes were recognized as signaling competence over and 
above univalent attitudes. After more than two decades of research that mainly focused on its 
weaknesses and negative consequences, the present research might open the way to the 
functional study of attitudinal ambivalence. 
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a Footnote 
 Two further experiments, not reported in full here because of their redundancy, 
perfectly replicated the "ndings of experiments 1 and 2. Forty participants participated in an 
experiment about repeating school years, and a hundred participants in another experiment 
about having children, two controversial attitude objects. Performing the same contrast 
analyses as in Experiments 1 and 2, results showed that participants judged the ambivalent 
profile as higher on social utility than the univalent profiles in both studies, respectively F(1, 
39) = 4.67, p = .037, !p
2 = .10 for repeating school years, and F(1, 99) = 11.26, p =. 01, !p
2 =. 
09 for having children. The orthogonal contrasts were not significant, all ps > .10. As for 
social desirability, the linear trend was also replicated, with the univalent pro-normative 
profile being evaluated higher on social desirability than the ambivalent profile, in turn higher 
than the univalent anti-normative profile, F(1, 39) = 9.99, p =. 003, !p
2 = .20 for repeating 
school years, and F(1, 99) = 139.38, p <. 001, !p
2 =. 58 for having children. The orthogonal 
contrasts were not significant, all ps > .10. For additional information, please contact the 
authors.  
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In this final part, we will begin by reviewing the results of our two research lines and 
discussing their relative contribution to the literature on ambivalence. We will then evoke 
their limitations, and finally elaborate on the implications of the work conducted in this 
dissertation. 
 
 1. Ambivalent attitudes are useful attitudes 
1.1 Highlights of the results 
 In this dissertation, we proposed to view ambivalent attitudes as useful attitudes. We 
inspired our reflection from recent studies that depicted such attitudes as potentially linked to 
adaptation and strategic behaviors. This work has been conducted in order to emphasize the 
fact that ambivalence attitudes could not only lead to negative consequences as well as to 
define some of the circumstances where they could be beneficial. Indeed, right before the 
beginning of this doctoral work, Cavazza & Butera (2008) challenged the dominant position 
that conceived ambivalent attitudes as unstable and weak attitudes (see Conner & Sparks, 
2002), by pointing out that ambivalent individuals could adapt to influence situation. We took 
up from this research in order to investigate if, as hypothesized, the level of ambivalence can 
be purposely controlled and displayed as a function of the situation. We also aimed at 
reporting that such shift in the attitude expression was done for self-presentational reasons 
and that ambivalence was more likely to be expressed when it concerns a controversial social 
issue in comparison with a consensual one. Seven Experiments have been reported in this first 
research line.  
 Experiment 1 was run on the Internet on a controversial issue (e.g. Genetically 
Modified Organisms; GMOs). Experiment 1a assessed Felt ambivalence whereas Experiment 
1b assessed Potential ambivalence in both its cognitive and affective components. All two 
Experiments convincingly supported our hypotheses. Regardless of the type of ambivalence, 
participants displayed more ambivalence in both the standard and the self-enhancement 
condition in comparison with the self-depreciation condition. The level of ambivalence in 
standard and self-enhancement condition was not significantly different. Thus, this first 
Experiment provided support for our hypothesis according to which individuals could be 
strategically controlling their level of ambivalence as a function of the situation (as the level 
of ambivalence varied as a function of the self-presentation condition). It also pointed out that 
such control was done for self-presentational concerns. Indeed, individuals reported a similar 
level of ambivalence in the standard and self-enhancement conditions, but less so in the self-
depreciation condition. 
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 Experiment 2 aimed at replicating these results using a paper-and-pencil paradigm, as 
we were concerned about the possibility that our results of Experiment 1 could have been 
method dependent. Experiment 2 led to the same results as Experiment 1. Again, more 
ambivalence toward GMOs was reported in both the standard and the self-enhancement 
condition in comparison with the self-depreciation one. The level of ambivalence did not 
significantly differ between these two first conditions. This was found using Felt ambivalence 
(Experiment 2a) as well as using Potential ambivalence in its cognitive component  
(Experiment 2b) and in its affective component (Experiment 2c). Hence, our results have not 
been affected by the assessment method. We did find the same results when the Experiment 
was set in a web-based or in a paper-and-pencil format. The current literature seems to go in 
line with this observation: web-based studies and paper-and-pencil studies can be used 
indifferently (see Huang, 2006; Weigold, Weigold, & Russell, 2013 for the most recent paper 
on the issue).  
 Experiment 3 was designed for the test of the hypothesis that displaying ambivalence 
could be done to appear positively on controversial issues whereas the opposite was expected 
on consensual ones. Experiment 3 was consequently run on a consensual issue (e.g. tooth 
brushing). We replicated the fact that individuals were able to intentionally display a different 
level of ambivalence in the self-depreciation condition in comparison with the standard and 
self-enhancement condition but of interest, they displayed more ambivalence in the self-
depreciation condition. Because of the strong consensus on this attitude object, people 
reported to be doubtful in order to appear negatively. Hence, this Experiment clearly 
supported our hypothesis according to which displaying ambivalence on consensual issues is 
less likely to be done to foster a positive image of oneself. However, despite this convincing 
evidence, the difference in the observed patterns could be attributable to another variable than 
controversy. We designed Experiment 4 to address this question. 
 Experiment 4 was again run on GMOs but in addition to the usual three self-
presentation conditions, we directly manipulated the level of controversy. In one condition, 
GMOs were introduced as a consensual issue, in that most Swiss allegedly hold a consensual 
negative attitude (89% were presented as being against GMOs and 11% in favor). In a second 
condition, GMOs were introduced as a controversial social issue where nearly the half of the 
Swiss was said to hold a positive attitude (49% of the population) and the other half a 
negative one (51% of the population). Our results supported the central role of controversy in 
the direction of the effect: participants displayed more ambivalence in both the standard and 
self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition when GMOs were 
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introduced as being controversial whereas they displayed less ambivalence in both the 
standard and self-enhancement conditions in comparison with the self-depreciation condition 
when GMOs were introduced as being a consensual issue. This first line of research 
demonstrated that ambivalent attitudes could be strategically displayed and controlled, as well 
as identified one of the possible factors that drive the effect. Indeed, the level of controversy 
associated with the attitude object significantly affected the pattern of result: people displayed 
ambivalence in order to gain social approval on controversial issues whereas the exact reverse 
was found on consensual issues.  
The second line of research has been devised in response to this first line of research. 
We repeatedly observed that individuals were displaying more ambivalence to give a positive 
image of themselves on Genetically Modified Organisms. This suggested that ambivalence 
was used to appear as positive in the eyes of others. In response to that, we decided to 
investigate if such strategy was effective, and if ambivalent individuals could be socially 
valued when they display ambivalence. We proposed that ambivalence could suggest that 
people are knowledgeable on the issue, and thus that they are displaying their competence 
when they display ambivalent attitudes. We consequently ran four Experiments in order to 
test if, as predicted, ambivalent individuals could be evaluated higher on social utility than 
individuals who hold clear-cut attitudes.  
Experiment 1 focused on attitudes toward immigration (a controversial social issue). 
Our results supported our hypotheses according to which (1) an individual displaying an 
ambivalent attitude should be rated the highest on social utility (competence) in comparison 
with individuals holding more clear-cut attitudes, and (2) we should observe a decreasing 
linear trend on social desirability moving from the pro-normative positive attitude to the 
counter-normative negative attitude (ambivalent attitudes being in the middle). Experiment 2 
replicated the results of Experiment 1 with another controversial social issue (death penalty). 
Experiment 3 tested the other side of our hypothesis as it focused on a consensual 
social issue (organic products). Contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, we found a decreasing linear 
trend on social utility as well as on social desirability, moving from the pro-normative 
positive attitude to the counter-normative negative attitude (ambivalent attitude being in the 
middle). Experiment 4 replicated the findings of Experiment 4 on recycling, another 
consensual social issue.  
 This second line of research revealed the potential efficiency of the strategic 
expression of ambivalent attitudes that has been observed in the first research line. Indeed, we 
previously pointed out that individuals tended to display more ambivalence on controversial 
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issues when trying to gain social approval, and here we reported that, indeed, such behavior 
was socially well perceived. Ambivalent attitudes have been valued on the social utility 
dimension to the extent that they were displayed on a controversial attitude object. Indeed, 
pro-normative attitudes have been rated the highest when being expressed on a consensual 
attitude object, and so on both social utility and social desirability. Hence, the perception of 
ambivalence seems to be contextual: on the one hand, it seems to be mainly negative on 
consensual issues since pro-normative attitudes are preferred to them, but on the other hand, 
individuals acknowledged that the expression of ambivalent attitudes could represent 
competence on controversial issues and hence, they favored ambivalence in comparison with 
more clear-cut attitudes. In sum, the expression of ambivalence can be valued when criticism 
is possible (i.e. when there is no strong consensus on an issue).  
 
1.2 Concluding and extending 
We believe that these two lines of research convincingly demonstrated that ambivalent 
attitudes could be considered as useful attitudes, and hence that the negative picture 
widespread in the literature is unwarranted.  
The first research line revealed that such attitudes could be deliberately controlled and 
used for self-presentation concerns; in other terms that ambivalent attitudes could be adaptive. 
To our knowledge, displaying more ambivalence in order to gain social approval has never 
been observed in previous research. Indeed, research on the pliability of ambivalent attitudes 
actually always observed less ambivalence as a result of an influence situation (see Conner & 
Sparks, 2002; Conner & Armitage, 2008 for reviews). Here we found a situation in which 
people purposely displayed more ambivalence as a result. We believe that historical reasons 
could explain why such an effect has not been previously researched and illustrated. If it is 
possible to notice that the function of ambivalent attitudes, as well as the motivational 
conflicts underlying its expression, have been questioned (Maio & Olson, 2000; Crano & 
Prislin, 2006), we would like to bring attention to the fact that both aspects could have been 
investigated in a biased way. Indeed, research on the pliability of the ambivalent attitudes 
almost exclusively conceived the expected pliability as an indicator of its weakness in 
comparison with clear-cut attitudes (see Hodson et al., 2001 for instance); hence, it is not 
surprising to notice that the experimental plans were designed in order to reveal such 
weakness and, apart from Cavazza and Butera (2008), to only highlight the cases where 
highly ambivalent individuals could be affected when low-ambivalent individuals could 
resist. Situations where highly ambivalent individuals could also resist have consequently 
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been left aside. In most studies, ambivalent individuals have been considered as willing to 
arrive at conclusion, and hence they failed to focus on situations where its expression could be 
adaptive and socially well perceived (see Laponce, 1975, for a discussion of this type of 
research bias). The first research line of this dissertation addressed this aspect by revealing 
that the pliability of ambivalent attitudes could be useful for self-presentational concerns. 
The second line of research revealed the efficiency of this behavior: people who 
displayed ambivalence have indeed been rated higher on social utility than people holding 
more clear-cut attitudes on controversial issues. This line of research contributes to the 
literature on ambivalence by several aspects. First, to our knowledge, no research had 
investigated the social perception of ambivalence before. Even if ambivalent attitudes were 
repeatedly presented with a negative connotation in the literature (as detailed in the sections 
2.1 and 2.2.1), they hitherto have never been subject to direct comparison with univalent 
attitudes. This line of research revealed that ambivalent attitudes could be socially valued and 
recognized as competence. This finding could be seen as contradictory with most research on 
ambivalence in Social Psychology as ambivalent attitudes have been commonly linked with 
hesitation (Mutz, 2002; Jewell, 2003) and conceived as inconsistencies (Newby-Clark et al, 
2002; Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). As a reminder, consistency has traditionally 
been described as normative and hence, as strongly socially valued (see Cialdini et al., 1995; 
Channouf & Mangard, 1997, and part 2.2.1 for more details). We believe, however, that our 
results could be compatible with this work in spite of this apparent contradiction. More 
precisely, it seems possible to merge the above-mentioned literature with the literature that 
viewed ambivalence as indicating mindfulness and reflection: the expression of ambivalence 
could be fostered and well perceived when people deal with a complex and evolving attitude 
object (such as companies for instance; see Piderit, 2000, or Fiol & O'Connor, 2003) whereas 
this could be less the case when people deal with more consensual attitude objects (e.g. 
recycling or physical training; see Costarelli & Colloca, 2003, or Sparks, Harris, & 
Lockwood, 2004). Ambivalence could thus be perceived as accounting for the understanding 
of the complexity of controversial issues whereas it could appear as a contradiction when it is 
expressed on consensual ones. In other terms, the consideration of the level of controversy 
associated with the attitude object could lead to a better understanding as it allows the 
inclusion of both approaches.  
We believe that our two sets of research could bring to the development of a new 
approach for the study of attitudinal ambivalence. Indeed, its function has been repeatedly 
questioned in the literature and this question is quite understandable if people only conceive 
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ambivalence as leading the individual to the avoidance of decision-making situations and 
discomfort. Why would people be ambivalent if this only brings negative consequences for 
them? In fact, the picture seems to be more complicated than that: with the growth of society 
and media communication, people are confronted to more and more information as well as 
more and more choices and decision-making situations, and as a result ambivalence is quite 
ubiquitous (Weisbrode, 2012). For instance, the political environment can directly affect 
people's political attitudes and notably their level of ambivalence (Keele & Wolak, 2008). In 
comparison with more neutral periods, the times of election campaigns have been described 
as a source of ambivalence in the population. Indeed, during such periods, several political 
sides are represented and consequently, different points of views on a same issue are salient in 
people's environment. Ambivalence can stem from such periods of elections (for a similar 
reasoning; see Stoeckel, 2013). Thus, people could become ambivalent as a result on the 
abundance of information.  
We mentioned in Chapter 1 that the concept of attitudes has been brought to the 
literature in order to predict behaviors, and hence it is not surprising to notice that most 
research on ambivalence has been conducted to assess how reliably it could predict behaviors. 
However, if it appears quite clearly that ambivalent attitudes can torment people in decision-
making situations as they either postpone their choice when possible (Lavine et al., 2001; 
Jewell, 2003; Nir, 2005) or feel discomfort when they have to decide (Nordgren et al., 2006; 
van Harreveld et al., 2009a, 2009b), ambivalent attitudes could be beneficial in non decision-
making situations. Indeed, people do not always have to act or to decide in real life. For 
instance, it seems plausible to imagine that people could be ambivalent on the question of 
death penalty even if they live in a country where death penalty is forbidden (such as 
Switzerland for instance). Thus, they will never have to vote in favor or against death penalty. 
Their ambivalence could therefore be detrimental if they had to face such situation one day in 
the future, but as ambivalence seems to be tied up with critical thinking and knowledge, they 
could also currently know a lot on the subject. Hence, they could be more likely to be wise 
when they have to express themselves on the subject and help the others to make up their 
mind.  
Therefore, we think that future researches should aim at designing studies that view 
ambivalence as consequential to critical thinking in order to further highlight its benefits on 
non decision-making situations (such as the research of Fong that linked ambivalence and 
creativity for instance; Fong, 2006). We believe that by showing that ambivalence could be 
controlled and portrayed as a function of the demands of the environment, as well as by 
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showing that people could be socially valued when they express their ambivalence, we 
contributed in reporting that ambivalence could also be beneficial. 
 
 2. Critical thoughts  
2.1 A quick comment on our samples 
Only students of the University of Lausanne composed our sample of participants for 
the first line of research. Even if we did have students from 14 different disciplines in 
Experiment 1, most participants were studying Social Sciences and, in a sizable part, 
Psychology. The second line of research has been conducted on a more various sample. It has 
included participants who were not students of the University of Lausanne and aimed at 
obtaining a wider age range. However, these two variables (namely, being a student or not, 
and age) could be important variables to consider in future studies of ambivalence. We argued 
in Chapter 2 that it is possible to think that, as university tends to value criticism (Guiller, 
Durndell, & Ross, 2008), this could indirectly lead to a more positive perception of 
ambivalence. However, we did not test such hypothesis and to our knowledge, no research 
has been conducted in order to do so.  
Similarly, age has sometimes been mentioned in the literature on ambivalence. 
However, its effect is unclear. For instance, focusing on the Americans’ attitudes toward 
United States of America, Citrin and Luks (2005) found a negative relation between the age 
of their participants and their ambivalence toward USA (r = -.11). They proposed that this 
could be due either to the fact that patriotism tends to increase with age or to the fact that 
people get more interested in politics getting older. Thus, as they know more on the issue, 
they can more easily pick a side. However, this second possibility goes against the more 
recent observation of Stoeckel (2013) who found that more knowledge leads to more 
ambivalence. Williams and Aaker (2002) focused on ambivalent emotions and reported the 
exact opposite relationship than Citrin and Lucks (2005). They predicted that older 
individuals should have greater propensity to accept contradictions and duality in comparison 
with comparably educated younger adults. They indeed observed in their Experiment 3 that 
older participants (Mage = 73.2 years) felt less discomfort when feeling ambivalent than 
younger ones (Mage = 21.1 years). They proposed that this was due to the fact that older adults 
tend to engage in more relativistic processing. Such reasoning has also been formulated by 
Mikulincer (cited in Wang, 2010) as he reported, “a certain degree of ambivalence is a sign of 
maturity”. Future research could be carried out in order to better understand the relationship 
between age, education and ambivalent attitudes.  
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2.2 Comments on the First Research line 
 2.2.1 A mbiv alent attitudes and attitude change 
Our first research line originated from research that revealed the greater sensitivity of 
ambivalent attitudes toward influence, and brought the debate on the function of their shift. 
We have mentioned that ambivalent attitudes may have an adaptive function in that they help 
individuals to display a positive image of themselves when expressing their attitudes on a 
controversial attitude object. However, we have to acknowledge that our set of studies did not 
provide any information about real attitude change. Indeed, unlike studies on attitude change 
that include a measure of attitude before and after a message of influence, our studies simply 
varied the type of impression that participants had to give when expressing themselves (either 
a good one or a bad one). What would happen with our paradigm if we measured attitude 
change? We can imagine two cases. If individuals are motivated to appear positively in the 
eyes of others, they could side with a message of influence that contains only weak 
arguments. However, if they are motivated to resolve their ambivalence as previously 
discussed, they should need convincing arguments to be able to pick a side (as reported by 
Maio et al., 1996 for instance). Future research could tackle this issue by integrating an 
evaluative component in its paradigm. For instance, it could mirror Maio et al.'s study (1996) 
on the attitude toward immigrants by adding two experimental conditions. The participants 
will either report their attitude privately after the message of influence (as it was originally 
done) or they will have to report it publicly (and thus be appraised by the others). We would 
hypothesize that, as ambivalent individuals tend to be strategic, they would only side with 
convincing arguments. However, it is plausible to think that they will do so to a greater extent 
when expressing publicly in comparison with when it they have to do it privately.   
 
 2.2.2 A  comment on Experiment 3 
In this Experiment that focused on a consensual attitude object, we observed that 
people did display a lower level of ambivalence in both the standard and the self-enhancement 
condition than in the self-depreciation one. Even if this pattern of results supported our 
hypothesis, this finding could appear quite "logical", as the experiment only considered Felt 
ambivalence as a dependent variable. In fact, in this measure, people answer a set of questions 
using traditional 7-point Likert scales (e.g. to what extent do you feel conflicted on...). The 
items are directed so that a high average score indicates that people feel highly ambivalent 
whereas a low score indicates the reverse. In other terms, this scale uses a continuum that 
ranges from 1 (not at all ambivalent) to 7 (extremely ambivalent). Hence, it could be not 
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particularly surprising to observe that when people display an attitude on one side of the 
continuum to appear positive (e.g. as nearly not at all ambivalent, Mself-enhancement = 1.64), they 
display an attitude on the other side of the continuum to appear negative (Mself-depreciation = 
6.11). Experiment 4 has been designed to cope with this problem. Despite this criticism, we 
believe that the fact that we observed that people indeed shifted their level of ambivalence as 
a function of the self-presentation conditions on both measures (the above-mentioned measure 
of felt ambivalence as well as via an open-ended measure) in a similar manner provides a 
convincing support for our first set of hypotheses.  
 
2.3 Comments on the Second Research line 
 Our second research line focused on the social perception of ambivalent attitudes as a 
function of the type of the attitude object. If our results seem to be supportive of our 
hypotheses, one limitation needs to be mentioned; that is, the control of the participants' 
attitude. Indeed, if it is plausible to think that positive attitude toward immigration are valued 
in Switzerland (as mentioned in Meuleman et al., 2009) and hence, that most individuals 
value the expression of a positive attitude toward immigration, we have to acknowledge that 
political attitudes may moderate this effect. It is indeed very likely that participants who 
endorse extreme right-wing attitudes would not do so even if those are socially well perceived 
(see Thomsen, Green & Sidanius, 2009 for instance). The same reasoning can be applied to 
other attitude objects. Hence, in addition to the consideration of the socially valued attitude in 
the reported experiments, we should also have integrated the participants' initial attitude in 
our analyses.  
However, if controlling the participants' attitude in the analysis makes perfect sense, 
the moderation of the evaluation of the profiles' attitude as a function of the participants' 
attitude should be difficult to found; notably when the attitude object is not socially debated. 
For instance, we hardly imagine that a representative sample of individuals who hold a strong 
negative attitude toward recycling or organic products should be easily achievable. The 
moderation of our reported results by the participants' attitude should consequently either 
require a lot of participants or to specifically contact different social groups (such as political 
groups for instance or individuals who tend to value human domination over universalism; 
see Dreezens et al., 2005). Indeed, we mentioned that social desirability and social norms are 
positively linked (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). More precisely, the link between attitudes and 
the social norms seem to be circular: a majority of individuals hold the type of attitude that is 
socially valued and an attitude is socially valued because most of the individuals tend to hold 
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it. It is thus more likely to find individuals who hold an attitude that is socially valued than 
individuals who hold a counter-normative one. For this reason, we believe that our results 
portray the most frequent type of social judgment even if we acknowledge that a small sample 
of the population could have judged in a reverse way on the social desirability dimension. 
Lastly, the focal point of our second research line was to highlight the fact that ambivalent 
attitudes were valued on the social utility dimension; we believe that this should be the case 
regardless of the participants' initial attitude. Indeed, in this research line we proposed that the 
cause of the value of ambivalent attitudes over univalent ones would derive from the 
perception of controversy. Hence, regardless of the individuals' attitude and thus regardless of 
whether they support or oppose the attitude object, ambivalent attitudes should be valued 
when they are expressed on an attitude object that is perceived as socially debated and 
controversial.  
 
2.4 A projection of the potential relationships between decision-making, 
ambivalence and controversy 
Even if we did not plan to work on decision-making situations in this doctoral work, 
an important amount of research has been devoted to articulating ambivalence with such 
situations; it seemed therefore interesting to try to link our research with decision-making. 
Indeed, we intended to highlight that ambivalent attitudes could be functional and perceived 
as useful in this doctoral dissertation. Notably, our second set of research aimed at 
investigating if, indeed, ambivalent individuals could be valued and judged as competent on 
controversial attitudes, and we found evidence that it seemed to be the case that, as far as 
competence is concerned, the expression of ambivalence was more valued than the expression 
of more clear-cut attitudes. However, if displaying such attitude could be profitable for the 
individual, we have to acknowledge that the behavior of ambivalent individuals in a decision-
making situation is hardly predictable on controversial issues. In fact, we found no studies 
that have focused on predicting how ambivalent individuals would pick a side on a 
controversial issue. However, since older studies can be informative for this reflection, this 
possible relation will be represented and summarized in the Figure 2 below; we will try to 
predict what should be likely to be observed in this specific situation. This reflection will be 
split up in three smaller parts, where we will (1) present the link between controversy and 
decision-making situations, (2) briefly evoke the link between ambivalence and decision-
making situations, and (3) discuss the relationship between ambivalence and controversy. We 
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will speak of the case where ambivalent individuals have to take a stand on controversial 
issues in a final part. 
 
 2.4.1 Controv ersy  and decision-making 
 Sapolsky (1968) was interested in understanding the voters' behavior on the 
referendum about fluoridation in his comprehensive paper. In the 60's, the United States of 
America started a campaign about fluoridation that was supported by the authorities (such as 
the Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy for instance). Fluoridation is "the addition of a 
fluoride compound to the public water in order to reduce tooth decay in children" (p. 427). 
Fluoridation has repeatedly been discussed for its positive aspects on social health (about 95% 
of the USA population suffered or had suffered from tooth decay according to the article), as 
well as for its economic implications (notably by reducing the national dental bill by a half; 
about $1.5 billion in 1968). However, this campaign became controversial with the 
appearance of the "antifluoridationists" who raised arguments against the introduction of 
fluoride into the public water supply. In fact, they doubted its efficiency on the prevention of 
tooth decays, raised possible health problems (such as the fact that a too high concentration of 
fluoride can cause ailments such as fluorosis or even cancers) and viewed this mass 
medication as going against individual liberty. Despite the evident benefit of such 
implementation, its public acceptance has been quite low. More precisely, 566 on the 952 
held referenda rejected the issue (59.45 %). Sapolsky interpreted this decline as possibly 
being due to two reasons. The first possible reason could be that most people were not enough 
knowledgeable to understand the benefits of this campaign. The second point (the most 
interesting for us) is that people could be concerned about making the wrong choice and 
hence, they voted against the reform in a self-protective way. Mazur and Conant (1978) also 
observed that people who had low knowledge about the issue voted no as a consequence of a 
public controversy (the implementation of a local nuclear waste repository). They 
summarized this behavior as follow: "if there is a possibility that it is dangerous, why take the 
risk?" (p. 236). Hence, it looks like controversy can easily frighten individuals and, as a 
consequence, lead them to vote against a reform. In sum, controversy should be a negative 
predictor of behaviors (relation a in Figure 2). 
  
 2.4.2 A mbiv alence and decision-making 
 We mentioned some of the numerous studies that were interested in studying the link 
between ambivalence and decision-making / behavior (see Chapter 2.1.1) and most of them 
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also observed a negative relationship. Indeed, nearly all of them found that more ambivalence 
toward a behavior led to a less extensive adoption of the behavior (relation b in Figure 2). 
Broëmer (2002) refers to this link as attesting for a "negativity bias". We believe that such 
bias could be tied the abovementioned argument by Mazur and Conant (1974), and the 
importance that people attribute to negative aspects. It has indeed been pointed out that "bad 
is stronger than good" (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) and that 
people are way more cautious of negative events than they are toward positive ones. Hence, 
when people hesitate between doing something and not doing it, they are more likely to 
decide not to do it.  
  
2.4.3 Controv ersy  and ambiv alence 
 The link between controversy and ambivalence has also been briefly discussed in the 
literature. We reported in the empirical sections that controversies associated with attitude 
objects enhanced both its expression and its perception. The existence of a direct link between 
ambivalence and controversies has been recently studied. Stoeckel (2013) observed that elite 
division around Europe yielded more ambivalence for the citizens. The idea of a link between 
controversy and ambivalence is also present in Zhao and Capella (2008). Speaking about 
marijuana (a highly controversial drug in the United States), these authors evoked that the 
high ratio of ambivalent adolescents toward this drug could result from heated debates and 
consequently from a lot of conflicting information over the years about marijuana in society. 
Hence, there could be a positive link between controversies and the subsequent level of 
ambivalence associated with attitude objects (relation c in Figure 2). This reflection is 
reinforced by the work of Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994), who reported that people tend to 
process interesting or involving messages (e.g. controversial) more systematically than less 
interesting or involving ones. However, this link has only been reported once (in Stoeckel, 
2013) and consequently it would require more studies to be confirmed. 
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Figure 2. Representation of the relationship between controversy, ambivalence and decision-
making. 
 
 2.4.4 Controv ersy , ambiv alence and decision-making 
 We did not find any study that focused on controversial issues, ambivalence and 
decision-making (relation d in Figure 2). However, several studies suggest that ambivalent 
individuals could support the right position when they have to decide in a complex situation, 
as they could be well informed on the issue; the right position is conceived as the most 
rational one or the one that is officially promoted. Thus, knowledge could represent a key 
factor in the relationship between controversy, ambivalence and decision-making. Fiol and 
O'Connor (2003), and Weick (1998, 2002, 2004) argued that ambivalence represented a wise 
attitude that could prevent from persistence or bad investments (such as buying an ineffective 
innovation for example). Hence, criticizing social issues could lead to a deeper 
comprehension of the issue and better choices as a consequence. The link between knowledge 
and ambivalence has been reported by Stoeckel (2013) who observed that as objective 
knowledge on Europe increased, the level of ambivalence toward Europe increased. Fabrigar 
et al. (2005) also hypothesized this relationship. In their theoretical paper they wrote "people 
are likely to express little ambivalence when they know very little about an attitude object" 
(pp. 88-89). As a consequence, it seems plausible to expect that ambivalent individuals would 
also support the beneficial initiatives such as in the above-mentioned study on fluoridation. 
Indeed, Sapolsky (1968) observed that people who were knowledgeable on the complex issue 
of fluoridation supported the issue regardless of the controversy.  
Hence, if we consider that ambivalence is positively associated with knowledge, it is 
plausible to think that ambivalent individuals could similarly be wise and make the right 
choice. In spite of this, other studies proposed a negative relationship between ambivalence 
4- General Discussion 
   112
and knowledge. For instance, Citrin and Lucks (2005) proposed to interpret their negative 
effect of the age on ambivalence as the indicating that as knowledge improves across time, 
picking a side on the issue becomes easier. Thus, more knowledge leads to less ambivalence 
in their reasoning. Sawicki et al. (2013) also recently reported a negative link between 
knowledge and ambivalence toward euthanasia in their Experiment 2 (r = -.22). However, 
they only considered "subjective knowledge" in their experiment. This was assessed via a 
single-item that asked the participants to indicate the extent to which they considered to 
"know much" on the issue, on a 7-point Likert scale. However, as ambivalence is linked with 
hesitations, this negative relation could simply result from the feeling that one does not know 
enough in comparison with univalent individuals. Thus, we believe that more studies should 
be devoted to assess the link between ambivalence and knowledge, by both considering the 
feeling of knowledge as well as the objective knowledge.  
 
 3. Practical implications 
3.1 Ambivalence and discomfort 
Ambivalence and discomfort has often been tied up together, notably in decision-
making situations. For instance, van Harreveld et al. (2009b) discussed the "agony of 
ambivalence" that results from such situations. We believe that actually three factors could 
contribute to this feeling of discomfort. First, ambivalent individuals have to neglect one side 
and give more prominence to the other when they decide and this can be quite painful (van 
Harreveld, 2009a; Weisbrode, 2012). It has been demonstrated that deciding leads ambivalent 
individuals to turn their back to the neglected side when they arrive at conclusion, and hence 
that they can fear they may make a wrong decision when they are committing to an issue. 
This fear could be the cause of discomfort. However, we believe that a part of this discomfort 
could also be due to social factors. In fact, the second factor could stem from the fact that it 
has been shown that people are reluctant to express undesirable information (e.g. this has been 
called the "MUM effect" since people tend to be silent, to "keep mum about undesirable 
messages to the recipient"; see Rosen & Tesser, 1970). This effect has also been illustrated in 
Manis, Cornel and Moore (1974) where participants had to hear several talks on marijuana 
legalization and then to summarize it to an audience. They reported that participants 
purposely altered their message accordingly with the attitude of an audience (as either being 
favorable or unfavorable toward a specific topic). In other terms, regardless of what they 
heard, they adapted their message as a function of the audience's attitude. The idea is that 
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people filter the information that they transmit in order to reduce the discrepancy between the 
views of the other and the information contained in the shared message.  
We believe that concern in avoiding unpleasing the others could also affect individuals 
holding ambivalent attitudes when they have to take a stand. The experiments of van 
Harreveld et al. (2009b) provide support for this reasoning. They included three experimental 
conditions in their paradigm: a condition without ambivalence and without choice, one where 
participants read a text that contained both positive and negative aspects about a fictitious law 
(thus, a condition that induces ambivalence) but with no choice, and the third where 
ambivalence was also induced but where participants also had to choose. Right after reading 
the text, participants were invited to write an essay to summarize it. They then had to choose 
if they would defend the law in their text or write in its disfavor. However, for an unknown 
reason, these researchers told their participants that some of the written essays would be 
published in the students’ newspapers of the University of Amsterdam. Hence, if deciding 
represents the most important reason of the discomfort as sustained by these researchers, 
participants could also have been concerned by the possible publication of their essays. In 
other words, they could have apprehended how they will be perceived by the others and 
hence, be torn between agreeing with the proposal and going against it. In such a situation, it 
is indeed quite complicated not to express undesirable information to the others because 
people have no idea of what is desirable (the issue was fictitious). Thus, it is plausible to think 
that individuals holding ambivalent attitudes could feel uneasy when they have to reach a 
conclusion, since for them there is no easy answer. They could consequently be concerned 
about how they will appear in the eyes of others after committing themselves. This could be 
even more complicated on a complex or a controversial issue. 
The third factor that potentially plays a role in the feeling of discomfort relies on the 
social perception of ambivalence. We briefly argued in the introduction that there seems to be 
a human tendency to view the world in dichotomies and to impose a polarity to each part 
(Laponce, 1975; Weisbrode, 2012). A consequence of such tendency is that the opposite poles 
are intuitively considered as mutually exclusive (e.g. the fact that people are positive towards 
an issue implies that they are also less negative towards it) even if this presumed bipolarity is 
not necessarily observed (see Laponce, 1975; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, 
Gardner, & Berntson, 1997). In other terms, people could expect to be able to arrive at stand 
on any issue, and hence ambivalence could be intuitively not likely to happen. The feeling of 
discomfort of ambivalent individuals could thus result from the perception that, in comparison 
with people who affirmed their position, their ambivalence is seen abnormal. Results of Bell 
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& Esses (Study 2) support this reasoning. As a reminder, they obtained the usual response 
amplification only it the condition where ambivalence was perceived as something negative 
(the negative motive condition) but not when ambivalence was perceived as something 
positive (the positive motive condition). Such perception could be reinforced by the fact that 
individuals could be pushed to pick a side in their everyday life. A current advertising 
campaign of Marlboro illustrates this reflection. In this campaign, the company aimed at 
influencing undecided smokers through a motto that says "don't be a maybe, be Marlboro". It 
has been quoted as "one of the most catchy recent cigarette campaign advert" in the 
Frankfurter Rundschau (cited in the Local, 2012). They derived their slogan in numerous little 
sentences such as "maybe never fall in love" or "maybe never made history". We believe that 
such campaign illustrates how being undecided could be socially not well perceived and that 
individuals should rather pick a side. Furthermore, our studies revealed that ambivalence was 
socially perceived as bad on non-complex and consensual cases. It is consequently possible to 
think that, indeed, ambivalent individuals feel that their ambivalence is abnormal, which 
could contribute to their feeling of discomfort when they have to make up their mind on 
consensual issues.  
However, if there is indeed a social pressure that would make people reach a 
conclusion, it could be less likely to be the case of controversial social issues; we observed 
that ambivalent attitudes were more likely to be expressed on controversial attitudes objects, 
and as well that they were positively perceived in terms of social utility. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to replicate van Harreveld et al.'s study (2009a) by considering both 
controversial and non-controversial attitudes objects in order to identify the extent to which 
deciding as well as the concern about the others play a role in the ambivalent individuals' 
feeling of discomfort. If the perception of ambivalence and the concern of the others are 
generating discomfort, ambivalent individuals should be at pain in decision-making situations 
on both controversial and consensual issues. However, if the social pressure to pick a side is 
responsible of the effect, ambivalent individuals should be less likely to feel uneasy on 
controversial issues in comparison with consensual ones. We would like to mention that only 
the first factor has been taken up in the literature so far. This question could be tackled by a 
2X2 experiment where participants would either have to defend a point of view or not on 
either a controversial or a consensual issue. We would predict that ambivalent individuals 
should feel discomfort only when they have to arrive at conclusion on a consensual issue. 
Indeed, the feeling of discomfort should be experienced to a lesser extent in the three other 
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conditions (since both choices could be understandable; i.e. a controversial issue; or no choice 
is involved). 
 
3.2 Ambivalence and social norms  
The final point that we would like to raise concerns social norms. During the whole 
dissertation, we mentioned the fact that social norms drive people's attitude, and that they are 
indirectly affecting the perception of ambivalence. If this tends to be true on consensual social 
issues (i.e. where the social norms are clear), we observed a different picture on controversial 
social issues, where individuals who displayed ambivalence were most likely to be valued on 
the dimension of social utility. We believe that this finding deserves to be discussed as 
previous research on social norms observed a valorization of the considered object on social 
utility and not on social desirability; this is true for the norm of internality (Jouffre et al., 
2001), for the preference for consistency (Channouf & Mangard, 1997; Sénémeaud, Mange, 
Gouger, Testé, & Somat, 2011), for intrinsic motivation (Cassignol-Bertrand, Baldet, Louche, 
& Papet, 2006), the belief in a just world (Alves & Correia, 2010), individualism and 
collectivism (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Green, 2006), and organizational citizenship 
behavior (Esnard & Jouffre, 2008), to name a few.  
The dimension of social utility refers to the social worth of the individual (Beauvois & 
Dubois, 2009). In other terms, this dimension gauges the extent to which individuals meet the 
requirements of the society, and hence the extent to which people is likely to access a high 
hierarchical social position (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). The fact that ambivalent attitudes 
have been valued on the dimension of social utility supports the idea according to which 
individuals who express ambivalence may be evaluated as the ones who have the highest 
chances of success in social life. Moreover, this finding also suggests that the expression of 
ambivalence could be "normative" when people deal with controversial attitude objects. 
Cambon et al. (2006) indeed reported that individuals who were the most normative were also 
the most described with terms associated with social utility (such as authoritative or 
ambitious). In other terms, our results imply that people should display ambivalent attitudes in 
order to be positively perceived when they deal with controversial issues. We believe that 
future research should focus more thoroughly on this aspect in order to confirm whether 
indeed ambivalent attitudes are normative when people deal with controversial complex 
attitude objects. It should also determine the social environments in which the expression of 
ambivalence is valued: for instance, as argued before, it seems interesting to try to replicate 
our findings outside university, as university could value critical thinking. We believe that the 
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investigation of the social value of ambivalence on controversial social issues would open 
new avenues for research on attitudinal ambivalence.   
 
 4.4 Conclusion 
Research on ambivalence stemmed from a critique of the bipolar conceptualization of 
attitudes (Scott, 1969; Kaplan, 1972). As a consequence, most studies on ambivalence have 
been conducted in this research tradition: they mostly focused on attitude change and its link 
with behavior or behavioral intentions and all nearly arrived at concluding that univalent 
attitudes should be preferred to them. We believe that this thesis provides support for the idea 
that, as claimed by Thompson, Zanna and Griffin (1995), we should not be indifferent toward 
ambivalence. Indeed, if society could pressure people to pick a side and then to stick to it, it 
seems that before deciding, people could benefit from taking their time and pondering the 
pros and the cons when they deal with a debated attitude object. In other terms, contrarily to 
most of the literature, the fact of not being able to easily pick a side could be profitable when 
the subject of the research deal with complex / controversial attitude objects. Research on 
attitudes should thus systematically include ambivalence measures in their experimental 
paradigm; this would indeed allow a better understanding of the potential positive 
consequences of such type of attitude.   
 
 
4.5 Coda 
We tried to promote a view whereby ambivalence was conceived as socially valued. As a 
conclusion of this dissertation, we would like to quote Weisbrode (2012), whose words 
perfectly summarize the idea that we tried to defend.  
    
    "For no matter how much we feel that making a clear choice, even the wrong 
choice, and putting our best energies behind it is always better than vacillating, ambivalence may in the end get 
the better of us"  
         Weisbrode (2012, p. 45) 
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 Instructions of the first research line 
 
Standard condition 
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Self-enhancement condition 
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Self-depreciation condition 
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 Instructions of the second research line 
 
Vous allez devoir évaluer trois profils de réponses , fournis par des participant(e)s, 
lors d’une étude antérieure  décrite ci-dessous : 
 
 
 
 
 
Description de l’étude antérieure 
 
 
Nous avons conduit une étude dans laquelle les étudiants étaient invités au laboratoire 
pour participer à une étude portant sur le recyclage. Ainsi, en remplissant les items ci-
dessous, les individus devaient nous indiquer leur attitude globale quand au recyclage. 
 
Ci-après, nous vous présentons trois profils de réponses correspondant aux différents 
profils de réponse que nous avons observé suite à cette étude.  
 
Votre tâche sera d’évaluer les réponses de trois participant(e)s différent(e)s. 
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Ci-dessous, nous vous présentons les réponses scannées d’un(e) premier(-ière) 
participant(e) .  
 
________________________ 
RÉPONSE DU PARTICIPANT n°1  
 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Au regard de ses réponses, à quel point le participant n°1 vous semble-t-il être quelqu’un… : 
   Pas du tout               Complètement 
 
…de sympathique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…de doué 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…ayant de fortes chances de réussir ses études 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…d’agréable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…d’appréciable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…d’intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… de compétent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… d'aimable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Pilot Study  
 
Perception of controversy / consensus 
 
A propos de X, il y a: 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
Consensus              ( )           ( )          ( )           ( )          ( )           ( )          ( ) Controverse 
Pas débat              ( )           ( )          ( )           ( )          ( )           ( )          ( ) Débat 
Un accord général          ( )           ( )          ( )           ( )          ( )           ( )          ( ) Polémique 
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